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EPIGRAPH 
I think I can see Adult Education deriving great benefit from 
the theorizing and research of ths "change theorists" now so 
active. I see our technology being enriched by increased 
understanding of the process of individual, institutional, 
and social change, and especially of the phenomenon of 
resistance to change and strategies for helping with change. 
Finally I see an enlargement of the definition of the clientele 
of Adult Education away from a primary focus on individuals qua 
individuals toward a concern with institutions, communities, 
and even larger social systems. I see us Adult Educators 
becoming increasingly concerned with improving educative 
quality of total environments and increasingly skillful in 
planning programs that will accomplish this end. 
Malcolm S. Knowles 
Professor and Philosopher of Adult Education 
Adult Leadership 
February 1967 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of LB-722 in 1959, the State of Nebraska 
embarked on one of the most extensive and challenging adult education 
programs of the past decade. LB-722 established the Nebraska Agri-
cultural Products Industrial Utilization Research Program (Nebraska 
Program) which in the course of its ambitious life undertook the 
re-education, first of Nebraska's production-oriented agricultural 
citizens, and then of other agricultural states and the Federal 
Government. Seen as an adult education program, the Nebraska Program 
clearly represented the kind of "enlargement of the definition of the 
clientele of adult education" proposed by Malcolm Knowles. This was 
adult education moving "away from a primary focus on individuals qua 
individuals toward a concern also with institutions, communities and 
even larger social systems." It was education functioning within and 
concerned with a total environment, an environment whose production-
oriented values, and whose success in living up to those values, had 
back-fired resulting in huge and embarrassing agricultural surpluses 
which depressed the market value of agricultural commodities, reducing 
the agriculture worker's standard of living and his status in the eyes 
of his fellow citizens. 
Insofar as the Nebraska Program attempted to change values and 
attitudes it also functioned as a change agent, finding itself 
increasingly preoccupied with lithe phenomenon of resistance to change 
and strategies for helping with change." Resistance to change was 
rooted in generations of emphasis on production and production 
1 
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research. Supporters of the Nebraska Program were convinced that 
utilization research was the solution to agriculture's problems: the 
Program's educational objective was thus a reordering of research 
priorities and an attenuation of the produce-more ethic. The admin-
istrators who undertook this education effort had a firm precedent in 
the success that agricultural societies, institutes, and agencies have 
had in the education of the public for agricultural production, a 
success which culminated in the establishment of the nation's colleges 
of agriculture: 
The local and regional agricultural societies which began 
appearing after the American Revolution to educate in agricul-
tural production through printed materials, contests, fairs, 
and discussion • • • were also becoming more aware of the 
possibilities of enlisting government aid •••• The societies 
reached their peak in 1861 and began to wane in favor of 
farmers' institutes which ••• provided direct instruction in 
technological improvements in farming. • • • The establishment 
of a federal Department of Agriculture and the passage of the 
Land Grant Act provided federal support for colleges to teach 
agriculture LProductio~.l 
The size of its clientele and its role as change agent in a 
total socio-economic environment were not the only things which 
distinguished the Nebraska Program. The Program was also dis tin-
guished by the fact that it was administered, not by a traditional 
educational institution, but by an agency of a state government (the 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture), and by the fact that it saw the 
State's educational institutions as part of its clientele: 
production-oriented like the state's citizens, resistant to change, 
committed to maintaining the status quo vis-a-vis agricultural 
research. This view of the state's educational institutions as candi-
dates for remedial education got the Program into difficulties with 
the University of Nebraska. In particular, the University and its 
supporters in the State Legislature contended that an educational/ 
research program in a traditional College of Agriculture area ought 
to be administered by the College of Agriculture. There was a 
heated exchange over the subject of who should administer the Program 
(a state agency or the University) when LB-722 was debated in the 
legislature, and partisans of the University continued to be vocal 
critics of the idea of state agency education throughout the life of 
the Program. 
The Program's name--Nebraska Agricultural Products Industrial 
Utilization Research Program--is misleading. It sounded, not like an 
educational program, but like a research and development program. In 
fact, the Nebraska Program was originally conceived as a research and 
development program designed to find new uses for agricultural 
products, and although Program administrators came to see the 
Program's principal business as education, Nebraska citizens and 
their representatives in the State Legislature never ceased to hope 
tha t the Program would produce marketable produc ts. This misunder-
standing about Program goals was to. create problems, particularly in 
the area of Program evaluation: seen as an education program 
designed to change attitudes and to reorder priorities in agricul-
tural research, the Nebraska Program was a great success; seen as a 
research and development program, it was disappointing (only one 
product got to the marketing stage). 
Although the agricultural surpluses which gave rise to the 
Nebraska Program have gradually disappeared, the educative work of 
3 
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the Program will be of interest to tho·se in the field of adult 
education who are engaged in programs of similar scope, or who are 
involved in education programs conducted by governmental agencies. 
The Program's problems and omissions, no less than its scope and 
daring, are instructive; in the judg~ent of this investigator, the 
Nebraska Program provided an exciting laboratory for testing the 
principles of adult education on a large population, and stands as a 
model for programs of similar scope and intent. 
CHAPTER 1 
AGRICULTURE'S PLIGHT 
It has been widely held that the American democracy sprang 
full-flowered from the soil, that the- family farm has provided the 
backbone of the nation, and that the farmer is the guardian of the 
American way of life. This belief has acquired the force of a myth--
the agrarian myth--and the political consequences of widespread 
acceptance of this myth are mammoth. It is, for example, generally 
acknowledged that the most successful "lobby" in the United States has 
been the Farm Bloc. According to C. Wright Mills in The ~ Elite: 
It has been so successful that it is difficult to see it as an 
independent force acting upon the several organs, especially 
with the Senate, in which, due to the peculiar geographic 
principie of representation, it is definitely over-
represented. l 
The same has been true in most state legislatures. 
Agriculture has been an American giant, not only with regard 
to the political power it has wielded, but in almost every sector of 
the national life. This stature is not unmerited; American agri-
culture has advanced more in the past fifty years than in all prior 
years. of United States history.2 It has kept pace with other 
industries in improvements and technological developments, especially 
in the production area. 
Moreover, although recent years have witnessed a migration 
away from the farm as a means of family livelihood, agriculture 
employed an estimated 7.1 million farm workers in 19603--and five 
5 
million in 1970, more than the transportation, public utilities, steel 
and auto industries combined. If the industries directly related to 
agriculture are included in the picture, an even larger employment 
figure results. 
The investment in agriculture, at the beginning of the 1960's 
equaled 200 billion dollars, representing 21,300 dollars per agricul-
tural employee and 15,900 dollars per manufacturing worker. The 
figure 200 billion dollars was equal to three-fourths the value of the 
assets of all corporations in the United States or three-fourths of 
the market value of all corporate stocks on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
Agriculture has been most familiar in its role as producer. 
However, the record shows that the farmer was also a good customer. 
In 1959-60 he purchased 25.5 billion dollars of the goods and services 
of other producers, other industries. 
Fourteen billion dollars went for the same things urban people 
buy--food, clothing, furniture, appliances. 
Two and one-half billion dollars went for new equipment. (As 
contrasted with the primary iron and steel industry which 
spent only one billion dollars in 1959 for equipment and new 
plants.) 
Three and one-half billion dollars went for fuel, lubricants, 
and maintenance. (Thereby direc:ly aiding agriculture's 
chief industrial product competitor, petroleum, which was a 
heavy spender for research and development of products.) 
Additional agriculture dollars purchased 320 million pounds 
of rubber.4 
The agriculture industry served as a creator of employment 
indirectly as well as directly.5 Four of ten jobs in private 
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employment were related to agricultu·re, resulting from the ten 
million people required to store, transport, process and mechandise 
agricultural products and the six million jobs required to supply the 
farm. In addition, agriculture was a taxpayer, channeling into public 
funds one and one-third billion dollars in farm real estate taxes, 
twenty-five billion dollars in personal property taxes and one and 
one-fourth billion dollars in income taxes. 
American agriculture extended its influence beyond the 
national boundaries. Agriculture held the distinction of being the 
world's largest exporter,. with 65 million of 321 million harvested 
acres going for export; (equal to the combined cropland of Nebraska, 
Iowa and Kansas). In 1960, 4.8 billion dollars in farm products was 
exported. This power was exerted in the cause of both peace and war. 
Agricultural exports relieved hunger and promoted economic growth in 
newly developing areas of the world. For example, United States 
wheat made five billion loaves of bread a year in India. Agriculture 
therefore became a significant tool in dealing with nations, the goal 
being stable governments through economic well-being and a full 
stomach. Agriculture entered the arena of war when the United States 
bartered farm products for strategic defense materials--more than one 
billion dollars worth from 1954 to 1962. 
So stood the giant agriculture, where output per man hour 
increased by six and one half percent per year in the 1960's, while 
output in non-agricultural industry increased by only two percent per 
year in the early 1960's and actually decreased during the late 
1960's; where one hour of labor produced four times the food and crops 
7 
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as in 1919-1921, allowing one farm· worker to produce enough food for 
himself and 25 others. Crop production was 65 percent higher per acre 
in the 1960' s. 
Unfortunately for agriculture and its workers, and in the long 
run for the nation and its taxpay~rs, the above trends in agriculture 
bode ill rather than good. Nationally, minus signs began appearing 
with increasing frequency in the farmer's bookkeeping. And it was 
the little man, the small farmer who could least afford the losses, 
who got hurt first and usually the worst--and he was quite numerous, 
as indicated by the data below. In 1960 agriculture with 3.7 million 
independent producers had the following record: 
1,638,000 farms or 44.2% of total farms sold less than $ 2,500 
617 ,000 farms or 16.77. of total farms sold between $ 2,500-$4,999 
653,000 farms or 17.7% of total farms sold beuveen $ 5,000-$9,999 
794,000 farms or 21. 47. of total farms sold more than $10,0006 
Of those farms selling more than 10,000 dollars of products, only 
102,143 farms, or two percent of the total, had sales totaling more 
than 40,000 dollars. 
A drop in the proportion of farm personal income from 
7.17 percent to 3.86 percent of the total national personal income 
7 
was recorded between 1950 and 1960. During that same period, with 
agricultural products going largely into food uses, the national rate 
of expenditure for food as compared to total personal consumption 
expenditure dropped from 30.6 percept to 26.6 percent. This took 
place even though food costs rose less since the Second World War 
than most other items in the cost-of-living index: 
9 
All items 27 .5% rise 
Rent 45.7% rise 
Medical care 59.970 rise 
All food 21. 2'7. r~se8 
Farm food - 12.07. rl.se 
The farmer got none (no rebate) of this increase in cost for the food 
he produced. In fact, he received 1~ percent less for the farm food 
"market basket" than he did in the 1940's. This accounted for the fact 
that the prices of farm grown food had risen only 12 percent although 
9 processing and marketing costs had risen 36 percent. For example, 
the farmer received in 1960: 
39¢ of $1 for all food 
2c for the corn in a 26¢ box of cornflakes 
2¢ for the wheat in a 20e loaf of bread 
ge for the oranges in a 23¢ can of orange juice 
27¢ fClr the cotton in a $4 shirt lO 
Taxes paid by the farmers have already been noted. The low 
income tax figure as compared with the property tax figure and the 
number of farm people is indicative of the farmer's diminished income. 
The average small farmer netted an average of 986 dollars a year, and 
of that figure 329 dollars came from non-farm sources. This left a 
meager 657 dollars from purely farm operations. These figures 
appear even more meager when compared with the non-farm population per 
capita income of 2,282 dollars (including 18 dollars per person from 
the agriculture industry). The wide discrepancy in farm and non-farm 
incomes can be even better seen in a comparison of average wages: 82 
cents per hour for the farmer compared with an average of 2.14 dollars 
per hour in food marketing and a'2.29 dollars per hour average in the 
factory. These were the statistics which briefly told a story with a 
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complicated plot and an unfortuna fe ending. 
The experience of the State of Nebraska can be considered as 
a case study exemplary of agriculture's problems. Nebraska was part 
of the larger picture. Being located in the fertile Midwest, most of 
Nebraska's history had been connected with the tilling of the soil. 
During the first half of the 20th Century most of her citizens lived 
in rural areas, gaining their livelihood from gambling with the 
weather, fighting the insects and weeds, and more and more often 
winning the battle until graineries filled to overflowing. By 1970 
there were still only two cities in the state, Lincoln and Omaha, 
which were classed as metropolitan and, as might be anticipated, their 
businesses and industries were linked to agriculture. 
Lincoln and Omaha gained in population during the 1960's at the 
expense of the rural areaS and the small towns. Farmers left the land 
in increasing numbers, adding themselves to the work force in the 
cities. The number of farms in Nebraska dropped from 121,000 in 1940 
to 50,000 in 1970, while total acreage in these farms showed a gain 
from 47,344,000 acres to 47,956,000 during the same time period. 
The question arose, what had caused these individuals to move 
from areas where actual tillable land had increased, where more 
families might have earned a living, to the city where the farmer is 
classified as "unskilled" and adds to the ranks of the unemployed? 
The full answer requires consideration of many variables, all of 
which contributed to the farmer's plights, and anyone of which might 
have been considered its prime cause. One of the primary factors, and 
11 
the one which is the focus of this research, is the accumulation, at 
this time, of tremendous agricultural surpluses. It was this 
so-called "surplus" of harvested farm crops which, among other 
factors, had contributed to a lower income and standard of living for 
the average United States farmer. This "surplus" was in turn the 
result of a number of factors, chief among which were high production 
and under-utilization of farm crops. And the answer to that 
situation, as it was in the effort to increase American agricultural 
production, was education--but utilization education. 
Both the Democratic and Republican parties had attacked the 
problem on the federal level by means other than education, but 
programs of production control and restricted land usage only brought 
charges of "bad planning." A lack of ways to dispose of surplus 
crops on hand brought the same charge. Meanwhile, production 
continued to outstrip utilization. 
This was not the first time the nation had faced such a 
problem. Crop surpluses caused concern as early as the post-World 
War I period (1920's). In the 1950's and 1960's agriculture again 
. began to feel an acute need to expand its markets or at least to halt 
their gradual 10ss.11 Both periods of cost-price squeeze were 
aftermaths of wars which had turned all efforts of industry and agri-
culture to production. During the 1950's and early 1960's, fear of a 
third world war led to further stockpiling of "grain reserves." The 
balance between production and consumption was upset. Even though the 
nation had a growing population and rising standard of living, the 
farm population's income began to lose pace. 
12 
By 1960, Nebraska's total personal income was three-fourths of 
one percent of the United States total personal income. Total 
Nebraska farm income in 1960 amounted to 2.8 percent of the 
United States farm income. The average Nebraska farm net income for 
1960 was one thousand eighty-eight d?11ars.12 This situation, and 
what was seen as rural opposition to progressive change, moved one of 
her more renowned native sons to label Nebraska a "depressed area. ,,13 
Such name-calling was unfortunate, for the farmer like every other 
workman lived by the philosophy: To have more is to produce more in 
order to sell more. The Nebraska farmer relied upon production 
research and education to attain his goal of "having more." Such 
research and education gave him fertilizers, irrigation techniques, 
crop hybrids, and farming methods which offset federal production 
14 
controls and caused record yields to be grown on less land. The 
result was that farm production consistently outran the capacity or 
inclination of the nation to consume farm products, thus creating the 
exact problems industry knew would afflict the nation if advertising 
could not keep the nation's consumer market for manufactured goods 
constantly increasing. The Nebraska Department of Agriculture's 1960 
Biennial Report stated the average agricultural worker's plight well: 
The regrettable fact is that the family farm, producer of 
many great Americans and moulder of the Midwestern character, 
can no longer support the farm family. The spread between 
farm produce prices and the cost of their production has 
become un-spread and is squeezing the economic life out of the 
small farm operator. Faced with the continued prospect of 
dwindling income, thousands ~re selling out and taking their 
chances with the towns and cities. Many are leaving the agri-
cultural states altogether, transporting their education, 
acquired talents, and personal capabilities to other areas. 
The family farm is caught in change, consolidation into 
larger, frequently huge work units employing machinery and 
methods too costly for the small operator, and which 
guarantee continuance of surpluses of major crops, further. 
depressing the market. is 
13 
The urban population could not ignore the situation. Whatever 
affected the farmer inevitably had its effect upon the urban 
dweller. In his move to the cities, the farmer created new problems 
for an already booming urban population. Civic leadership was called 
upon to provide utilities, schools, homes, jobs, law enforcement, and 
living room for a segment of the population considered "unskilled." 
All this in the face of an American society which had become 
primarily urban-industrialized in composition and which was beginnIng 
to spawn urban dwellers, intellectuals, and political represen-
tatives who looked down upon agriculture, its workers and its 
problems. This situation was aggravated by a Supreme Court decision 
ordering reapportionment of state legislatures, so long dominated by 
rural influences. The only possible hope was to convince the urban 
dweller that the situation required a united attack. It was 
possible the pendulum would swing back again someday. Perhaps a 
catastrophic event could bring the nation to a greater dependence 
upon the farmer again. But, as one student of the situation 
observed: 
••• it is going to be difficult to get the land out of the 
hands of a few large landholders in which our farmland is 
coming to rest, if and ",hen the population wants to return 
to the farm; to out-migrate from the city back to the 
farm. l6 . 
What to do about agriculture then? An increase in exports 
seemed unlikely as other countries became more self-sufficient and 
14 
such enti ties as the European Common 'Market arose. Ye t Americans 
appeared to agree that their industries, agriculture included, 
should maintain a high level of efficiency and quality, therefore 
legitimatizing the farmer's continued belief in a high level of 
production. The prime question forpgriculture then became: could 
agriculture develop profitable industrial markets in the national or 
international sphere capable of absorbing enough of the excess farm 
products to minimize, possibly even to eliminate, the need for costly 
" . d I' d"" t"?17 restrlctlons, supports an surp us- lsposlng opera ions. 
These desperately~needed industrial markets lay at the end of 
a long, hard road paved with large amounts of money. Turning raw 
agricultural materials into manufactured goods required a concentrated 
program of research, development, and marketing, plus acceptance by the 
public and cooperation by the manufacturing industry. Unfortunately, 
the manufacturing industry had assisted in the decline of agriculture. 
Most of its new products had been based on non-agricultural raw 
materials. This was a reversal of a past practice. Industry 
increased its investment in research by at least three billion a year 
from 1951 to the beginning of the Nebraska Program--three percent of 
its gross sales (see Figure 1). By utilizing its big, well-
integrated units and large resources of men and money, it produced a 
flood of new and improved products--fabrics, plastics, building 
materials, surface coatings, drugs, detergents and chemicals. Most of 
these products had non-agricultural ral, material compositions. This 
was, however, not entirely industry's fault. The reason that it 
turned to such materials as petroleum for compositional bases was the 
E:IGURE 1 15 
INDUSTRY'S INVEST!1ENT IN RESEARCH 18 
Total of $14.5 billion spent in 1961 or 3% of gross sales. (Compare 
$375 million spent by agriculture in 1961 or 1% of gross sales.) 
Industry: $14.5 Billion 
Agriculture: $375 Million 
FIGURE 2 
AGRICULTURE'S INVESTHENT IN RESEARCH19 
-Of $375 million spent in 1961 for agricultural research, 40% ~ent 
for basic research and development and only 5% for utilization 
research~ 
$148 Million 
Basic Research and Development 
$16-18 !1illion 
Utilization Pesearch 
$192 Million 
Other Agricultural Research 
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same reason any producer or manufacturer changes his practice, the 
economy and efficiency of new materials and processes. Agriculture, 
in other words, made the mistake of placing too much emphasis on 
production research and allowed industry to out-compete it in the 
field of utilization research and ~evelopment. Such segments of 
industry as petroleum made good use of the three billion dollars 
that industry added each year to the money set aside for research and 
development of new products. In contrast, agriculture's expen-
diture for its total research program reached only 375 million 
dollars by 1961--about one percent of its gross sales. Most of this 
figure went for production research, with 130 million dollars going 
for "basic" research and development and no more than 16 million dollars 
to 18 million dollars going for "applied" utilization research (see 
Figure 2). 
It can be clearly seen that emphasis was lacking in the area of 
agricultural utilization research and development. Nor had this 
imbalance gone unnoticed: 
Under the surface, but potent politically, is the feeling that 
too much money has gone to the industry and its research 
institutions on the East and West Coasts of the United States. 
The Midwest and the South, in particular, feel slighted. 20 
There were rumblings in the Congress about looking into the situation. 
It was evident, however, that increased allotments of federal funds for 
agricultural research would not allay agriculture's problems unless 
those funds Were clearly earmarked for utilization research and 
educa tion. 
The inpouring of government money for production and 
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development during the two world wars gave industry a good base from 
which to advance its utilization research after the wars. Agri-
culture in contrast devoted most of its energy only to production 
during the wars, and to production research after. Such utilization 
research as was carried on by agric~lture (that is, the development of 
new war materials) resulted in such discoveries as penicillen, nylon 
from corn cobs, synthetic rubber, frozen fruit juice concentrates, 
and wash and wear fabrics. For some reason, agriculture failed to 
exercise the foresight that experience should have engendered. It 
failed to press its advantage, to exploit its opportunity and 
therefore to meet the competition industry presented in the field of 
utilization research and development. 
Industry had taken the competitive initiative and gained the 
advantage. With its billion dollar expenditures during past years it 
had researched synthetics which had captured the natural fibers market 
from cotton, wool, flax, and silk. Industrial plastiCS, films, and 
adhesives had shouldered aside heretofore agriculture-supplied 
products. Two out of three tallow and fat soaps had been replaced by 
·non-degradable, petroleum-based detergents. Agricultural oils for 
cooking, painting, and lubricating were bypassed. Two out of three 
pairs of shoes were made from leather substitutes, with three out of 
three a distinct possibility: 
Last week !April 6, 196~ the tumultous United States market-
place was deciding the fate of a brand-new material--man-made 
leather [Corfauy for shoes. And the ne," synthetic looked 
like a winner for the giant E. I. Du Pont Company. The 
material itself is an acknowledged triumph of sophisticated 
chemistry and cost approximately $15 million to develop. 
This event was followed by the Arnan Industries, Incorporated, 
all-plastic shoe. The $700 million-a-year tanning industry 
is, of course, challenging all claims of both companies. 2l 
Industry, because of its high monetary rewards, was able to 
attract the best scientific minds. It was able to obtain 
increasingly better results from costly programs which produced 
products worth the risk and effort. As a consequence it was able to 
also hold prices stable, resulting in consumer acceptance of new 
products. In addition, an adequate, steady flow of high quality 
18 
supplies made manufacture and distribution easy within well-integrated 
industry. 
Industrialists attested to the efficacy of their utilization 
and new product research programs. Frank Pace, Jr., Chairman of the 
General Dynamics -Corporation, was quoted as saying that almost 90 
22 percent of his company's current products did not exist a decade ago. 
According to David Sarnoff, Chairman of Radio Corporation of America, 
four out of every five dollars of RCA's record 1960 sales came from 
products that Were researched and developed after World War 11. 23 
Agriculture, for its part, reacted sluggishly when it 
awakened to its lag of six to eight years in utilization/new product 
research and development. It found, as is pointed out in the chapter 
on the Nebraska Agricultural Utilization Research Program, that there 
was usually a further lag of five to seven years or more before money 
24 
spent on utilization research began to show up in new developments. 
It found that, even though it possessed the same raw materials and 
capacity as industry, the risks of new product development were 
mounting, and that industries on the decline, as was the case with 
, 
\ 
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agricul ture, assumed grea ter risks. It became evident tha t the 
statement, "Just stop your research for a year while your competitors 
. h 'II b d d ,,25 h d' . f h keep rlg t on--you e ea, a serl0US meanlng or t e 
production-oriented, economically sick agriculture industry which had 
failed to give adequate emphasis to ~tilization research. Agriculture 
needed massive aid and superhuman effort to even begin to compete with 
companies which could devote 300 man-years of labor, 50 million 
dollars for development, and two million dollars for promotion of one 
26 
new product. Agriculture, in contrast, would be mightily taxed to 
absorb a loss on even one of its new utilization research products, 
by the failure of even one product to gain industrial and consumer 
acceptance, that.is, markets which return the investment. 
Before agriculture could even think about competing with 
industry for markets, she had to exert herself to catch up. Until 
she did, the pendulum would continue to swing to industry's advantage. 
Agriculture was only beginning to realize these facts of life of the 
industrial-technological age. But there were a few who saw the 
problem clearly: "Industry has done a ,,,onderful job in the field of 
. utilization research. Given the opportunity, agriculture can produce 
27 the same results~1I 
Individuals who had foreseen the need for agricultural utili-
zation research programs, such as those who initiated and admin-
istered Nebraska's educational and lobbying program in 1959, argued 
that agriculture had all it needed to initiate and press competition. 
It had the ra", materials, capacity, and potential. Petroleum and 
20 
starch provide a good example of the competition between industrial 
synthetics and agricultural raw materials. Industry increasingly used 
petroleum as the basic raw material for a majority of its synthetic 
materials. These materials were then converted into consumer 
products, invading markets heretofore dominated by agricultural raw 
materials. Petroleum took over dominance of such fields as 
detergents, plastics, explosives, adhesives, germicides, pharma-
ceuticals, resins, soaps, and cooling and lubricating fluids. This 
happened even though the raw materials produced by the farmer were 
made of the same chemical components as most non-agricultural 
materials, including petroleum. Coal and petroleum were, after all, 
plants that died and decayed long ago. 28 It followed that the agri-
cultural plants now existing possessed the same characteristics and 
potential as their predecessors. There could be no other conclusion 
than that research must make the difference. If farm products could 
be modified and tailored to particular needs through utilization 
research, new products would mean new consumer demand and more markets 
for agriculture. 
The ingredient that had been lacking was the realization on 
the part of agriculture that agriculture as an industry had to do 
the initiating, the pressing, instead of merely trying to maintain 
the markets it possessed--or those it had traditionally possessed in 
the past. Agriculture seemed concerned only ,"ith maintaining the 
status quo, and deploring the loss of markets to industrial 
substitutes. In a few words, what was needed was education of the 
'·5 
farm and non-farm public in the benefits of utilization and utili-
zation research in agriculture~ Such an effort required imagination 
and aggressiveness. 
Except during World Wars 1, and principally II, materials from 
the farm had not had intensive, systematic, utilization research 
emphasis. 
Because in the past food was never abundant, because manpower 
had to be released from farms to run industry, because great 
wars created great necessities, most research emphasis and 
funds in agriculture have gone to production research. 29 
The philosophy of "to produce more crops is to have more income" had 
been religiously followed by the producers of agricultural raw 
materials, with disposal and utilization supposedly taking care of 
themselves through routine marketing procedures. 
As this system began to fail, responsibility for assistance in 
the disposal of agricultural products was viewed as a problem of 
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national scope and therefore an area of proper concern for the Federal 
Government. This was not without precedent. The government's 
subsidies (a main cause of agriculture's bad public image), purchases, 
storage programs and gratis handouts of agricultural products had 
increasingly made it the farmer's agent, researcher, salesman and 
public relations agency. But this w~s also true of industry, at least 
in the area of research. In this crucial area, much of the time the 
Federal Government found itself financing both sides of the compe-
titian: "Much of today' s Lindus tria g research is paid for by 
government. About $3 out of every $5 of such spending is paid from 
the federal treasury, even though the actual work is done by 
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industry.,,30 The main problem with the Federal Government's handling 
of this area of agricultural affairs lay in its continued emphasis on 
production--production research and education--and a lack of emphasis 
on utilization research and education. The State of Nebraska, for 
one, grew increasingly disturbed oyer this fact and began to voice its 
concern: as in "The current program of the USDA, invaluable in so 
many ways, indicates an apparent reluctance to conduct applied LUtili-
zatiow research in areas competitive with other industries.,,31 
The USDA and the colleges of agriculture had been agri-
culture's champions in the production research efforts of the past 
years. Within these agencies' jurisdiction were laboratories and test 
plots used for agriculture's advancement. The USDA handled additional 
duties for the agriculture industry in the fields of education, infor-
mation, and administration of agricultural affairs on a national and 
international basis. The agriculture colleges, with their campus 
~acilities, extension programs and experiment stations also handled 
extensive education and information programs e However, questions 
were beginning to be asked: Had these institutions had a clear 
enough view of what agriculture should be doing? Had they put effort 
in the areas necessary to keep agriculture competitive with industry? 
Had they kept pace in the Technological Age? Had they responded to 
change and adopted the successful methods of industry? Had they 
recognized that agriculture must be progressive? A negative answer in 
the first instance implied negative answers in the others and 
perceptive individuals maintained that a negative answer must indeed 
be given. 
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The charge was that the USDA was not competitive and, though it 
had some programs and labs in the area, its philosophy, history, and 
current operations demonstrated a definite lack of utilization. 
research emphasis. The charge directed against the colleges of 
agriculture was that they were to~ conservative and were almost 
totally production and production research oriented. The loss of 
markets and the building of huge surpluses were the only results to be 
expected of the failure to change emphasis from production to compe-
titive utilization and new products research as the battle was joined 
with industry. It was said that agriculture--its farmers, its 
government agencies, its schools, its laboratories, its represen-
tatives--needed a push, or at least needed some kind of help to get 
moving in the direction of competitive research. The institutions and 
agencies, of course, assumed a defensive stance, especially when it 
was suggested that they modify their traditional emphasis. 
Against this strong, long-established tide stood an increasing 
number of people in agriculture led by a few far-seeing individuals. 
These leaders, using their positions,their voices, and the 
instrument of education which had proved so effective in production 
efforts, began to press for the change of emphasis needed in the 
industry of agriculture. They began to seek legislative measures to 
implement their convictions. Such leaders faced a problem in 
rallying necessary support from a loosely organized farm industry and 
its population. But without this support, legislators could and 
would not act. If the farmer himself remained unconvinced of the 
results of utilization research, he would leave his representatives 
in Congress--those who controlled the large USDA research estab-
lishment--open to arguments and influence which have inevitably 
resulted in inaction. Many Congressmen from agricultural areas, 
despite good intentions, had faced a Congress deadlocked by such 
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arguments, pulled all ways. In addition, both groups, farmers and 
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representatives, faced United States Secretaries of Agriculture whose 
office traditionally resisted attempts to alter its priorities. A few 
Nebraska private citizens, various congressional representatives from 
Nebraska, and fellow senators and representatives from the Midwest and 
South had tried time and again to shake Congress out of its inaction 
on the agricultural utilization research issue. But lack of under-
standing by even_their own people at home hampered such a cause. 
Reliance upon the Federal Government and its subsidies appeared to 
have blinded an industrious people to a chief cause of its ills, and 
so utilization research, which might have been a solution to agri-
culture's plight, remained sidelined. It became apparent that the 
first order of business was an educational, or rather are-educational, 
effort operating on two fronts: the public and the Federal 
. Government (Congress and the USDA). 
In other words, Congress had to be motivated to act by the 
lobbying pressure of a newly informed public. And the USDA had to 
assist it in acting. A change in emphasis could be achieved only 
th h f 1 1 . 1 . 33 roug sound edera egls atlon. 
The Nebraska Program was an initial attempt to educate the 
public and to educate and influence the Federal Government by 
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example. The dramatic "research" program initiated by the state in 
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1959 operated to inform citizens of utilization research's promise in 
the hope that they would in turn exert pressure on the federal 
agencies. But before examining the Nebraska Program in detail, 
congressional action--or inaction--and USDA positions will be 
examined. It will then be possible.~to consider Nebraska's Program in 
the appropriate perspective. 
-p 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONGRESS, THE USDA, AND THE WELSH REPORT 
An overview of the work of Congress and the United States 
Department of Agriculture in the utilization research area illustrates 
why the Nebraska Program was initiated. What follows is an exami-
nation of the support utilization and utilization research received 
from the nation's representatives. Unfortunately, the progress of 
this "cause" had been painfully slow in each chamber of Congress. 
Both the Senate and the House had given consideration to the problem 
of surplus, but neither had been able to agree that utilization 
research was the means by which to alleviate the problem. The House 
Committee on Agriculture had requested a report on the history and 
progress of utilization research and marketing for the past 
seventy-five years, prior to 1954. The resulting information in the 
1 form of the Pace Report was made available to state agencies, 
including state departments of agriculture, for the first time in a 
collected form. This constituted the first comprehensive guide on 
the progress of utilization research and development, and an index for 
detecting duplication of research. 
It was not until 1956 however, that Senator Capehart of 
Indiana with thirty co-sponsors introduced the first utilization 
research and development bill, in the 84th Congress. Its failure to 
pass later prompted him to introduce Senate Bill 724, a duplicate 
p 
measure, into the first session of the'85th Congress. Similar legis-
lation was proposed in the 84th Congress by Senator Curtis of 
Nebraska (S. 2306) and Senator Johnston (S. 3697). The House was 
somewhat slower in introducing such legislation, but once started it 
came up with a multitude of bills: 
H. R. 1050, 
8325, 
9677 , 
13513, 
4923, 6800, 
8326, 8428, 
10099, 11508, 
13605. 2 
6985, 
8539, 
11610, 
8186, 
9192, 
12384, 
8324 
9366 
13305 
All of the above bills were efforts to implement the recommendations 
of a 1957 follow-on study to the ~ Report, the Welsh Report. This 
all-important study was one result of the 84th Congress's 1956 
Agriculture Act. 3 The Act, known officially as Public Law 540, 
contained Section 209 which Senators Carl Curtis of Nebraska and 
Capehart of Indiana had managed to attach during the bill's movement 
through the legislative process. Section 209 established a 
bi-partisan, five-man "President I s Commission on Increased Industrial 
Uses of Agricultural Products" to deal in its own way with the farm 
surplus problem. Specifically the act requested that the commission 
conduct studies of all agriculture crops and products useful or 
potentially useful in industry. It provided for the organization of 
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188 of the nation's leaders in agriculture, industry, and science into 
18 task groups to do the actual grass roots work under the leadership 
of the five-man Commission. J. Leroy Welsh, a prominent Omaha, 
Nebraska businessman--a grain dealer--was appointed as chairman. 
The Commission, after approximately a year of work, submitted 
an Interim Report to the 85th Congress on April 17, 1957. This 
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allowed Congress to begin considering the report before it was 
completed, but in time for legislative action. The final report was 
submitted to Congress on June 15, 1957. Two years later, as a 
congressional committee debated the subject of the report, the 
committee chairman would explain ~hy, during the 22 month time period 
since the report's submission, none of the recommendations had been 
implemented: 
Some may wonder why we are a little late getting into this 
field since the Report was made in 1957. The fact was that 
the Report was made during the latter weeks of the 1957 
session. And during 1958, despite all of the work that was 
done by numerous members of the House and Senate, this 
subject is not yet off the ground •••• Personally, I 
think that is very unfortunate. It is an important subject. 
In my judgment, it offers the only real outlet for American 
agriculture to regain its once prominent position in the 
American economy. I am very happy that at the beginning of 
this session we have been able to get our wheels up and get 
the hearings going. I am hopeful that before the session is 
concluded that even though there are wide differences of 
op~n~on as to what should or should not be done that we will 
corne up with some legislation. 4 
The foregoing comment could be considered an understatement, 
considering the urgent need for action on a national scale and the 
fact that the states had been waiting for federal leadership for many 
. years. What then did the 1957 report recommend to Congress that 
caused endless debate, numerous hearings, and the loss of so much 
time? 
The major findings and recommendations of the final report 
were not much changed from the interim report. It outlined 106 broad 
fields of utilization research and development which had been 
thoroughly researched by the 18 task groups and were considered areas 
where emphasis should be placed. The tone of the report was set by 
statements on the agricultural situation and various comparisons with 
industry and its synthetics. The Commission also stated on behalf of 
agriculture precisely what industrial manufacturers and advertising 
5 
men had long realized about their product markets: 
American farmers have succeeded so well in the necessary 
effort to increase efficiency that they now consistently out-
run the capacity of the economy to consume what they produce. 
To cope with this situation the government has resorted to 
costly programs for restricting land use, controlling 
production, and disposing of surpluses •••• Can the economy 
develop profitable industrial markets capable of absorbing 
excess farm production?6 
The report deplored government control programs which 
attempted to bring the supply and demand situation back into balance, 
primarily because of the cost factor. This criticism had the support 
of most Americans, as of their representatives in Congress. In order 
to eliminate the need for such costly supports, restrictions, and 
surplus-disposal operations, the Commission found that four basic 
needs warranted attention: Admitting that there seemed to be little 
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prospect of a sufficiently large expansion of food markets in the next 
decade to use all the excess, the main need seen by the Commission was 
for a sharp sense at the federal level--lacking so far--or the possi-
bilities inherent in the industrial utilization approach. Obviously, 
education of the public's representatives had priority. Complementing 
this would be an expanded program of fundamental and applied research, 
the second need. Of certain interest to educators, scholars, and 
scientists was the third need, education of the public. Money was to 
be channeled into adult education programs dealing with utilization. 
Some funds for this purpose would be transferred from production 
areas. The use of fellowships, scholarships and grants was projected 
to attract, train and channel scientific talent into the "neglected" 
field of farm product research and development. The fourth need was 
concentrated in the competitive area of product development and 
marketing, a field of high risk in w~ich both agriculture and 
industry had experienced a multitude of failures for every success 
during past years. The Commission saw the need to provide financial 
incentives during development and delicate trial periods. 
The Commission professed to see its report as primarily an 
educational document. Later congressional hearing testimony by 
chairman Welsh bore this out. Its text and recommendations made the 
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following points, later to be utilized by the Nebraska Program and its 
administrators in launching attempts for support: (1) The Commission 
restated the generally accepted feeling on the part of the public 
that the spending of a great quantity of money on education and 
research meant great returns. There were numerous references in the 
Commission7 and Nebraska ProgramS literature to the fact that each 
year industry increased its investment approximately three billion 
"dollars over the past year in the field of education and research and 
development--three percent of its gross sales. While agriculture, 
including federal and state efforts, increased its efforts by 
reinvesting only about one percent of its gross sales. (2) Past 
results of agricultural research were pointed out. The Commission 
reported that 125 processes worked out in federal government agri-
cultural research laboratories during the late 1940's and early 
1950's were in commercial lise. This highlighted the concrete results 
'p 
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that could be obtained from such efforts, but also recorded the small 
number of attempts. It was further emphasized that 300 other 
processes and products awaited commercialization in 1957. The 
Commission appeared to realize, as the Nebraska administrators later 
did, that researching new proces,ses and products was not the hardest 
part of a utilization program. It was the "development" part of the 
program, the commercialization, the selling of processes to industry, 
the selling of products to the public (development of mass markets), 
that required the greater effort. (3) And, of importance to the 
current study, education of the public and education of greater 
scientific manpower in the field of utilization research was 
projected. 
The conclusions the Commission reached in its Report To 
Congress were contained in ten specific recommendations interwoven 
through the report and each backed by commentary. Grouped together 
they were: 
1. The Commission proposes as its first and most "necessary 
recommendation" that the funds for industrial uses 
research be increased to not less than three times the 
amounts currently ($16,145,000) available; and that 
additional sums be provided as herein suggested for 
education programs, new crops research, trial commer-
cializations, development, and incentives. 
2. The Commission recommends that Congress declare as a 
matter of policy the obligation to foster basic research 
in agricultural products and their uses, and that the 
administrators, in the allotment .of funds at their 
disposal, be directed to place appropriate emphasis 
upon research projects having as their objective the 
discovery of new basic ·knm'ledge of farm products. 
3e The Commission recommends that administrators be 
authorized, in addition to using facilities of the 
;;. 
{"Uni ted Sta te::l Department of Agricul ture, land-grant 
educational institutions and experiment stations, to 
contract also with other universities and colleges, non-
profit or profitmaking research organizations, private 
corporations, and foreign institutions especially in 
countries where Public Law 480 funds may not be 
available. 
4. The Commission recommends. that the administrators be 
given authority'to share research costs on specific 
projects with private industries or with other public 
research agencies where in their judgment such sharing 
will bring desirable results economically and 
efficiently. 
5. The Commission recommends that the administrators be 
directed where appropriate to provide research grants, 
student fellowships, scholarships, and similar aids 
which, while accomplishing research projects, will also 
increase the supply of trained scientists. These funds 
should be so allocated that graduate training may be 
strengthened in each of the four major agricultural 
regions. 
6. The Commission strongly recommends that an adequate 
annual investment in research and development for new 
crops be favorably considered along with suitable 
authority to the administrators of the program to provide 
incentives where essential to bridge over the 'awkward' 
stage of establishment. 
7. The Commission recommends that the administrators of the 
industrial utilization and new crops program be 
empowered to enter into appropriate contracts for 
development of research results into trial commercial-
scale operations, and that an adequate proportion of 
funds be authorized to be used for this purpose. 
8. The Commission recommends that the administrators of the 
industrial utilization and new crops program be provided 
with authority and funds to extend suitable incentives 
to farmers or to industry where appropriate to hasten 
the establishment of a new crop or of a new industrial 
use, where such appear likely to lead to durable addi-
tional markets, and for rapid disposal through industrial 
channels of accumulated surpluses. 
9. The Commission recommends that the creation of a non-
partisan Board with five members be made, to be appointed 
by the President by and with the advice and consent of 
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the Senate, one of whom shall be an Assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture; the Board shall be known as the 
Agricultural Research and Industrial Board. 
10. The Commission recommends that 15 percent of the annual 
gross receipts from customs revenues be alloted to the 
administrators of the industrial utilization and new 
crops program for carrying out the proposals herein 
described. Authorization should be provided whereby 
such funds could be carried forward in amounts not to 
exceed $150 million. Continuty of funds will greatly 
improve the ability to plan and execute both research 
and followup actions. 9 
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The above recommendations were important for two reasons. One, 
they served as guidelines for most of the legislation on agriculture 
utilization thereafter sUbmitted to the 85th Congress. Two, they were 
followed to a degree by the State of Nebraska in establishing and 
sustaining its demonstration program. In addition, the body of the 
report documented some of what had and had not been done in the past 
by Congress, the USDA, the colleges, and other agencies and individ-
uals in the area of agricultural utilization research. If later 
testimony and public statements by Commission members could be 
believed, the Commission in its writings strove to be non-critical of 
the USDA and the way it administered its research and education 
programs. However, criticism did show through in its recommendations 
and in the reasons cited for the Commission's report. The very fact 
that such recommendations were necessary implied criticism of 
existing practices under the guise of constructive proposals. In 
addition, the Commission Chairman, J. Leroy Welsh, at first made a 
determined effort to remain uncritical of the USDA and Congress when 
he was questioned before congressional committees in 1957-59. Later 
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this man, whose influence as a prominent Omaha grain dealer could be 
seen in the report by the stress placed on using grain to make 
alcohol, was to become more vocal as utilization legislation bogged 
down in Congress. He began using every opportunity in speeches and in 
the press to point out publicly not only the virtues of agricultural 
utilization research, but the express failure of Congress and the 
USDA in this field. 
The finished report itself, after being submitted to Congress 
by Senator Carl Curtis of Nebraska, was quickly routed into committee 
for consideration. Its first airing was before the House Agriculture 
Subcommittee on Research and Extension in August 1957. The report 
was read before the Subcommittee as a matter of procedure. It was 
duly explained and some routine discussion resulted. The Welsh 
Commission was directed to formulate legislation on the basis of the 
report which Representatives Abernethy, Jennings, and Dixon would 
introduce during the first session of the 85th Congress. However, no 
support was given by the USDA and all bills containing Welsh 
Commission recommendations failed to pass. 
The Welsh Report's second hearing was August 8, 1958, before 
the House Committee on Agriculture, Cooley of North Carolina 
presiding, during the second session of the 85th Congress. The 
hearing was called to consider Senate Bill 4100 and related House 
bills. S. 4100, introduced by Senator A. J. Ellender, Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, was of particular importance, 
for it incorporated elements from Capehart's S. 724, Curtis's 
S. 2306, and Johnston's S. 3697. It was a direct effort by the 
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Senate to implement Welsh Report recommendations by putting all such 
legislation into one workable package. S. 4100 had passed the Senate 
81-0 on July 29, 1958, and was reported out of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee 28-0. 
The hearing record showed Senat.or Capehart led the testimony by 
presenting the enormous cost to the nation of buying and storing 
surplus agricultural raw material from 1933 to 1959: 
1933-52 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
$7.174 billion 
329 million 
964 million 
1.349 billion 
1.936 billion 
3.255 billion 
4.877 billionlO 6.000 billion 
This amounted to a 25 billion dollar expenditure to buy and store 
surplus in approximately 25 years. 
Capehart cited the instituting of the Price Support Program by 
the Democratic Party in 1938 and the introduction of the Soil Bank by 
the Republicans in 1956. He asked if the nation could not alleviate 
the surplus problem by initiating a crash research program under a 
Czar in the manner it did with the synthetic ru"bber effort during the 
11 Second World War. The Senator closed with the statement that there 
was no need for more money in the utilization research and 
development area, but a great need for increased awareness and 
emphasis. He made clear that education programs would affect 
awareness, and increased awar~ness and emphasis would surely bring 
more money and therefore more projects in the area. 
The USDA had contacted Senator Ellender before the hearing 
and expressed its opposition to S. 4100. 12 . The day before the 
hearing, True D. Morse, Acting Secretary of Agriculture, sent a 
letter to Representative Cooley, Chairman of the House Agriculture 
Committee, reiterating the USDA's opposition.l3 The USDA's statement 
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of opposition again demonstrated why the ~ause of utilization research 
had advanced so slowly in Congress. The USDA agreed wholeheartedly 
with the objective of S. 4100, but could not accept the possibility 
of the creation of a new organizational entity to administer an 
expanded utilization research program such as the bill (and the Welsh 
Report) recommended. Instead, the Department favored Representative 
Hill's bill, H.R. 13513, or Representative Dixon's bill, H.R. 13605, 
both which did not provide for a separate administrative unit. 
In contrast to Capehart's testimony, which called for·increased 
emphasis on utilization research based on funds already available, the 
USDA spoke in terms of a need for increased appropriations. It 
stressed that its facilities and personnel were ready for increased 
work on utilization research, but that Congress would not appropriate 
requested funds, as it had not in the 1959 Budget. In fact, according 
to the USDA its total research budget had been reduced even though the 
Department had doubled its research in the five years before 1959. 
The Department felt that a new agency would have the same source of 
funds as the research structure within the USDA and would get only 
what the USDA got, therefore it could be only as effective as the 
USDA. The USDA's. committee testimony agreed, as the Nebraska Program 
would emphasize later, that the problem was the responsibility of the 
Federal Government ·that the Federal Government alone was in a , 
. ',""'."-. ,.,.,:,,~ 
'. 
ii. 
posi tion to provide the increased res'earch: 
Utilization research is, or we believe must become, an 
increasingly heavy responsibility of the federal government 
through the Department of Agriculture. The federal 
government is in a position to provide the concentrated 
research needed. Only in recent years has this fact become 
fully apparent in areas of vital importance to agriculture 
and the nation •••• Farm prod~cers, to whom the outcome is 
a matter of economic life or death, must look to public 
agencies. 14 
But the bill which would have placed additional responsibility for 
such research on the Federal Government was opposed in its entirety 
by the USDA because of the Department's fear of a new agency. Such 
occurrences prompted observers to comment: "The current program of 
the USDA, invaluable as it is in so many ways, indicates an apparent 
reluctance to conduct applied research in areas competitive with 
other industries.,,15 The USDA had to face the further accusation 
that it had initiated no bills to increase emphasis on utilization 
research and therefore appeared lacking in initiative as well as 
uncompetitive to the states which were looking to this public agency 
for action. 
Members of Congress immediately counterattacked, saying in 
effect that they did not care how the program was carried out, just 
that it was carried out. In reference to the above bills, the USDA 
was accused by Senator Capehart of fearing a loss of authority and 
of having the Washington disease of N.M.H. (Not Made Here, in the 
USDA) " d " h P k" ; L 16 In accor ance Wlt ar lnson saw. Most of the provisions 
of S. 4100 and the other bills were stressed as being advantageous 
to the USDA, i.e. authority for trial commercialization of research 
products, authority to make research grants to other institutions, 
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authority to initiate education programs, authority to grant 
scholarships in research" 
Yet the USDA continued to fight the bills, saying that a new 
research agency would not be considered as a threat to the USDA's 
authority, but as a duplication o~ effort. The Department stressed 
that it would be against the principles of sound administration to 
have a dual-headed arrangement with no unity of command. Applied 
research in the USDA was already in a separate unit of the Department, 
the Chemistry Division, where a utilization research unit was 
separately bUdgeted and directed, but whose work was coordinated with 
all other departmental research through an Administrator of Research 
and an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. Each side had good 
arguments, and there the matter stood for the duration of the 85th 
Congress. No action was gained on proposed legislation. 
The Welsh Report was given its last federal consideration at a 
third set of hearings before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on 
Research and Extension on February 18-19, March 4-5-6-11, and 
April 20, 1959. 17 The Subcommittee met to consider a number of 
86th Congress legislative bills drawn up to implement the Welsh 
Report's proposals: H.R. 127, 309, 2380, 2718, 2720, 2766, 2803, 
2880, 2881, 2970, 3070, 4167, 4168, 5234, and 5441. The list 
included two bills which ,,,ere drafted by the Welsh group: H.R. 309 
introduced by Representative Abernathy of Mississippi and H.R. 2970 
introduced by Representative Brock of Nebraska. In the Senate, 
parallel legislation was being introduced by Senators Mundt of 
South Dakota (S. 43), Cur tis of Nebraska (S. 74), and Johns ton, 
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et. al. (S. 690). 
Proponents of utilization research were giving solid support to 
the Welsh Report and resulting legislation from which the agriculture 
industry would gain so much. Present to either support or refute the 
Report were, from the USDA, E. L. Peterson, Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture; Dr. B. T. Shaw, a Senior USDA administrator; 
Dr. E. C. Elting, Deputy Administrator of USDA's Agricultural Research 
Service; and Dr. G. W. Irving, Deputy for USDA Utilization Research 
(a man later to become an important contact for the Nebraska 
Program's administrators); from the academic world, the Deans of eight 
state university colleges of agriculture; others included 
J. Leroy Welsh, interested scientists and congressmen, and represen-
tatives of industry and agricultural groups. 
The USDA immediately voiced its objections to most of the 
proposed legislation for the reasons it had given during past 
testimony: it remained totally opposed to the idea of any new and 
independent administrative agency being set up to give utilization 
research increased emphasis by being singularly responsible for this 
. task (thereby taking the USDA's utilization research functions unto 
itself). The USDA continued in the opinion that it was giving due 
emphasis to such research in the programs of its Agricultural Research 
Service. It asserted its qualifications for administering any 
expanded utilization research program within the department's present 
structure. It felt that a new agency would unnecessarily duplicate 
its work in the field and therefore reiterated its support for those 
legislative bills before the subcommittee which would increase the 
emphasis on utilization research but continue to leave utilization 
research responsibility in the USDA . 
. The USDA did have impressive credentials for such work. Its 
Research Administration was created December 13, 1941,18 and an 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture wa.s put in charge, with the 
Secretary of Agriculture having overall supervision. l9 Utilization 
research came to be centered in the USDA's Chemistry Division,which 
was set up in 1889 and reached bureau rank in 1901. The Division's 
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laboratories, including four regional ones throughout the nation, were 
. authorized by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and completed 
in 1941. 20 But the Welsh Report pointed out that "for nearly half of 
their existence these laboratories, created to further industrial 
utilization, have been obliged to be diverted from such work in order 
to engage in war and defense research work. ,,21 The state university 
laboratories in turn emphasized production research when their work 
turned to war efforts. Criticism of the lack of utilization research 
after the Second World War was stiffled by the onset of the Korean 
War. The accompanying fear of World War III also tended to increase 
production research and the consequent production and storing of 
large quantities of agricultural raw materials. During the Second 
World War, however, USDA laboratories had managed to develop 
synthetic alcohol, penicillin, and dextron blood plasma, all using 
agricultural materials. This gave great hope for the peacetime future 
of uses of agricultural products. 
After World War II the Research and Marketing Act of 1946 
emphasized the desire to increase utiliza tion research and granted 
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USDA the authority and funds to contract with outside agencies. It 
also established an Advisory Committee of eleven men which met 
quarterly. This Committee was cited in congressional subcommittee 
testimony and is important because of the resemblance the future 
Nebraska Program's seven-man advisory committee would bear to it. The 
USDA committee was further augmented by twenty-five sub-advisory 
committees which usually represented the groups that used the 
discoveries of USDA research. A key component which the USDA research 
structure contained, and which the Nebraska Program would lack 
because of its emphasis on use of research findings for educational 
and lobbying purposes, was the technical liaison personnel at USDA 
laboratories who.kept industry informed on research results and 
brought industry's problems to the attention of the laboratories. 
Of particular note is the admission by the USDA before the 
congressional subcommittee that the Department's utilization research 
programs didn't get going effectively until after the Korean War and 
then were hampered by fear of World War III. According to the USDA, 
the year 1955 apparently marked a renaissance of utilization research 
·when this type of work was put on a par with other agricultural 
research within the USDA. The Department made a case for its side of 
the issue, as it had in the past. Yet, while granting the many 
points touched upon by the USDA representatives, the congressman 
pressed the issue during the hearings. The chairman of the sub-
cOmmittee recalled that "fifteen ·years ago it was the feeling on this 
Hill that utilization research was not getting off the ground. 22 He 
pointed out that Representative Clifford Hope, a past member of the 
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House Agricultural Committee, had collaborated with Representative 
Flanagan, Chairman of the Committee, in introducing legislation 
which became part of the Agricultural Research and Marketing Act of 
1946 to correct this situation. Of interest was the fact that 
J. Leroy Welsh appeared before the Senate Agriculture Committee in 
1945 by invitation of Senator Curtis of Nebraska to testify for 
increased emphasis on utilization and utilization research. 
By 1951 Representative Hope had become disappointed with the 
progress of the government program he had initiated. He began to 
speak of a need for education efforts because of a lack of under-
standing or confidence by the public and by the federal government, 
i.e. Congress and USDA, in what utilization research could do for 
agriculture in the United States. 23 He urged certain research admin-
. . h h S fA' 1 24 t . 1 1strat10n c anges to t e ecretary 0 gr1cu ture; 0 no aVa1 , 
since the Secretary had just reorganized the USDA along different 
lines. Hope finally concluded that: 
• it was not even the fault of the Appropriations 
Committee of Congress in not giving the full funds author-
ized by law for the program that the effort failed, but the 
fact that the intent of Congress was never' carried out with 
the funds available. 25 
It was evident that Hope's identification of a continuing lack of 
awareness at the public and federal levels was a key point. 
The disappointing developments Representative Hope saw in the 
years following his 1946 legislation to stimulate utilization 
research Here to continue through the 1950's. In 1956, when the 
USDA finally supported expanded utilization research, Congress 
appropriated 24 million dollars for the next five years. But by the 
• 
~ •. 
end of fiscal 1957 only a small part of the expanded program's 
schedule for that year had been attained. This situation directly 
brought about the Welsh Report and new attempts at legislation based 
on its findings. 
The final congressional hea:ring on the Welsh Report in 1959 
found Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Peterson disputing Hope's 
contention tbat awareness and not appropriations was to blame for 
unsatisfactory progress in utilization research efforts. Various 
statements by Peterson before the House Subcommittee on Research and 
Extension indicated the USDA felt appropriation difficulties to be 
directly responsible: 
••• in recent years the Appropriations Committees of Congress 
have reported out bills, subsequently passed by Congress, 
which, as the record will indicate, have increased our funds 
available for this purpose [Utilization researc~ quite sub-
stantially, as measured by the funds going into this work of 
some years past. I must also say, however, that the 
Appropriations Committees and subsequent legislation deriving 
fro!Il their activities has not in all instances included the 
funds we have asked for this or other research purposes ••• 
I think the need for increased funds to step up utilization 
research is quite apparent •••• The USDA was forced to cut 
its dollar request for utilization research in half even after 
the Bureau of the Budget had approved the increase in 
1959 .••• The request of USDA for increased funds was not 
able to be accommodated in the 1959 federal budget because of 
the total administration decision to attempt to contain the 
gross of federal expenditures with federal revenues Lan 
Eisenhower balance-the-Budget attemptJ.26 • 
The Assistant Secretary then reaffirmed the USDA's position 
that there was no need for new legislation, no call to separate the 
field of utilization research from the USDA--especially to give it a 
new agency--that "\-"hat was needed was more money to maintain the 
present program of agricultural research administered jointly by the 
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USDA and the land-grant colleges. He said nothing about not having 
spent what had been appropriated by past Congresses, as Hope had 
charged. He merely continued to point to the money gap that 
statistics plainly showed existed: 
1940 Agriculture got 40 cent~ of the Federal Research 
Dollar. 
1959 Agriculture got three cents of the Federal 
Research Dollar. 
*** 
1957 
1958 
1959 
(1960 
* * * * * 
Forty seven million dollars budgeted for Production 
Research, Federal Government. 
Fourteen million dollars budgeted for Utilization 
Research, Federal Government. 
Fifty three million dollars budgeted for Production 
Research, Federal Government. 
Fifteen million dollars budgeted for Utilization 
Research, Federal Government. 
Total Federal Agriculture Budget: 121,689,000 
dollars. 
Fifty eight million dollars budgeted for Production 
Research, Federal Government. 
Nineteen million dollars budgeted for Utilization 
Research, Federal Government. 
Five million doliars budgeted for Utilization 
Research, State Governments. 
Total Federal Agriculture Budget: 120,000,000 
dollars. 
Total public agricultural research effort, state 
and federal: 234 million dollars. 
Gross national product of agricultural raw material 
production: 40 billion dollars,)27 
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Congress, through co~ittee, then proceeded to investigate the 
effort the colleges of agriculture of the land-grant universities were 
expending on utilization research. The eight college deans who 
appeared before the 1959 Subcommittee hearing gave useful testimony. 
Their testimony was to be considered later by the State of Nebraska. 
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It played a part in the Nebraska Program's conception and operation. 
It was to cast doubt on the wisdom of a Nebraska State Senator's 
later request that .the Nebraska Legislature "give the Nebraska 
Program to the University of Nebraska and keep it out of politics ... 28 
And on the wisdom of a campaign promise made by a former United States 
Secretary of the Interior running for the Nebraska governor's office: 
"If I am elected I will increase and expand the Nebraska Program, 
giving more of the Program to the University of Nebraska instead of to 
'd • • . ..29 QutSl e lTIstltutl0ns. When United States Representative Abernethy 
stated in the hearing that his bill, H.R. 2718, to be introduced in 
Congress, would increase the five million dollars currently being 
spent annually by the states on agricultural research in the utili-
zation area, and that the states could and would expand their research 
through the colleges of agriculture and experiment stations as 
provided for in H.R. 2718,30 it would have been supposed that the 
college deans would have responded positively. Such was not quite the 
case. 
Testimony revealed that "land-grant colleges were only luke-
warm to marketing and utilization research in the past, .. 3l and it 
was "doubtful tha t the colleges' a tti tude had changed since 1957 when 
• 
they opposed a Congressional appropriation of twenty-five percent of 
university-oriented research funds for utilization research.n32 
Under questioning by Representative Quie of Minnesota the deans 
admitted that facilities for utilization research might have been made 
available in their agriculture colleges, but certainly not person-
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nel. Additional weight was given to 'these statements when 
Herbert Voorhees, an American Farm Bureau Federation Board of 
Director's member, and John Lynn, Legislative Director of the same 
organization, stated under questioning that the agricultural schools 
did not have the people or facilities for an expanded utilization 
research program. They were disappointed in this fact because they 
felt the public should urge its high schoolers and college people into 
'1"' h 34. t Ut1 lzatl0n researc careers, JUs as the Welsh Report had 
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advocated. Later statements by Welsh Commission members and USDA ''''''', 
officials were to point out that the land-grant colleges probably 
preferred to keep utilization research programs within the USDA 
because the colleges felt they would get more of the research dollar 
that way. The Subcommittee members concluded that in the end, no 
matter whether expanded programs were directed by the USDA or by a 
separate and independent agency, there was no doubt but that each 
would turn to the colleges of agriculture for assistance--just as in 
the past. 
The question that remained for the deans and their colleges of 
agriculture was whether the colleges were changing or ever would 
change their attitude toward utilization research and education. 
Administrators and researchers who had. been reared in the school of 
production at the colleges of agriculture would, no doubt, find it 
difficult to change. They were faced with somewhat the same situation 
as when leaders of agriculture and agricultural education had estab-
lished the colleges and put pressure on the schools to give agri-
cUlture better production methods: if those leaders now so convinced 
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Congress, the colleges faced congressional legislation which, if they 
wished to stay allied with the USDA, would require them to undertake 
not only a change in research emphasis, but to engage in an education 
and information program through their extension and adult education 
resources. This new research emphasi~ would entail a massive 
re-education campaign designed to change the attitude and behavior of 
the agricultural and non-agricultural public. The agricultural 
worker would have to be persuaded that producing more did not auto-
matically assure him a good living; that utilization research would 
be a long range "preventive" medicine applied to his income situation, 
not a short-range, stop-gap measure with punitive side effects in case 
of non-compliance as in past programs, i.e. the Soil Bank. This need 
for the re-education of the public was directly responsible for the 
initiation of the Nebraska Program. 
The testimony given during the 1959 Congressional Subcommittee 
Hearing by J. Leroy Welsh36 deserves special mention, for his 
appearance apparently damaged his cause more than it helped. The more 
he was questioned, the more a negative situation developed between 
this advocate of utilization and congressmen who were basically 
sympathetic. Welsh approached the members of the Subcommittee with 
the attitude that they were not aware of the true situation and its 
seriousness. He repeatedly talked down to his distinguished 
audience, many of them gentleman farmers from the South, frequently 
beginning his remarks with such statements as: 
I ask you gentlemen today, do any of you know what the 
problem is going to be on surplus •.•. 37 
"",,.,,, .. 
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I wonder how many of you know. • -. 38 
I am sure none of you can realize. 39 
This type of approach can be dangerous when speaking with any 
individual, and it was no less so before the House Agriculture 
Subcommittee on Research and Extension. 
The generalizations and speculations cast about by Welsh 
immediately provoked considerable comment from Representative Cooley 
of North Carolina,- Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, who 
was sitting in on the Subcommittee hearing. Democrat Cooley felt that 
Republican Welsh was criticizing the Democrats for the so-called, in 
Welsh's words, "failure of past agriculture programs." Cooley felt 
Welsh was implying that the price support/production control programs 
of past years, initiated by a Democrat-dominated Congress, had 
failed. Cooley questioned Welsh closely about Welsh's possible 
agreement with Republican Secretary of Agriculture Benson, then in 
office under President Eisenhower, that the "agriculture programs of 
the last 20 years had failed." CObley felt that there was definite 
evidence Benson was trying to discredit the price support/production 
, control programs of the Democrats, and that Welsh was assisting. 
Cooley therefore proceeded to cast all blame for the lack of utili-
zation progress on Benson: Benson was blamed for lack of leadership, 
failure to use funds at hand, failure to accept more authority 
offered by Congress, and of course for trying to discredit the then 
existing agriculture programs. 'Cooley pointed out that the price 
support program made 13 million dollars in the 20 years it operated 
prior to 1953 and that utilization programs would have to be carried 
on along with other important programs such as price supports. Welsh 
immediately stated that he was referring to previous attempts at 
ending the surplus through utilization research when he spoke of 
programs failing. Cooley was unmollified and ended the exchange by 
exclaiming: 
When a man CO!1les in this committee room and denounces the agri-
culture programs as failures, and does not know why they 
failed, and does not know what we could do to improve them--
and the Secretary of Agriculture tells us he does not need any 
more authority--what can we do?40 
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It took Representative George McGovern of South Dakota (a Democrat and 
friend of the soon-to-be-appointed Nebraska Director of Agriculture, 
Pearle F. Finigan) to soothe feelings and to point out again that all 
was evidently a misunderstanding, the two men were talking about two 
different things: Cooley was speaking of the overall agriculture 
programs of the Democratic administrations, while Welsh was speaking 
in terms of the utilization efforts only. 
Undeterred, Welsh continued to lecture the Subcommittee in his 
eagerness to present his case and advance his cause. His attempts to 
impress the group as to the "seriousness" of the situation began to 
. raise more questions in the members' minds than were answered. Things 
progressed to a point where Welsh was not allowed to finish a 
sentence. In the end, although most of the Subcommittee members were 
sympathetic to Welsh's cause, he did not make any friends, and it was 
questionable whether utilization research did. The Welsh Report 
received less and less attention during and after subsequent Agri-
culture Committee and Subcommittee hearings. Congressional bills 
incorporating the report or drafted by the Welsh Commission were 
• 
defeated in Congress. The bills would usually get out of committee, 
but bog down on the floor. The reason was put very well by 
Senator T. G. Abernethy of Mississippi: 
When the USDA opposes something, we in committee get very 
strongly divided. It is a bad situation, but that is what 
happens. I am not cri ticizing ~anyone, because everyone is 
sincere about his posttion. 41 
When the bills went to the floor of Congress without the strong 
support of a committee they usually became stalemated, and this 
eventuality was a partial explanation of congressional inaction in 
the utilization research area. As a consequence, the Welsh Report 
remained nothing more than a report. Welsh would later tell of 
approaching President Eisenhower in 1959 and introducing himself as 
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the former head of the President's Commission on Increased Industrial 
Uses of Agricultural Products. Welsh was greatly taken aback-when 
Eisenhower replied, "Oh yes! By the way, whatever happened to that 
report?,,42 
It was evident to observers that years of argument were 
getting nowhere on the federal level. Obviously more intense 
pressure had to be brought to bear on the Congress, the USDA, and the 
colleges of agriculture, and this pressure could only come from the 
public. Representatives of that public on the state level thus 
initiated the educational effort necessary to awaken and inform the 
public--agricultural and non-agricultural, urban and rural, state and 
national. These leaders envisioned an education program that would 
exploit dramatic research results, utilize educational methods and 
serve as such an outstanding example of what could be done through 
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increased utilization research that the lagging public institutions 
could not resist the lobby. A program devised, initiated, financed, 
and administered by the State of Nebraska is examined in detail in 
the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE NEBRASKA PROGRAM 
The Stage Is Set 
As a state directly involved in one of the six most pressing 
national problems, agriculture,l Nebraska faced the challenge of 
attempting to find possible solutions to the agricultural surpluses 
dilemma after federal government attempts at solution proved 
ineffective. The state pondered an expensive do-it-yourself effort, 
then decided in view of finances to attempt instead an education 
program which would move an awakened public to demand a refocusing of 
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federal efforts in the field of utilization research. In doing so the 
State experienced several changes in its political makeup: the out-
lines of a true two-party state emerged, both parties came to be 
represented in state leadership, an ambitious Program designed to have 
national effect was initiated, and the largest department of state 
government moved from a passive role to one of power. Under the guise 
of a state research effort Nebraska began an education program 
designed to bring the Federal Government around to its way of 
thinking. 
The stage for the above events was set with the election in 
1958 of Ralph G. Brooks (inaugurated January 8, 1959), the first 
Democrat elected governor of Nebraska since the 1930's. Brooks, an 
educator from McCook, Nebraska, was dedicated to his state and anxious 
to initiate programs which he felt would help the state and also 
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advance his party's standing within the state. This had to be done 
within the mandate given him, as a Democrat, by the Republican as well 
as the Democratic voters who had helped elect him. He therefore 
retained many Republican department chiefs in the state government, 
while appointing the usual partisan followers in certain,key offices. 
One of those appointments, made before the governor's untimely death 
on September 9, 1960, was a relatively unknown individual, 
Mr. Pearle F. Finigan, as Director of the Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture and Inspection. 
Finigan, a University of Nebraska graduate, had been a well-to-
do farmer all of his life except for five years with a Colorado drug 
firm as treasurer and vice president. His family had been active in 
Nebraska politics as well as in the controversial National Farmers 
Organization. But as was the case of the Labor Party in Britain 
before World War II and the Republican Party in the Southern United 
States before 1964, a long period as the "out" party had left the 
Nebraska Democratic Party with few known and tried individuals who 
could be even slightly identified as members of a "shadow cabinet." 
"Mr. Finigan therefore found himself in the right place at the right 
time with a history of work for the victorious party behind him. 
The Nebraska Legislature with whom the new governor and 
director would work was elected on a nonpartisan ballot and contained 
a majority of registered Republicans during the 1959-1960 time period. 
In its makeup, however, was a registered Democrat, Senator Hans O. 
Je,nsen of Aurora, Nebraska, destined to playa part in Nebraska 
history because of his foresightedness and his chairmanship of the 
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Legislature's Agriculture Committee. 
The Nebraska Program: Preliminary Maneuvering 
Realizing that a group of like-minded states, or preferably the 
Federal Government, was the only organization which could handle a 
large-scale attack on the probletnsof agriculture--specifically the 
surpluses situation--and discouraged by inaction on the part of the 
states and the ineffectiveness of federal action, Ne.braska set out to 
show where it thought the solution lay. It had seen, as had the 
nation, what research could do for production in the agricultural and 
industrial fields. Those who saw utilization research as the next 
logical step for the application of technology to agriculture faced 
the problem of how to bring the full weight of all research organ-
izations--federal, state, university, and private--behind such 
research. The capacity for such research had been maintained 
primarily in federal laboratories, but operated on a small budget in 
proportion to all other research in government and industry. 
Senators Jensen and Bahinsky of the Nebraska Legislature therefore 
began preliminary work to initiate a Nebraska program designed to 
demonstrate what could be done by the states and the Federal 
Government in this field, should they choose or be forced to concen-
trate their efforts in this area. In 1957 the two senators introduced 
Legislative Resolution 6 2 into the Nebraska Legislature. Although 
this resolution dealt with locating a grain alcohol plant in 
Nebraska, it contained the first mention of "industrial uses H in the 
State Legislature and was a first effort to redirect federal attention 
to the utilization research field, for· it endorsed United States 
Senate Bill 581 3 which dealt with such research. 
The successful political effort which resulted in the Nebraska 
Program began on February 2, 1959 with the introduction of 
Legislative Bill 6044 in the Nebraska Legislature. Again 
Senator Jensen was the author, with Senators Ruhnke, Otto, and 
Olinger as co-introducers. Senator Jensen stated later that he "had 
55 
5 had the idea for a long time" and that he "had read the Welsh Report." 
Whether the idea was conceived first by him and then encouraged by the 
Report, or the Report initiated the idea, was not clear. In any case, 
the bill asked that a four percent tax be placed on the gross amount 
wagered through parimutual betting in the state, with the funds going 
to an agricultural-industrial utilization research program. Of further 
note is the fact that the bill gave control of the funds and the 
authority to administer the program to the Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture: 
Fifty percent of the Lbetting ta~ balance shall be allocated 
and paid to the Department of Agriculture and Inspection to 
be used for the development of additional uses or new 
industrial uses for agriculture products, and for 
research. • • 6 
LB-604 was read to the Legislature for the first time on 
February 2, 1959, then referred to the Revenue Committee. At that 
time State Senator Carpenter of Scottsbluff informed Senator Jensen 
that he, Carpenter, also was drafting such a bill. The bill, 
Legislative Bill 658, was comparable in intent to LB-604, but 
suggested that funds should come from property taxes and go into the 
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state's General Fund--not directly to' the Department of Agriculture. 
Carpenter asked Jensen to allow a combining of the two bills. Jensen 
agreed and allowed LB-604 to be postponed indefinitely in the 
Revenue Committee, believing that the collection of funds was 
secondary to the main purpose of the. bill and that who administered 
them was also secondary as long as the main goal of an Agresearch 
Program was left intact. To Senator Jensen's dismay, the final bill 
as it came from the Revenue Committee had collection of revenue 
spelled out but made no mention of use of the funds for research: 
The committee felt that the principle of taxing pari-mutual 
betting was good (LB-604), but another bill was accepted 
(LB-658) which allocated such tax money into the State 
General Fund. It was the feeling of the committee that a 
bill which ear-marked the proceeds would have a more 
difficult time earning passage than LB-658 which provides 
for the proceeds to go into the General Fund. It was also 
felt that it would be harder to amend LB-604 into a workable 
form than LB-658. 7 
The committee advanced the bill (LB-658) to the General File, 
for it felt this bill would have the best chance of passage. 
All members of the committee agreed to support the bill. 8 
The Nebraska Program Forms 
Senator Jensen, backed by Governor Brooks, therefore entered 
the legislative battle again with the. introduction of a new bill and 
a call for the killing of both LB-604 and LB-658 as they returned to 
the General File and the Legislature for discussion and a vote. The 
new bill, Legislative Bill 722, became the base for an effort 
destined to be expanded in concept from a small-scale, bit-
contribution attack on the national agriculture problem, to an 
edUcation/lobbying program directed at the state and national public, 
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with federal action the ultimate goal. LB-722 was more carefully 
handled than the two previous bills. It went from the Legislature 
into the Revenue Committee under the guiding hand of the Agriculture 
Committee which Jensen headed. Hammering out of the final draft of 
LB-722 proceeded, with interest picking up in the state and 
Legislature as time and debate proceeded in the Revenue Committee. 
Jensen led the testimony, pacifying production-oriented 
individuals and groups, cautioning against high expectations, subtly 
urging continuity in any legislature-established program and, signif-
icantly, hinting at the.expanded national, federal government, and 
public support needed: 
I support continued production research, but utilization 
research must be emphasized now. The University of Nebraska 
has some facilities and personnel for such work, but not 
enough. 
A crash program with large sums of money would not necessarily 
bring early results. Results of such research are slow in 
coming and often unpredictable. There are no magical 
results. 
Meetings are needed for coordination with the rest of the 
nation. Our program here in Nebraska would be but one part of 
that going on in the rest of the nation. The problem is so 
high and complex and the research so expensive that alone we 
could do very little. But we need to do our part. By getting 
a good program underway. Nebraska should be able to partic-
ipate in federal funds. In addition, we must establish a 
program which will have continuity. To have continuity, it 
must develop strong public support. 9 
The remarks forewarned of the eventual by-passing of the University 
of Nebraska. They later became by-words for Program administrators 
attempting to gain public support and quiet public impatience. And 
they served as first mention of the direction the Nebraska Program 
would take toward solving agriculture's problem of surpluses--the 
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initiation of a combined research and education effort. LB-722 was 
to be interpreted in practice much differently than many of the 
program~earlY supporters expected. Those whom the creators charged 
with the administration of the Program soon realized that the research 
effort was too small to solve the problem of agricultural surpluses. 
Therefore the question of whether public support for federal 
. government attention to the Program's proposed solution could be 
developed and maintained became of foremost importance. In view of 
the above statement by Senator Jensen it is apparent that he at least 
to a certain extent anticipated this development. 
Two private citizens appeared to voice opinions in comm.ittee 
debate on LB-722. Mr. Elton Breck, Director of the Nebraska Farmers 
Union, appeared in support of the bill. In opposition came 
Mr. Henry Behrens, a private citizen from Beemer, Nebraska, stating: 
The money will not actually do any good or bring relief, as 
it will go for salaries and miscellaneous expenses. The life 
of the bill, if it is passed, should be shortened from the 
suggested ten years .10 
Letters arrived from numerous chambers of commerce throughout the 
state supporting the bill. A letter also was received by the Revenue 
Committee from J. Leroy Welsh of Omaha, former chairman of 
President Eisenhower's Commission on Industrial Uses and an ardent 
advocate of increased federal help in this area. Welsh had been 
pessimistic about the bill and, though he never missed a chance to 
utilize a public platform or the media to advance his cause, he 
uncharacteristically declined an invitation from Senator Jensen to 
appear before the committee in support of the bill, sending a letter 
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instead. He later changed his mind when it appeared that the Nebraska 
Program was aimed toward his favorite targets, the education of the 
'" 
public and the influencing of the Federal Government to assist in 
solving the problem of agricultural surpluses. He became a firm 
supporter of the effort. 
There appeared at this critical moment in a capitol city 
(Lincoln, Nebraska) newspaper an editorial which the field of Adult 
Education would consider quite sound in its advice. It called for 
"an advisory commission to assist in administering the program" and 
suggested that "more benefit might be insured if the bill which 
provides money only for research was broadened to include 
'development ... ,II Such utilization of mass media for urging adoption 
of certain principles by the people's representatives was a forerunner 
of the use to which the media would be put to educate and influence 
the people themselves when the program began operation. The 
constructive advice offered was weakened in the editorial by the 
following: 
The program will demand an imaginative but sound adminis-
tration. The bill places this function in"the State 
Department of Agriculture. The question of who administers 
the program does not seem a vital one as long as ample 
provision is made for coordination with the University of 
Nebraska and other public and private research agencies both 
within and outside the state. 12 
As it happened, LB-722 in its final reading made no mention of 
"other public and private laboratories within or outside the state," 
although provision was made for coordination with the University of 
Nebraska. However, the question of who would administer the program 
was to be most vital. Determination of the direction the program 
would take and what its ultimate goals would be would lie dir~ctly 
in the hands of the program administrator, and the administrator 
alone wou~ determine what part universities, laboratories, media and 
education wo~ld play in the program. Administration is dealt with in 
full later in this chapter and in Ap~endix A. 
Not one to ignore constructive advice, Senator Jensen 
submitted an amendment during the May 20, 1959 Revenue Committee 
hearing to set up an advisory committee and to insert the word 
"development" into LB-722. Senator Munne11y of Omaha moved the 
amendment be adopted and. the motion carried. Senator Olinger moved 
that the time limit of the program be shortened from ten years to six 
years. The motion also carried. Although the advisory committee 
which was later duly created accomplished little, the "development" 
aspect was to be highly utilized in the upcoming education program. 
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No effort of government can go forward without money. With the 
prefatory remark that "industry spends ten dollars for research and 
deve lopment for everyone dollar agriculture spends," Jensen 
submitted for committee discussion the following projected program 
. budget: 
Equipment 
Eight staff personne1--1 year 
Fifteen technicians--l year 
Operating expenses--1 year 
Temporary and part-time personnel 
TOTAL 
$200,000 
100,000)Ed to U °t 60,000 uca ~on n~ 
30,000 pe:s~nne1 
10,000 prov~s~on here. 
$400,000 
The Revenue Committee proposed to place a tax of one-tenth 
mill on all property in the state except intangible property. Such a 
tax would have raised 350,000 dollars annually, or 2.1 million 
dollars during the six year duration 'of LB-722 (later shortened to 
five year~. Jensen made it clear in legislative debate that "he 
didn't care where the funds came from as long as it was specified 
that they went to utilization. ,,13 
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Before LB-722 moved to General File, Senator Burbach added one 
last amendment. Burbach moved that the bill be amended to include a 
provision to receive any federal grants or funds if available. The 
motion carried. LB-722 passed its committee hurdles on May 20, 1959 
and went from the Revenue Committee to the General File by a vote of 
five to none, two not voting. 
With the realization that a Nebraska research program was 
awaiting debate ,on the floor of the Legislature and had a good chance 
of becoming reality, senators rushed to define what type of program 
they were actually calling for. Senators Jensen, Stryker, and 
Ruhnke, realizing who in agriculture (as opposed to industry) was 
primarily responsible in the utilization research field, introduced 
Legislative Resolution Thirty-Nine14 into the Legislature on 
May 25, 1959. It appeared to be aimed at establishing guidelines 
for a program of state self-help, but had primarily to do with the 
Federal Government. The resolution was in two parts. In the first 
part, a committee of five was appointed from the Legislature to not 
only study the type of program needed, but to determine the 
extent to which federal-state coordination was being achieved in the 
area of research on industrial uses. In addition, the second part 
of the resolution called upon Congress to establish a laboratory at 
the University of Nebraska for the purpose of doing basic and applied 
T 
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utilization research. To maintain momentum during the committee study 
period, Senators Stryker, 
worded r~lution on June 
Jensen, and Ruhnke introduced a similarly 
26, 1959, having mainly to do with a federal 
h I b op t Tw f R 1 0 ThO N' 15 researc a oratory--as ~n ar 0 0 eso ut~on 1rty- ~ne. 
Many United States Senators had already tried to introduce 
16 
resolutions similar to the above in Congress. Resolution Thirty-
Nine was a continuation of that effort on the state level. As this 
became more and more evident to Nebraska state senators, seven addi-
tional legislators rushed to add their names to Resolution Thirty-Nine 
as co-introducers. LB-722 was therefore gaining more assurance of 
passage on the Legislature floor. 
Legislative Bill 722 Establishes The Nebraska Program 
LB-722, during its consideration on the floor of the Legis-
lature in June of 1959, met with two challenges, one minor, the other 
serious. Senator Carpenter, who ·had been involved in the determi-
nation of revenue for the Program, submitted an amendment designed to 
tax intangible property for research revenue. The amendment, 
submitted on June 1, 1959, was later withdrawn by Carpenter in favor 
of the Revenue Committee's recommended tax of one-tenth mill on all 
17 property except intangible property. 
A more serious attempt to change LB-722 Came from Senator 
Cooper who, agreeing with a charge 1)y Senator Romans that "the program 
should be kept out of politics," strongly advocated movement of program 
administration from a political arm of the state government, the 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture, to an educational branch, the 
University of Nebraska and specifically its College of Agriculture: 
Mr. Coop~ moved that LB-722 be returned to Select File for 
the folltwing specific amendments: 
1. Amend section 1 of the bill by striking line 2 and 
inserting "the University of Nebraska College of 
Agriculture •••• '1 
2. Amend section-2 of the bill, lines 3 and 4 by 
striking ''Department of Agriculture and Inspection" and 
inserting "University of Nebraska College of 
Agricul ture. " 
3. Amend the bill by striking section 3 and inserting 
in lieu thereof the following: 
Section 3. To aid and advise the Dean of the University 
of Nebraska College of Agriculture in carrying out the 
prov~s~ons of section 2 of this act, there is hereby 
created an advisory committee to consist of 14 members to 
consist of the Director of the Department of Agriculture 
and Inspection, the Dean of the University of Nebraska 
College of Agriculture, the Chairman of the Committee on 
Agriculture of the Nebraska State Legislature 
Let cetere7 •••• The committee shall meet on the call of 
the Dean of the University of Nebraska College of 
Agriculture •••• 18 
Senators Cooper and Romans had, as had J. Leroy Welsh, 
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foreseen the use of any developing program as a political instrument 
by state administrations. The two senators and Mr. Welsh were later 
proved correct. In a state where campaign issues were few, the 
program developed by the legislative branch was soon seized upon by 
the executive branch as a political cornerstone upon which to build 
an administration record. But a majority of others in the 
Legislature apparently were of another persuasion. LB-722 survived 
this most important challenge unchanged by a vote on the amendment of 
twelve ayes, twenty-five nays, six not voting. 19 Program admin-
istration was therefore left in the hands of a political division of 
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state government. 
Governor Brooks continued to give his full weight to the bill 
as it cl'e from Committee into the Legislature. 
move outside the Legislature, the Governor sent 
In a significant 
his Direc tor of 
Agriculture, Pearle F. Finigan, ~o Washington D.C., making it clear 
to all that Mr. Finigan would, among other things, check into utili-
zation on the federal level. Finigan upon his return suggested a 
literature survey of the utilization research field, legitimate 
advice for a fledgling research and education effort. These steps 
suggested that the Governor and the man who would direct the program, 
Finigan, were reasonably confident of LB-722"' s passage. And in fact 
LB-722 had been"picking up strength as it moved through the legis-
lative process. Additional senators became convinced, some of the 
possibility of successful utilization research on the state level, 
others of the possibility of successfully lobbying the federal 
government via an "example" program. In the Legislature life was 
given to the Nebraska Program on June 10, 1959: 
LEGISLATIVE BILL 722 20 
Voting In the Affirmative, 37: 
Adams Jensen Russillo 
Aufenkamp Klaver Skarda 
Bowden Lautenschlager Stryker 
Bridenbaugh Liebers Swanson 
Burbach Marvel Syas 
Carpenter Moulton Tews 
Cooper Munnelly Thompson 
Erlewine Nelson Vosoba 
Fenske Olinger Webb 
Fulton Orme Williams 
Gerdes Otto 
Hollenbeck Peck 
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Voting In the Negative, 3: 
Diers Pizer Romans 
, Not Voting, 3: 
Donner McHugh Simmons 
LB-722 was signed into law by Governor Brooks on June 11, 1959. 
While LB-722 was under consideration in the Nebraska Legis-
lature, United States Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson was 
opposing United States Senate bills on agricultural utilization 
research in Congress. At the time Benson was committed to the Soil 
Bank Program as a solution to the surpluses situation. Congress was 
of the same mind, for even when United States Senators Russell of 
Georgia and Curtis of Nebraska tried to raise federal appropriations 
for agricultural production research by twenty-five million dollars, 
Congress cut the figure to four and one-half million dollars. Others 
could therefore look at the Nebraska-federal situation and say, "The 
Nebraska Program looks like an example of the self-reliance that 
once was known as an American trait.,,21 But those who were concerned 
with the direction and goals of the Nebraska Program, while they were 
. willing to take credit for self-reliance, also felt it necessary to 
re-emphasize the national character of the problem: 
The farm problem is a national problem requ1r1ng and deserving 
national consideration and solutions. However, the people of 
Nebraska have indicated, through the action of their legis-
lative representatives, their wish to find some of their own 
answers, so far as possib1e. 22 
This statement accurately gave due credit to the representatives who 
saw the people's needs. Thus Nebraska set out with a two-fold 
purpose: To attempt to find some answers via the research and 
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education efforts of its Program, and to demonstrate to the Federal 
Government that increased utilization research as a solution to one 
of the six mo,; pressing national problems should be given national-
level consideration. 
I 
The Administering Agency 
A statement.was reported earlier in this chapter from a source 
outside education and government suggesting that the question of who 
administered the Nebraska Program was not a vital one as long as the 
provisions of sound and imaginative administration and coordination 
were adhered to. This view proved incorrect. Granted, whatever the 
agency, it would have had to be capable of developing into an 
efficient administering unit in addition to maintaining its normal 
duties. But much more is entailed when such a program is given to a 
political agency rather than to a research or educational agency. A 
political agency is limited to a greater extent than the other two 
agencies by the necessity for its officials to please the public that 
oversees its activities. In addition, it is possible that a program 
within a political agency might be used to further other, more 
political goals than just those of the program. It can be seen, then, 
that placing the Nebraska Program within the Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture and Inspection, a political division of state government, 
made for a much more "interesting" .administration of the program than 
would have occurred if the program had been given to, say, the 
University of Nebraska. 
Under past state administrations, until 1959, the Nebraska 
"w 
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Department of Agriculture and Inspection functioned almost entirely 
as a service agency with several non-agricultural functions. In 
a non-technological, non-educational operation. addition, i,was 
Least of all was it involved in the research/production areas of the 
. 1 . d 23 agr1cu ture 1n ustry. Both its, name and its image were 
misleading. The Federal Government and the University of Nebraska 
handled the technological, educational, and research/production 
functions, leaving the Nebraska Department as a catchall for state 
government services: 
Motor and Aircraft Fuel Regulation and Tax Collection .Unit 
Gas and Oil Severance Tax Collection Unit 
Cigarette Tax Collection Unit 
Nebraska Resources Industry Attraction Unit 
Chemistry Laboratory (Quality Testing Only) 
Dairies and Foods, Weights and Measures Regulation Unit 
Truck Ports-of-Entry Operation and Maintenance 
Veterinarian Unit 
Plant Industry Unit 
Weed and Seed Regulation Unit 
Wheat Development, Utilization and Marketing Unit 
Agricultural Statistics Unit (State-Federal cooperative effort). 
Approximately one-third of the Department's activities could 
be called agricultural service functions, but even these were more 
of an inspection or regulatory nature. Since indirect protection of 
quality and markets was the most identifiable service rendered the 
citizen, it sometimes appeared that the Department was most 
concerned with the urban dweller. Such an image had brought past 
accusations that the Department was actually against the farmer, 
while its name implied it was established to assist agriculture. 
Indeed, so much an ins trument of s ta te government had the 
Department been in the past, in its inspection and tax collection 
duties, that a more accurate name ·would have been the 'Uepartment 
of Inspection, Collection, and Consumer Protection." As a direct 
result of the Nebraska Program initiated by LB-722 a name change 
later took'Place when the Nebraska Legislature selected "Department 
of Agriculture and Economic Development" in July of 1963. 
Department-University relations had not been extremely 
cordial during past years. The University resented any attempt by 
a political agency to intrude into its research and education 
affairs and other areas of responsibility. For its part, the 
Department, being the biggest and most powerful agency of the state 
government which controlled the UniversitY,tended at times to 
believe it could influence policy in the College of Agriculture of 
the University. Events in the 1959-1967 period of the Nebraska 
Program did not give evidence that this situation had changed. The 
very initiation of the Program was, in fact, partially directed at 
a University "failure" to see and emphasize the "correct" agricul-
tural goals, specifically in its research and education. The 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture appeared to believe that the 
public and its government should, as a consequence of their having 
been educated in the correct goals of agricultural research, direct 
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the University to channel gover~~ent funds into utilization research 
and educa tion. 
Department relations with the national gover~mental level had 
followed normal lines of state-federal partnership. Most contact 
was maintained by way of the United States Department of 
Agriculture. The Nebraska Department of Agriculture participated in 
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federal funds through such cooperative efforts as compilation of agri-
cultural statistics and the maintenance of crop production experiment 
stations 
areas of 
around the state. Each government agency 
res~nsibility, guarding its dominion but 
maintained its 
never hesitating 
to try to expand its sphere of infl~ence by attempting to bring its 
partner to a concurring view on a particular subject. In the course 
of the Nebraska Program, the State went on the offensive, assuming 
responsibility for "educating" the USDA and the federal government 
about what it saw as a national problem, the need for increased 
utilization research by agriculture. 
Contrary to popular knowledge, the Nebraska Department did have 
contact with foreign governments and an international public during 
the period before 1959. Most of these foreign relations were 
conducted through the Nebraska Wheat Commission, a unit of the 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture. This commission, the nation's 
second, established in 1955, worked closely with the Nebraska Wheat 
Growers Association and the Great Plains Wheat Organization, both 
private groups with extensive networks of foreign offices. Only in 
. this one instance could the department be said to have been involved 
in increased utilization efforts, and then only to the extent of 
increasing sales through market expansion. But the State of 
Nebraska, through its -new Program~ became even more involved in 
international dealings. Nothing could have been more advantageous 
for the gaining of wide-spread public attention for the Nebraska 
Program. The Wheat Commission was in a position to exploit this 
attention, for one of its purposes was education. In addition, the 
Federal Government naturally took notice of any intercourse between 
a state government and a foreign gover~nment, such notice providing 
definite encouragement for Nebraska's work on the international 
level. 
, 
However, with little pub,lic knowledge of the Nebraska 
Department of Agriculture's activities except as a tax-collection 
regulatory agency, the department had developed a severe negative 
image, inspiring the press to comment: 
What should be one of the most important departments of state 
government, the Department of Agriculture, has in the past, 
been pretty much a routine operation of collection and 
inspection, with some attention paid to agricultural legis-
lation before the Unicameral. 24 
Past administra.tions had been content to let the department remain 
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an agency partially closed to agriculture. Department directors and 
personnel appeared to accept the idea that the Department was an 
irritant to the public because of its collection-inspection duties, 
and abided by the motto "The less the Department is known, the 
better. II 
The passage of LB-722 was sensed by many as the beginning of 
a role in keeping with the agricultural part of its responsi-
bili ties. 
£The Director of Agricultur~ and the state administration 
could meet the challenge facing Nebraska by making the job 
take on stature. With Nebraska agriculture at the cross-
roads, the Department of Agriculture could furnish leader-
ship in education, industrial uses of agriculture products, 
and attraction of industry. This should not overlap the 
areas already covered by the University of Nebraska, but 
should complement and make use of the research and 
educational work by the university. The time has passed 
When Nebraskans should be content to let the Department of 
Agriculture be merely a fiscal collection agency for many 
functions, some of which have nothing to do with agricul-
ture. 25 
There had been an earlier attempt to refocus the attention of the 
Department on agric~ture. A legislative bill in the State 
Legislature's Agriculture Committee had proposed taking restaurant 
inspection duties away from the department and giving them to the 
Health Department. If the bill had passed, other such shifts were 
certain to follow. Ironically the Department of Agriculture opposed 
the measure on the grounds that its real functions were being taken 
away: that instead of making the department more agricultural in 
emphasis, the bill would actually weaken the department "s real 
responsibilities. Yet, with the initiation of the Nebraska Program 
the Nebraska Department of Agriculture assumed the role of a 
government utilization research and education agency and, in doing 
so, underwent a transformation that put it squarely in the field of 
agricultural administration with a role similar to that of the USDA. 
The new role of the Nebraska agency fitted that which the Welsh 
Commission had envisioned on the federal level: 
i:It would be impossib1~ to build up another series of 
laboratories and enter the field for the manpower to carry 
on research. We are talking about setting up an agency to 
do no research but to have the power of decision, to have 
the money with which to contract research with i:companies 
and laboratorieif, and to use the manpower it already has. 26 
Upon the passage of LB-722, a flurry of organizational 
activity enveloped the Nebraska Department of Agriculture as the 
agency marshalled its resources and staff to begin the as yet i11-
defined Program. With no particular guidelines established by the 
Legislature, efforts began to find areas that could be utilized to 
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demonstrate to the watching public and to the Federal Government that 
utilization research contained the potential anS'\"er to a serious 
national problemG Whatever its later stated "discoveries," Hnew 
uses," or "imp~vements" in the research area, the Program never 
became more than this--an educativ~/lobbying effort. Therefore, the 
Department took the Welsh Report and transformed department admin-
istrative divisions into a supporting operation for a program that 
would serve as a showcase for the Report's recommendations. The 
transformation of the Department was not so much physical, barring 
the addition of a few personnel and changes of letterheads, as it 
was an intangible occurrence which resulted from the integration of 
the Program effort into the entire department. It was not quite 
attained with the "manpower it already had," but nearly so. As the 
Department transformed its image into a positive, leading agency of 
state government, divisional chiefs and personnel were never allowed 
to forget that supporting the Program was a primary duty, whatever 
their unit's assigned duties. And as the Program inevitably became 
immersed in election campaigns, it became as important for the 
department to sustain the Program for short-range political reasons 
as it was to press toward the Program's long-range goals. The 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture began immediately in 1959 to 
initiate action designed to produce a showcase program, an educa-
tional effort which became more far-reaching and involved than any 
of its proponents dared visualize. The implications of the Program 
for a state and its citizens, for a nation and its government, and 
for certain individuals increased significantly during the 1959-1967 
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time period. 
The Showcase 
The ~st step of the Program, the literature survey, was not 
difficult since The Welsh Report served that purpose. A second move 
included the appointment ,of an advlsory committee as follows: 
Pearle F. Finigan 
Dr. W. V. Lambert 
Maynard W. Jensen 
E. Thome Johnson 
Robert R. Rauner 
Vince E. Rossiter 
Director of the Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture; CHAIRMAN. 
Dean of the University of Nebraska 
College of Agriculture. Later 
replaced as Dean and committee 
member by Dr. E. F. Frolik. 
Gentleman farmer from Aurora, 
Nebraska. Son of LB-722's author, 
Senator Jensen. Considered 
friendly to the Brooks Adminis-
tration and cooperative with the 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture 
and its intentions. 
Gentleman farmer from Fremont, 
Nebraska. Considered of opposite 
political persuasion to the state 
administration, but friendly 
toward the Program and cooperative 
with Department efforts. 
Private citizen from Gurley, 
Nebraska. Former member of Nebraska 
Legislature and cooperative with the 
Department and the Program. 
Friendly toward the Brooks Adminis-
tration .. 
Private citizen from Ha~tington, 
Nebraska. Former member of the 
Nebraska Legislature. Friendly 
toward the Brooks Administration, the 
Agriculture Department and the 
Progra'm. 
Although these members might appear to have been selected on a 
political basis, their appointment was strongly in keeping with 
educational theory. These men were' eager students, involved in the 
effort because of their connections with agriculture and anxious 
enough to see the Program work to give of their time 
The repres~tatives on the committee reflected those 
and talents. 
sec tor s of the 
public engaged by the Program: fa!mers, legislators, urban 
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dwellers, educators, administrators, and researchers. The committee 
was expected to playa vital part in the Nehraska Program; however, 
its proponents did not reckon with its meeting a strong and 
ambitious administrator in the form of the chairman of the committee, 
the newly appointed Nebraska Department of Agriculture Director, nor 
did they foresee tha t the committee after some success might not 
actually operate as it was designed to. 
Committee members initially contributed significant 
suggestions useful in setting up the education effort and also 
played a small part in actual administration of the Program. 
Rossiter and Jensen were sent to Chicago where they contacted 
Dr. C. B. Linn of Universal Oil Products Company, Des Plaines, 
Illinois, who held patents on methods, of interchanging petroleum and 
grain starch molecules. Since petroleum-based synthetics were the 
chief rivals of grain starch-based goods, it was believed that 
potential relief of the national farm surplus would come from utili-
zation research discovery of areas where grain could compete with 
petroleum. After a briefing by Dr. Linn, the two committee members 
went to \,[ashington D.C. to view and discuss the national government' s 
research efforts with various federal officials. 
The Program Advisory Committee, after a few meetings, usually 
~ •... 
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once a month, and a few trips, virtually dropped from view. The 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture Director assumed a position of 
dominance through .his day-to-day handling of Program administration 
details. ~lthough the . committee was still useful as a program-
guiding sounding board, it began ~o meet only sporadically. 
Possible decisions with political implications were thrown to the 
committee to determine reaction of the public to certain Program 
moves. What had begun as an educationally sound concept, a board 
made up of Program participants began operating quite imperfectly. 
In addition to the advisory committee, other sections of the 
public immediately responded to the Program. In the late 1959 
period while enthusiasm for the Program's objectives as stated in 
LB-722 ran high, a gro~p at Central City, Nebraska led by State 
Senator Hans V. Larson and Mr. Thomas Moats formed the Merrick 
County Agricultural and Industrial Corporation. Its first efforts 
were directed toward investigating the possibility of opening a 
pilot grain alcohol processing plant in Central City. This was 
stimulated by some remarks made by Director Finigan concerning the 
reopening of such a plant in populous Omaha. Before industry, with 
government backing, could be enticed to do so, both had to be 
convinced it was necessary and possible. Thus the pilot plant was 
established for demonstration purposes. 
A second private group, the South Central Nebraska Agricul-
tural and Industrial Corporatiori, was formed at Hastings, Nebraska, 
and was to beco~e important in the New Crops phase of the Program. 
Both of the above groups contained competent promotion-minded 
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individuals and were destined to play significant roles in the 
education part of the Program as it developed from the theory stage 
into the "education of the Federal Government by example" stage. 
Since this ~ an important facet of the Program, it can be seen that 
these groups became of increasing imp~rtance to Program adminis-
trators. 
In advancing from·the theory stage to the actual initiation 
and operation of a program which would serve as a front and a lever 
for obtaining other objectives, the Nebraska Department of Agricul-
ture assigned staff personnel to gather quantities of utilization 
research information presumably not availabLe through the liter-
ature search. Evidence of this searching, researching, discussing, 
initiating and administering can be found in the 20,672 dollars in 
.' Program funds that were spent by the Department by June 1962. But 
funds were as plentiful as information in those first idealistic 
years of the Program. In an initial move, the federal government 
was persuaded to release 200,000 dollars to the Nebraska Program 
from the·recently deactivated Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, a 
. left-over from Depression years. Either State Senator Burbach had 
had his eyes on federal money in such funds as the aforem~ntioned 
Or he had surmised that, as in many previous cases, there would be 
some available when he added the amendment to LB-722 in committee 
which allowed any available federal funds to be used by the Program. 
In any case, the 200,000 dollars was the first channeling of federal 
money into the Nebraska Program. 
To guide the information gathering, the funding, any future 
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researchers, and the watching public in its education and evaluation, 
Finigan disseminated the following philosophy--mainly by way of the 
press: "Since Nebraska needs results fast, most funds of LB-722 will 
be spent ~ applied research which does not take the time of basic 
h ,,27 researc .. Again, this was a s?und move, for applied projects 
usually have more usable, "showy" results for educational purposes 
than basic research efforts. This statement was expanded in a 
department publication which presented the philosophy in a candid 
manner: 
The position of the department and its advisory group, the 
Agricultural Products Research Fund Committee, has been that 
basic research is an essential element of progress, but is 
primarily the responsibility of the universities and the 
privately endowed institutions who can afford to look far into 
the future; that, on the other hand, our present situation, 
being in the nature of an emergency, cries out for relatively 
short-term results. This is particularly true of the LB-722 
program, financed as it is from public tax funds and heavily 
dependent as it must be upon public support for its 
continuancefrom one TegT'STative session.!2. the next .. 
[Underlining min~28 
The publication continued: 
The main factors determining approval or disapproval of a 
research project proposal have been and will continue to be: 
1. Practicality of the subject matter. 
2. Its apparent chance of success in the not too distant 
future. 
3. Its cost in comparison to its prospects. 
4. Its eligibility for funds within the wording of 
LB- 722. 
5. Reasonable assurance that its performance will not 
duplicate other previous or existing projects. 
6. Demonstrated competence of the research institution 
and personnel to be assigned to the project. 
The department-committee team has not been hasty in 
cOMnitting itself to projects. [Underlining min~29 
It appeared, then, that "practicality" figured predominately 
in determining research projects and institutions '''hich could handle 
I 
them. The word was in fact mentioned quite frequently in Nebraska 
Department of Agriculture publications. Such an identifiable fact 
possibly stemmed from one or more of the following: 
1. N~aska Midwestern heritage of practicality. 
2. The need for tangible evidence or material to work with 
in the educational effort. 
3. The need for quick results by the Program for political 
reasons on the state level and lobbying reasons on the 
national level. 
4. The pressing need for a total solution or alleviating 
alternative to the agricultural surpluses situation. 
The Tangible Program 
It did not prove difficult to begin actual research. The 
difficulty lay in the careful selection of projects within the 
money a11oted, the chief criteria for which, as noted above, was 
practicality. There was immediate interest from private companies 
and individuals. The state was contacted by American Maize Products 
Company of Roby, Indiana, and Dr. J. W. Evans, Vice President In 
Charge of Research, briefed the Nebraska Agricultural Products 
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Research Committee on the merits of corn containing a high content of 
a chemical called "amylose. ,,30 Dr. Evans suggested that Nebraska 
test-grow the corn and laboratory-research the results, for the 
amylose starch had a high potential for use in industry. In 
addition, Dr. Evans suggested that Nebraska could point to itself as 
the western-most state to undertake such an effort and could 
advertise itself as a potential natural supplier for the West Coast 
market. It went without saying that the American Maize Company, 
would have been happy to see a non-competitive agency supply research 
effort and dollars toward the production and improvement of the very 
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item the company dealt with in the manufacture of food, textiles, 
paper and construction materials. It appeared to be a natural 
partnership containing much potential in regard to the publicity that 
could be ga~d for the Nebraska Program. 
An inquiry on castor beans ~as received by the Department 
from the Platte Valley Fertilizing Company of Nebraska. The company 
pointed out that the beans were used in industrial foams, missile 
fuels, and jet aircraft high-temperature lubricants, and that ninety 
percent of those put to such usage were imported from Brazil--inter-
esting information for those attempting to find not only industrial 
. uses but industrial crops to replace staple crops in surplus. Also 
of interest with respect to this particular proposal was the fact 
that in 1953 the University of Nebraska had worked on a castor bean 
project directed by Dr. J. H. Williams. The effort was an attempt 
to grow· the bean in Nebraska and was aided by the Baker Castor Oil 
Company and the Pacific Vegetable Oil Company of Richmond, 
California. While the effort was not a total failure, for data was 
obtained, it was nevertheless terminated without apparent success. 
It was decided that the slow growing season and weed and harvesting 
problems ruled out the castor bean for Nebraska. The University was 
therefore highly skeptical at the consequent promotion of the castor 
bean by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture. And when the 
Department and its company allies succeeded in initiating an 
education effort which persuaded Nebraskans in ten counties to grow 
ten thousand acres of the beans in 1960 through Program education 
and assistance, the University exhibited concern. Not that it did 
not have reason, for it could easily have been provoked by the 
increasingly education-oriented Department of Agriculture's use of 
the press and other mass media to promote department Program goals. 
Nevertheless, ~e was the tangible beginning of a coolness between 
university administrators (especiall¥ College of Agriculture 
individuals, but in the end reaching to Chancellor Hardin)3l and 
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32 Department of Agriculture administrators in regard to the Program. 
The Department found that the first research institution-
submitted project suggestions as supplemented by its own information-
gathering on crops were sound, and added the following to its 
philosophy of Program operation: 
Another are? of decision lies in the phrase "research and 
development." The cO!llInittee has interpreted this as 
permitting work both in the laboratories and in the field 
test plots (including the growth of new crops, with the 
hope of eventually diverting sizable acreage from surplus 
grains) as well as the development of new products •••• 33 
Now two areas of endeavor were defined which would be used to 
promote the Program's educative and lobbying goals. 
From Dr. C. B. Linn of Universal Oil Products Company, 
Des Plaines, Illinois, came a proposal for the development of paper 
34 from corn. However, the department was at that time looking into 
the making of paper from wheat and '·ras somewhat reluctant to change 
its emphasis, expecting more support from the well-organized wheat-
growers and therefore more power behind its impact on the federal 
35 government. Nevertheless, high-amylose corn eventually produced 
the better paper in commercial form after the Department had 
accepted Dr. Linn's proposals. It proved a belated but wise 
T , 
decision, for the concrete results which were promptly forthcoming 
were extremely useful to Program education efforts and political 
lobbying progress. 36 
As proposals continued to be received and projects continued 
#' 
to be evaluated, the Department f~und its activities in the agri-
cultural administration area expanding. Department Program admin-
istrators, Director Finigan and his aides, decided on a bold move. 
It was announced through the Advisory Committee that the Committee 
had voted in February 1960 to secure project proposals from private 
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1 b . 37 a oratorl.esG There had been no provision made for such a move, no 
basis established in LB-722. This broad interpretation of the Bill 
was another significant step in the Program in which the committee 
had a part. Further, the Committee took full responsibility for the 
move, shielding Finigan and the Department from criticism and thus 
freeing them for immediate action. Before possible opponents could 
grasp the significance of the move, they were presented with a fait 
accompli • 
There was immediate action on the part of the private labora-
tories, as could have been expected, for private laboratories, 
non-profit or otherwise, usually have many dormant projects and ideas 
which only await a source of working funds. Southwest Research 
Institute of Texas which had done previous work in the area of grain 
alcohol responded, as did Midwest Research Institute of Kansas City 
which had worked on uses for grain, and the Institute of Paper 
Chemistry of Wisconsin which had worked on starches for paper. The 
National Chemergic Council, which was later to elect Finigan to its 
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board of directors, was also heard from·with an offer of cooperation 
and assistance to the Program. This last group, being national in 
character, was a step forward in achieving the national recognition 
Nebraska was trying to bring to its Program,and the resulting 
educative fa110~ of which would be inyaluable. It was of extreme 
importance to the educative/lobbying efforts of the Program that by 
contracting out projects to private laboratories Nebraska had begun 
to spread its efforts over the entire United States, and would soon 
be able to release "results" obtained from laboratories reaching 
from New York to California and Wisconsin to Texas. 
A further development was that the USDA itself began 
submitting project proposals. Three were forwarded by the Northern 
Regional Laboratory of the USDA at Peoria, Illinois. 38 Nebraska, 
which viewed this development as an immediate Program educational 
success, gave the proposals serious consideration, but rejected 
them when it was found Nebraska would merely have been paying tech-
nicians working on existing USDA projects under USDA administration. 
This was not quite the effect of the educative/lobbying effort 
l-Iebraska had in mind. Further, patent rights for any discoveries 
vould not have gone to Nebraska under such a state-federal 
arrangement. Here again there seemed to be little of educative 
value, since the USDA could take credit for any discoveries. Later, 
after the ironing out of such details, cooperative projects were 
established at the University of Nebraska and on the West Coast at 
the USDA's Western Research Laboratory. The USDA, though, not yet 
fully cognizant of the goals of the Nebraska Program, continued to 
hold the opinion that Nebraska's work was a duplication of USDA 
research work with too little effort given too much emphasis for its 
size. When a Nebraska Department of Agriculture representative 
called on the USDA Assistant Administrator of Utilization Research, 
Dr. W. D. 
copy of a 
MCCl~ in washi~gton, th~ Nebraskan showed the official a 
Saturday Evening ~ editorial (June 10, 1961 edition) 
which praised the Nebraska Program, calling it "an example of the 
self-reliance that was once known as an American trait." Still not 
comprehending the true goals of the Program, but thinking mainly in 
terms of the research work, the administrator replied: '~e've been 
doing this for seventeen years and they don't even know we exist." 
The atmosphere of the visit remained cool during the rest of the 
. d' h t' 39 meet1ng, accor 1ng to t e representa 1ve • However, other indi-
. cations of aroused USDA interest in the Nebraska Program were just 
enough to convince Program administrators that they were on the 
right track to the achievement of their purposes. 
In all, a total of twenty-two projects and their deri-
vations were given initial consideration by the Nebraska Program. 
These included: 
(a) Industrial utilization of wheat gluten. 
(b) Utilization of grain starch. 
(c) Market potentials for high-amylose (high starch) corn 
and corn in general. 
(d) Breeding high-amylose corn hybrids for industrial 
utiliza tion. 
(e) Feasibility of castor beans as a commercial crop in 
Nebraska. 
(f) Development of production practices for castor beans 
in Nebraska. 
(g) Modification of dry-milled starch products for use in 
papermaking. 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
(h) 
(i) 
(j) 
(k) 
(1) 
(m) 
(n) 
(0) 
(p) 
(q) 
(r) 
(s) 
( t) 
Development of improved starch products of- increased 
versatility in paper-making systems. 
Effects of water conditions on the cooking, dispersion 
and paper-making properties of starch. 
Industrial utilization of lard, tallow, and meat scraps. 
Detoxification of castor bean pomace. 
Use of wheat straw in paper-making. 
Utilization of flesh of yearling hens. 
Saffl~er products invest~gation. 
Vege~ble growth<and commercial processing. 
Basic research into modification of starch molecular 
structure. 
Use of Nebraska wheat in bulgar-type products. 
Use of hard red winter wheat in the macaroni industry. 
Analysis of market opportunities for organic acids 
produced by fermentation processes. 
Three projects submitted by Northern Regional Laboratory 
of the USDA at Peoria, Illinois. 
In what could possibly be called the first approved Program 
project, it was announced through the Advisory Committee that the 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture would cooperate with the Great 
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Plains Wheat, Incorporated, organization of which the Nebraska Wheat 
Commission of the Department and the privately financed Nebraska 
Wheat Growers Association were members, to "give market bottlenecks 
as much emphasis as moving researched products into industry. ,,40 It 
had been suggested in the past that the entire Program should have 
been geared to function like the Great Plains Wheat, Incorporated, 
41 
marketing programs. Be that as it may, Nebraska had again estab-
lished an inroad to the federal government, for the chief partner 
with Great Plains, Incorporated, was the Foreign Agricultural 
Service (FAS) of the USDA which was responsible for promoting utili-
zation through export markets. Great Plains and FAS offices were 
located in the Netherlands, Peru, India, Pakistan, Japan and 
Washington D.C. This placed Nebraska's Program in an area of inter-
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national operations, an area of endeavor which later proved to be 
very successful for all parties and a rich field for Program 
educational use •.. The project became increasingly important for its 
ability to use its international aspects to garner national attention 
--as is pOin1 out later. in this !;hapter. 
Nine research projects were initially assigned of the twenty-
two given initial consideration, supported by Program funds located 
in the. Nebraska Department of Agriculture's Budget Appropriation· 
Account Number 14-A: 
MARCH 1960 
"(a)" above was assigned to Midwest Research Institute, 
Kansas City, Missouri. 
MAY 1960 
"(b)" and "(c)" above . d t M'd t R h were ass1gne 0 1 wes esearc 
Institute. 
"(f)" was assigned to the University of Nebraska 
Agricultural Experiment Station, Lincoln, 
Nebraska. 
"(e)" was assigned to the South Central Nebraska 
Agricultural and Industrial Corporation, Hastings, 
Nebraska. 
JUNE 1960 
"(d)" was assigned to the University of Nebraska 
Experiment Station. 
AUGUST 1960 
"(g)" "(h)" and "(i)" were assigned to the Institute of 
Paper Chemistry, Appleton, Wisconsin. 
By the end of 1964 contracts and understandings had been 
established with seven institutions, all non-profit organizations: 
BJORKSTEN RESEARCH LABORATORIES, Madison, Wisconsin 
FOSTER D. SNELL, INCORPORATED, New York, New York 
INSTITUTE OF PAPER CHEMiSTRY, Appleton, Wisconsin 
MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Kansas City, Missouri 
SOUTHWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE, San Antonio, Texas 
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, Lincoln, Nebraska 
USDA WESTERN RESEARCH LABORATORY, Albany, California 
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The assigning of projects to the institutions carried with it the 
problem for the Department of giving the institutions some idea of 
what the Program was to accomplish as to both its long- and short-
range goals. Much time was spent in conferences where the Department 
stressed that research results should be forthco~ing, and that it 
was these qu~results, not continued investigations, Nebraska was 
interested in for educative and lobbying reasons. The research 
agencies may have found instructive what the public was being told: 
Every effort is made to apportion 5esearch fundsJ among 
projects with a reasonable prospect of measureable success 
within the period for which they are set up. Extreme long 
shots are not in favor--the Program perfers more favorable 
odds and operates on a rather conservative basis. 42 
It was repeatedly emphasized to the laboratories that such successes 
as were realized should be exploitable. Exploitable for what was the 
key to the entire effort. Some still believed that project results 
should be marketable. 
A proposal was submitted by J. Leroy Welsh to reopen a grain 
alcohol processing plant which the Federal Government had operated in 
Omaha during World War II. The plant, which had produced alcohol for 
aircraft engines, had operated at a loss and was consequently closed 
at the war's end. J. Leroy Welsh, being an Omaha grain dealer, had 
tried for years to get legislation passed in Congress for the 
addition of grain alcohol to automobile gasoline. It was hoped that 
the Omaha plant could then be re-opened. Congress paid no heed, and 
Welsh turned to the Nebraska Program immediately upon its initiation. 
But the Nebraska Department of Agriculture was also unwilling to 
press the case: 
/JIw are not interested in "one shot'- uses for farm commod-
ities where technical feasibility has been demonstrated, 
but economic practicality has not. The committee thoroughly 
investigated the possibilities •••• 43 
Director Finigan and his Assistant Director, Leon Kreiner, also 
publicly repudiated the idea. 44 Nebraska's thinking was further 
demonstrated for research institutions to heed in a speech by 
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Finigan before ~ newly organized, Nebraska-initiated Agricultural 
Products Utilization Association (examined later in this chapter) on 
September 26, 1960. In the course of the attempt to expand the 
Program's educative aspects nationally and therefore increase its 
lobbying pressure on the Federal Government, Finigan counseled: 
A sound economic approach similar to Nebraska's is advocated 
before large sums are spent on random research projects that 
could produce interesting products, but ones for which the 
farmer could not afford to supply raw materials. 45 
The issue of "marketability" which stood in the way of pursuit of 
the Program's true goals was felt by administrators to have been 
effectively dealt with. 
Although several projects had been assigned to the University 
of Nebraska, Nebraska's primary research and education agency, it 
appeared that the Department had made these assignments to the 
University to avoid criticism from Nebraskans. It was likely that 
. the University would emphasize research over education. In any 
case, it was significant that the University was given projects 
which dealt only with production research, i.e. the New Crops phase 
of the Program. Since the University had done previous work on 
.castor beans, safflower, and amylose corn, it was quite appropriate 
that the University undertook this type of Program research. A more 
realistic appraisal was that the Program administrators believed the 
University lacked personnel and facilities for utilization research 
and development, that production research facilities and staff were 
more readily available, and that quick, exploitable results were 
needed by the state's utilization camEaign. The University 
consequently began with two projects and later was given four more, 
all but one continuing for five years. It was doubtful that the 
college even as a~ducation agency recognized that many of the 
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"Program's efforts were educational in nature. It did however have a 
media department which disseminated news about progress ~f the 
projects. Later discussions with university personnel revealed that 
they considered their work on these projects informative and 
therefore educational. This at least would have pleased the Program 
administra tors. 
Relations.between the executive leadership of the Nebraska 
Pepartment of Agriculture and the University of Nebraska's College of 
Agriculture were not particularly amiable. The two agencies had in 
C9llIlllon only a like dependence on the Legislature for funds, and the 
"Common title of "Agriculture." A better relationship existed on a 
person-to-person basis among the second echelon workers and admin-
istrators in both agencies. Individuals of certain divisions of the 
Department and the University worked with and respected each other, 
bo~h in regard to the research effort and in other day-to-day work of 
mutual interest. But the ever-changing personnel and policies of a 
Political agency were confusing and sometimes irritating to the 
versity. And the Department, in turn, did not seem to fully trust 
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the University with the full duties or full knowledge of the utili-
zation education effort. Consequently, suspicion of motives, 
operations, and objectives was evident in Program cooperation between 
the two agencies, and credit for any research results was guarded by 
both. The citizen who was not able to talk with individuals working 
in the agencies saw the battle being fought mainly through the 
press. This was much the way the struggle also went at the federal 
level. While the Nebraska Department pressed its case, the Federal 
.", 
Government's USDA attempted through the media to counter Nebraska's 
educative efforts which, it began to see, had the task of pointing 
out that not enough attention was being given utilization and utili-
zation research. Each agency, the Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture, the University, and the USDA attempted to claim that its 
progress in the field was the most important, most spectacular, and 
46 
most recent. All of this assisted the Nebraska Program's cause of 
educating the public about utilization. 
The Department-University conflict escalated significantly in 
late 1964 when Finigan abruptly cancelled all projects at the 
University and refused to pay 100,000 dollars in research claims by 
the institution. Finigan stated that "no progress was being made at 
the University and the agency had not complied with requirements for 
47 
reporting expenditures and results." Chancellor Clifford Hardin, 
at a meeting of all concerned, apparently ended department-
university Program cooperation for some time by candidly declaring 
that "["the Universit)!7 does not have ambitions in this ["utilization 
research} direction. The University doesn't want to become 
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,,48 involved where it would be a contracting agency for other groups. 
It could, therefore, be concluded that the Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture was initially correct in not wanting to contract utili-
zation research with the University, but was forced to do so by 
pressure from the public and the Legislature. On the other hand, 
there could be little doubt that the University had ultimately 
looked beyond its projects, had viewed the entire Program and had 
seen that it was not a true research program, but rather an 
,-
educative effort in which the University had little part in either 
the research or the education, and an ~ttempt to lobby the Federal 
Government by attention-getting tactics. In other words it saw an 
attempt underway to educate the public to bring the same kind of 
popular pressure on the Federal Government that it had brought on 
the Nebraska Department of Agriculture in order to force the 
Department.to contract research with the University. Thus ended for 
the time being cooperation between a state political agency and a 
state university on a vital national problem. It had endured 
approximately four and one-half years. In the end Program admin-
istrators had found the University deficient in the pursuit of 
Program goals, both educational and political. 
Exactly the opposite type of relationship appeared to develop 
between the Department and the Midwest Research Institute (MRI) of 
Kansas City. And as events would show, within the contracts of MRI 
lay the future power and glory of the Nebraska Program. The 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture worked most closely with this 
agency and was rewarded by the production of the most spectacular 
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results of the Program, promptly promoted by both institutions in 
relati~n to each agency's purposes. The philosophy of MRI seemed to 
have been ready-made for Nebraska's efforts. The outer page of an 
MRl publication invariably bore the following inscription: 
Nothing is so powerful as an idea_arriving at the right 
time--GOETHE 
Midwest Research Institute was built upon the fact that the 
Midwest needed an agency to help it participate and compete 
in the new technological age which this nation was entering in 
the middle 1940's •••• It is only recently, particularly in' 
the post-S~ik years, that the general public has begun to 
grasp the importance of scientific research; informed persons 
have recognized for many years that it is essential to the 
welfare of all people and to the prosperity and secur:ity of 
the nation. 
The continued flow of the material blesSings of civilization 
depends not only on the increase in scientific knowledge, but 
on the way in which knowledge can be put to use by indus-
try •••• MRI's research must not only be outstanding, but 
of economic value to the sponsor.49 
Perhaps because it so closely reflected the needs of agriculture and 
the parallel educative and research needs of the Nebraska Program, 
MRI became the primary research agency that helped press the 
,awakening of the general public and its representatives to the 
promise of utilization research. 
The states had been as guilty as their publics in their lack 
Of foresight in this field. And whi I.e the USDA had carried on 
research mostly in the production area, it could not be as heartily 
condemned, for it did have some utiliZation research in progress. 
Thus as the unique state-sponsored utilization program was underway 
(viewed by the public as a program of much the same type as the 
education and technology crash programs of the late 1950s, early 
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19605),50 Nebraska, as it wished, became' an experiment watched by 
many other states and the Federal Government. The State of Nebraska 
itself was a "pilot plant," and it fell to the Midwest Research 
Institute to make good both its own and Nebraska's philosophies in 
the research field. MRI was to produce_ the results for Nebraska to 
use in accordance with its Program goals. 
MRI was given the first three Program projects assigned out-
side the State of Nebraska. 5l Those projects, that state money, 'and 
the MRI philosophy later produced, among other things, a dissolvable 
film package made from corn which could be cooked and eaten without 
being removed from the food it contained--an item into which 
industry had put some six million dollars for research and 
52 development. Another initial MRI item was the Nebraskit Survival 
Ration. Both of these items proved invaluable to Nebraska Program 
goals. MRI immediately became the lead agency in the production of 
short-range, "crash" research results in the Nebraska Program. It 
was then up to Nebraska and its Department of Agriculture to 
accomplish the more subtle, long-range educational and political 
results in which the Program was engaged. 
A successful initial effort was also made by the Institute of 
Paper Chemistry (IPC).53 It submitted promising results of its 
research on grain starch as a paper bonding agent. 54 IPC was given 
three initial projects in August of 1960, involving some 69,000 
dollars, to try to demonstrate the feasibility of bringing grain 
starch into competition with paper bonding starch then imported from 
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, . ' 55 Tha11and. Midwest Research Institute watched this effort closely, 
for it was, as has been previously stated, also interested in 
starch utilization as applied to uses such as packagings and films. 
Nebraska Program directors were fully aware of the need and 
potential of such research, but was ~he United States Congress or the 
public at large? Nebraska Program directors did not think so. The 
head of Ford Foundation Resources for the Future, former Chancellor 
of the University of Nebraska, Dr. R. G. Gustafson, who may have 
been aware of the developing Nebraska effort, had stated the 
situation in remarkably.clear language: 
In my opinion, if the day they drilled the first oil well in 
America they had, instead of hitting a supply of petroleum, 
hit a supply of starch that would have served humanity for 
all time, and we had carried on like research on starches as 
has been carried on by the petroleum interests on petroleum, 
we could have been making practically everything that we are 
making today out of petroleum out of starches that are a 
surplus on the face of the earth and a burden to this nation 
and the taxpayers today.56 
The South Central Nebraska Agricultural and Industrial 
Corporation of Hastings, Nebraska extended its interests by 
providing field test plots and· furnishing supplies to the research 
institutions. In addition, with Nebraska Department of Agriculture 
guidance, other private individuals outside the corporations were 
furnished assistance in growing test plots. Such participation by 
individuals was evidence of the initial support being won for the 
Nebraska Program in its early stages through its educative efforts. 
All of the above projects and institutions were involved in 
the initial "tangible program" designed to produce "results" that 
could be exploited for educational, and later political, purposes. 
Projects at Bjorksten Laboratories and the USDA's Western Laboratory 
were added in 1961, and Snell, Incorporated and Southwest Research 
Institute were sigtled in 1962. The "research" effort was well 
underway by 1963. 
Goals Of The Research Projects 
It should not be forgotten that two areas of endeavor were 
paralleling each other during the above work. The intangible, 
ultimate goals of the Program were actively pursued on the 
educational/political levels during the actual work on the research 
projects. Even though the awarded projects were of high 'importance 
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to the Program and its relief-of-the-surpluses public goal, they must 
be kept in perspective by assigning them their proper place as a 
means to an end. And that end was an educational/political goal, the 
education of the public about utilization research and resulting public 
pressure on the Federal Government to adopt utilization research as a 
possible solution to the agricultural surpluses problem. It was, 
therefore, not essential for Nebraska's research program to undertake 
anything more than the initiation of "promising" projects and the 
revelation of spectacular "results" 'for educational and political 
,1easons. 
In pursuing the above mentioned tactics, certain bodies of the 
public were concentrated on. It was clear that education of the 
Nebraska public was of primary importance, for it supported and 
maintained the Program. Of equal tactical importance was the 
attraction and education of other states of the Union which could 
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lend'public, political, and financial support to the effort. 
Naturally Nebraska's neighboring states were aware of proceedings 
because of their proximity and their mutual interests. But 
Nebraska's efforts did not stop with the attention of neighboring 
states: a much wider national educati2n effort was planned. Public 
officials from the Nebraska Governor on down, particularly the 
Director of Agriculture and the Agresearch Advisory Committee, in 
addition to numerous private individuals of high prestige, energy, or 
interest, formed an education task force whose focus was the nation. 
This endeavor met with some success as the Program came to assume a 
place of interest among certain areas and groups of the nation: 
various state governments, individual public officials, legis-
latures, groups among the public, the press, schools and educators. 
The most favorable result Nebraska hoped for among the states was 
positive legislative action on their part, adding assistance to what 
was yet only an isolated state action. Bringing the ·concerted power 
of state governments to bear on the Federal Government was expected 
to have the influence that a reverse action usually has on the 
states. 
As a first step in the effort to obtain the backing of other 
states, Nebraska Governor Brooks requested that a conference be held 
among states having an interest in the Nebraska Program either agri-
c.ul turally, industrially, financially, educationally, politically, or 
otherwise. It was a first attempt to establish negotiations among 
the states, with the desired strategic result being a coordinated 
education effort culminating in a forceful public lobbying effort 
up;'n the Federal Government. Admittedly, the assistance which a 
regional effort would bring was most important in the area of the 
education effort,. for all else--moral support, financial backing, 
active research participation, promotion, political assistance-~ 
would be expected to follow. The ~nitial meeting of the interested 
and the curious was held January 6, 1960 at Shenandoah, Iowa, 
57 
sponsored by that city's chamber of commerce. Many of the states 
represented did not confer official status upon their represen-
tatives. Officially the roster read that Iowa, Missouri, and 
Nebraska attended. Nebraska Director of Agriculture Finigan served 
as chairman of this meeting which named committees on "organization" 
and "by-laws." The name "Agriculture Products Utilization 
Association" was selected to give the loose union some type of 
official standing. 
Director.Finigan later reported that the tactical purpose of 
the meeting was "the coordination of applied research and an 
exchange of information in the development of new uses for agri-
culture products now in surplus." He added: "It was not our 
purpose to immediately initiate research programs in independent 
laboratories, educational institutions, or private businesses as 
reported by some of the press."S8 Nebraska was therefore tactfully 
not asking for an immediate outlay of money by other states, a 
tactic which might have caused immediate skepticism among members 
and potential members of the Association. Rather, it appeared that 
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the ultimate goals of the effort were stressed. And it could not be 
denied that it was an appropriate time to stress those intangible 
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goals, for no greater pressure could be brought to bear on Congress 
or the Federal Government than the voice of the states, their legis-
latures, and their people, who also choose the makeup of the Congress 
and therefore the Federal Government as a whole. The strategic aim 
of the entire effort was made clear~for the close observer to 
discern and for the states to actively support on an educational or 
. political front. The official statement as released by the 
Shenandoah group declared that the group would: 
••• follow Nebraska U.S. Senator Carl Curtis' suggestions 
as contained in an amendment to the 1959 House Industrial 
Bill. fThese wer~: a. fContinued pressure tqJ require 
the federal government through the USDA to contract with out-
side research facilities including colleges of agriculture 
for a substantial and increasing amount of agricultural 
research and, b. fContinued pressure tqJ require the 
federal government to include in all agricultural-industrial 
research contracts provisions for pilot testing and trial 
commercialization of new farm products and new crops in order 
to assist utilization. 59 
Such bold indications of the true direction of the entire effort, 
from Nebraska's Program to the coordinated actions of a regional or 
nation-wide group, were rare. 
Of passing note at this meeting was a suggestion by Iowa 
State Senator Harbor. The Senator proposed that federal financial 
help be requested only as a last resort in any state's utilization 
research venture. The probable impact of this proposal on the 
gathering, especially upon the Nebraskans, could be theorized as 
somewhat other than positive, for prodding the Federal Government to 
greater action whether on the federal level or on the state level 
was one of the chief goals of the meeting and the effort. No support 
was gained for Harbor's suggestion. It was, however, agreed upon to 
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ask Vice President Nixon to attend a 'future Midwest meeting of 
. d 60 1ntereste states. Investigation revealed no record of Mr. Nixon or 
United States Secretary of Agriculture Benson ever accepting such an 
. • • b h' 61 1nv1tat10n y t 1S group. Representatives of the states remained 
at this point the highest opinion le~ders the Nebraska Program could 
draw, educate, and hope to see spread its gospel. 
A second meeting of the Association, held February 25, 1960 in 
Lincoln, Nebraska, saw serious organization get underway among 
members. Nebraska State Senator H. B. Stryker was elected chairman 
of the Association and an acting board of directors was created: 
Jefferson Broady, Brownville, Nebraska 
Hans V. Larson, Central City, Nebraska 
H. B. Stryker, Rising City, Nebraska 
Frank Hoxie, 'Shenandoah, Iowa 
J. W. McMannanma, Shenandoah, Iowa 
Raymond Eveland, Kelly, Iowa 
Franklin Main, Lamoni, Iowa62 
Incorporation of the Association took place under Nebraska's Nonprofit 
Corporation Act. Incorporators were: 
Iowa State Senator Frank M. Hoxie 
Missouri State Representative Fred Mahon 
Nebraska State Senator Harold B. Stryker 
Nebraska Research Advisory Committee member 63 Maynard Jensen 
At this 'and subsequent meetings held at Saint Joseph and 
Kansas City, Missouri; Denver, Colorado; Council Bluffs, Iowa; and 
Omaha, Nebraska during the 1960-1962 time period, full discussion took 
place on methods for advancing the purposes of the organization. 
Reports of the Nebraska Program's progress were disseminated and the 
views of the various specialists were heard. Association officers and 
other individuals also reported on their progress. The organization 
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had achieved the wide interstate character it had hoped for, if one 
considered the states present at its meetings. These included at 
various times repr~sentatives from New Mexico, Oregon, Wyoming, the 
Dakotas, the South, and the Midwest. However, by the last meeting of 
the Association in 1962 before it ce~sed to meet, only Iowa and 
Nebraska were official members. States such as Missouri continued to 
send only unofficial representatives; Colorado's Governor Nichols 
indicated his interest by sending a personal, but unofficial 
observer; Kansas was represented at one meeting and not thereafter. 
Nonetheless the Association was serving its purpose as an educational 
. group, a sounding board, a pressure group, an official working body 
carrying the battle to the Federal Government via the states. This 
prompted Nebraska Director of Agriculture Finigan to observe: 
"A regional program, even if only Iowa and Nebraska participate at 
first, will. accomplish far more than we could hope to alone." 
Iowa did indeed make a valiant attempt to assist its 
neighboring state. Advocates of utilization research in Iowa, 
Kansas, and Missouri had actively campaigned for programs similar to 
.. Nebraska's, but only Iowa's came close to realization when in 1960 
Iowa legislators indicated at the convening of their Legislature that 
a bill concerning such research would be introduced. An Agricultural 
Products Utilization Association meeting was called on 
November 20, 1960 by Nebraska to influence such a bill. The 
education effort undertaken upon ·the Iowa public and its represen-
tatives by the Association could be termed a precedent, forecasting 
Similar action in the hope of influencing other states' legislation 
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. h 64 1TI t e same area. Unfortunately for such hopes and for the 
progress of the over-all effort, Iowa's legislation was indeed 
introduced but failed to be voted into law. This in turn, 
of course, resulted in yet further intensification of the Nebraska 
Program's education efforts in Iowa~ as its need was seen to be 
greater then at first expected. 
Governor Brooks of Nebraska had meanwhile been utilizing his 
office to assist in widening the education and political front on a 
higher level, to keep the struggle to draw other states into the 
effort moving. In conjunction with Finigan's work in forming a 
utilization association to act as a center for cooperative thought, 
education, and action, Brooks persuaded the Governor of Minnesota, 
Orville Freeman, to hold a Midwest Farm Conference in Saint Paul, 
Minnesota. (Ironically, Freeman was later to become United States 
Secretary of Agriculture and was therefore to assume a position 
which, among others,wou1d be a focal point of attack for the very 
forces he was assisting in 1960. After he assumed the Secretary's 
duties in 1961 it soon became evident that he was seeing things 
from a federal standpoint.) The conference, held March 4, 1960, was 
attended by two other Governors, Loveless of Iowa and Herseth of 
South Dakota. Representatives were sent from other surrounding 
states. 
The stated purpose of the meeting, significantly broad so as 
to interest as many states and individuals as possible, was to 
discuss the economic impact of pending federal farm legislation. 
Brooks gave added impetus by publicly ·stating: 
The farm bills before Congress leave too much discretionary 
power in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture. That 
situation has been substantially responsible for the agri-
culture problems of farmers such as in Nebraska. 65 
After taking one last verbal swing at Secretary of Agriculture 
66 Benson, branding him as "opposing all positive progress," Brooka 
revealed through further statements the underlying purpose of the 
Minnesota meeting. It was to Brooks' credit that, while 
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criticizing present policy, he suggested constructive alternatives. 
The presentation of those alternatives was the purpose of the 
meeting, and those alternatives were, of course, "positive 
approaches to agriculture problems like Nebraska's Legislative 
Bill 722 and organizations like the South Central Nebraska 
1 d d 1 . f . b ka ,,6 7 Agricu ture an In ustria Corporat~on 0 Hast~ngs, Ne ras • 
The conference soon focused on consideration of proposed federal 
legislation and appeals by the group for serious public and federal 
consideration of the utilization research approach to agriculture's 
problems. Limited results were obtained at the meeting on both 
subjects, but Nebraska had at least been successful in establishing 
another educative inroad among high opinion leaders, the political 
leaders of other states who could do no less than amplify the 
Nebraska Program's voice among their peoples and through their 
channels to the Federal Government. 
From 1961 to 1962 the educative effort applied to other 
states to gain overt support for the Program slackened. Nebraska 
leaders Were marshalling forces and gaining new evidence with which 
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to renew the tactical effort to convince other states. By 1962 
Nebraska began to feel t~hat its sister states, especially Iowa which 
had appeared so promising, were merely tagging along providing some 
vocal support but little financial or legislative action until they 
saw how the Nebraska Program fared educationally and politically: 
whether it could maintain public support in the face of a production-
orientated tradition, and whether it did indeed have a chance of 
federal recognition. Evidence of this Nebraska concern began to 
appear in speeches by Nebraska officials and in their statements to 
the press. In 1962 at one of the last significant meetings of the 
Agricultural Products Utilization Association (attended, among 
others, by Iowa~Governor Erbe, his Secretary of Agriculture Liddy, 
Iowa State Senator Hoxie, Nebraska Governor Morrison, his Director 
of Agriculture Finigan, and Nebraska State Senator Stryker); Liddy 
responded to this criticism by asking that it be remembered Iowa had 
made an unsuccessful attempt two years before to set up a program 
like Nebraska's, but could get no funds appropriated. 68 
Governor Erbe poured oil on the troubled waters by stating that Iowa 
would try again to launch a program within two years, but that 
tt · f th 1 . 1 t b· 1 .. . 69 ge 1ng money rom e eg1s a ure was a 19 1m1tat10n. Finigan 
responded that (apparently in spite of Nebraska's efforts on the 
education front) "Iowa's try for a program failed because legis-
lators and the people had not been convinced of the value of such a 
program.,,70 J. Leroy Welsh, whose patience was by then growing thin 
with congressional inaction on his commission's proposals, took the 
occasion of a speech before the Association to blast the national 
-
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public, Congress, and the USDA for a similar lack of understanding of 
the problem. On those notes the Association, which was a excellent 
educational device, seemed to again fade into the background. It was 
June of 1962 before another concrete act took place outside Nebraska's 
borders to complement the Nebraska effort. A private group of 
individuals opened Agri Research, Incorporated in Manhattan, Kansas 
to promote utilization research through education to attract 
. 71 
industries which would use agricultural products. 
The Nebraska Program also met a serious crisis on the political 
front in 1960. Approximately one year after the Program's enactment 
and six months after its strong supporter Governor Brooks of 
Nebraska had launched his drive for other states' support, the 
Governor died in office (September 9, 1960). Lieutenant Governor 
DWight W. Burney assumed the Governor's chair. 
The resulting political situation could have affected the 
Nebraska Program in many ways. The passage of LB-722 had pleased 
lIl,my people on both sides of the political aisle. The registered 
Republican majority in the "nonpartisan" Unicaml'ral had until this 
"time been indulgent of Brooks' and Finigan's Program management. That 
"honeymoon" was now endangered. Brooks and his appointed fellow 
Democrat Finigan had worked together as an effective team not only as 
officials of state government but as close personal friends. The 
Governor's death struck Finigan deeply. It also dealt a blow to the 
Democratic Party in Nebraska, for its first governor elected in some 
two decades was struck down before he had completed even one term. 
With the assumption of the Governor's Office by Republican 
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Lieutenant Governor Dwight W. Burney,' the appointed Democratic admin-
istrators of the Nebraska Program became apprehensive about the 
future of the Program and of their jobs. Their fears must surely 
have increased when Governor Burney removed Mr. Frank Golden, Chief 
of the State Cigarette Tax Division~ Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture, because of his parallel job as Chairman of the 
Lancaster County Democratic Party organization. At this same time, 
the close cooperation between the Governor's Office and the Office ,of 
the Director of Agriculture ended. Director Finigan could certainly 
have been removed for his activities as a stalwart in the Democratic 
Party. If this had in fact happened, the utilization research 
effort would have lost a champion in a position of leadership within 
a state. However, events served to keep the same Nebraska 
Department of Agriculture administrators with their first-hand 
knowledge of the_Program in their positions. This is not to say that 
others could not have handled the Program, but to point out that 
those who had helped create the Nebraska Program, managed it 
through the legislative process, devised realistic goals for it, put 
.it into operation, and attempted to expand it nationally were 
permitted to continue in positions where their past experience could 
,continue to benefit the effort. Perhaps Governor Burney felt he did 
not have a proper or powerful enough mandate at the time to make 
further changes. Possibly there were other pressures, but probably 
Burney decided to await the impending elections when a most likely 
(in Nebraska) new Republican governor would have the prestige of 
election to remove the popular Finigan by exercising the pr'erogative 
.' 
of a newly elected governor to appoint his own directors. This 
situation almost came to pass, not through a Republican governor, 
but because Frank a. Morrison, another Democrat (from Lincoln), was 
elected Governor November 3, 1960. 
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Despite the fact that the new governor and the incumbent 
director of agriculture were of the same political party, the 
question arose as to Finigan's retention. Morrison and Finigan were 
not on the best of political terms because of past differences on how 
the Nebraska Democratic Party should be run. Finigan and the late 
Governor Brooks had been powerful voices in the party by right of 
their offices and tended to'cooperate with the Chairman of the State 
Democratic Party, Bernard Boyle of Omaha, top party policy-maker and 
political foe of Morrison. Finigan's political past was therefore 
tainted as to his inclusion in a Morrison Administration. It became a 
question of whether Finigan would adhere to Morrison policy, which 
would include one unsuccessful attempt and a later successful effort 
to remove Chairman Boyle and replace him with a Morrison man; 
whether Morrison would realize Finigan's usefulness to his admin-
'~istration, to the state and to its Program; or whether Finigan might 
move on to a United States Senate nomination, for which Morrison was 
certain to have tried ,in the next election and for which Finigan was 
now considered the most likely substitute. It appeared likely that 
Finigan would have announced his Senate candidacy had he been turned 
out of office,72 but he first made known that he would prefer to 
remain in Nebraska, in his job with the Program, and in harmony with 
Morrison. Morrison accepted the new ally whose worth he realized and 
. --.', 
···,11\ 
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whose help against Boyle he needed, and reappointed Finigan after the 
Governor assumed his office January 1, 1961. Finigan therefore 
remained as one hold-over link between the old administration and 
the new one in regard to the Nebraska Program, for Senator Jensen, 
author of LB-722, left the Nebra,ska Legislature to ·himself assume a 
federal job. Thus the Nebraska Program weathered political events 
and fortunes during the first year or so of its existence. The 
future appeared promising, for the Morrison Administration anchored 
itself on the Program and began to apply itself to it; however, the 
use of it for gaining public exposure for the administration later 
proved to hinder the true goals of the Program, which were educa-
tional. 
The Political and Economic Context of the New Crops Effort 
At first the New Crops section of the Program.made the most 
progress while the laboratories were beginning the somewhat slower 
activity of product utilization research. The goal of this work was 
to demonstrate to Nebraskans that they could become the nation's 
leading producers and processors of industrial oil crops. The 
ability of Nebraska to compete in this field was based on its 
abundance of usable land and water, in contrast to chief competitors 
Texas and California with their high-cost land and water. The 
over-all effort was helped by the very kind of political assistance 
Nebraska was trying for--federal legislation. In 1962 Congress 
passed legislation permitting the farmer to plant industrial crops 
on the same idle acres he was drawing government payments on for 
107 
taking the land out of production. The farmer could therefore 
plant, harvest, and sell the very crops the Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture was encouraging through the New Crops section of its 
utilization education program, while drawing one-half of his 
previous federal payments. In this particular case an interesting 
effect was noticed: The Nebraska Program, stressing utilization 
education, had capitalized on the traditional production-oriented 
thinking of the farmer, and Nebraska castor bean and safflower 
" d" "f" I 73 acreage lncrease slgnl lcant y. This successful experiment, 
especially the castor beans, proved to be a "feather in the cap of 
" . " d h b ka f" 1 .. 74 Dlrector Flnlgan an t e Ne ras Department 0 Agrlcu ture, not 
to mention the fledgling Democratic Administration which was 
striving to gain prestige and maintain position. But more in 
keeping with Program goals, such success with legislation and 
experiments could not help but have. had an educative effect on a wide 
public and its representatives. 
While attending to the favorable educative and political 
effects all this would have, Director Finigan was aware of the 
desirability of achieving a transition from a state dependent upon 
agriculture to one dependent upon industry, although an agricultural 
emphasis would have to be maintained in that industry. At least a 
balance would be tried for, with an a"lareness that industry would 
later have to gain a predominance if Nebraska and her fellow agri-
cultural states were to compete effectively in an industrial-
technological American society. This fact could also be found in 
the Nebraska Blue Book statistics for the 1950's, for even though 
the industrial work force rose in the ·state from 1950 to 1960, the 
rise was not in balance with the reduction in agricultural workers: 
YEAR 
1950 
1960 
AGRICULTURAL 
(FARM) 
WORK FORCE 
200,000 
130 ,000 
70,000 
INDUSTRIAL 
(MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING) 
WORK FORCE 
45,000 
66,000 
+ 21,000 
The progress of the New Crops effort was not without its 
troubles. Noteworthy among these was the running University of 
Nebraska-Nebraska Department of Agriculture battle conducted mainly 
in the press as to who should get credit for ·introducing industrial 
crops to Nebraska and for educating the state's public as to their 
worth. The University, while willing to concede that its fellow 
state agency had been fairly successful in its education program to 
gain widespread adoption of the crops, correctly claimed that it had 
been the first to recognize the importance and promise of such a 
program and had experimented with the industrial crops in the past. 
~he University was effectively countered by the fact that it had 
concluded that industrial crops were not suited for growing in 
Nebraska and had abandoned its efforts to convince Nebraskans to 
plant and grow them. 
Another inevitable struggle was the political two-party 
confict. Although the Program enjoyed over-all bipartisan support, 
it became painfully clear to Republicans that the Democratic admin-
istrations were deriving total benefit and increasing strength from 
Program progress. Republican-oriented newspapers, such as the 
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Hastings Tribune owned by former Eisenhower Secretary of the Interior 
and later Nebraska gubernatorial candidate Fred Seaton, mixed their 
reporting of the Program with criticism, however constructive •. Among 
various charges by the Tribune and the Omaha World-Herald was the 
Tribune's accusation that the Program A~visory Committee was 
encroaching on the duties officially assigned to the Resources 
Division of the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, the legitimate 
organization charged with bringing industry into the state and 
locating it. (In doing so, the Division was to educate industry 
about Nebraska, and Nebraskans about how to get and treat industry.) 
The Tribune commented: 
The Agriculture Committee is taking over some of the duties 
of the Nebraska Resources Division in locating industry in 
Nebraska. It isn't that the Resources Division can't use 
help, but it appears to this writer that the committee would. 
be more effective in using its funds for basic research ••• 
Indeed, it would seem that Finigan, in his newspaper columns, 
should discuss functions of the committee, telling just what 
it can and can't do.75 
The foregoing was valid, constructive criticism, but no direct 
reply by Finigan was ever made. The answer to such a charge lay in 
the fact that the Resources Division, though it had done a 
commendable job in the past, lacked adequate funds and personnel to 
.fully carry out its duties. Since Nebraska and its Midwestern sister 
states needed all the help they could get in attracting industry, the 
chance to use the funds, personnel, .educational structure, publicity, 
. and prestige of the Program was looked upon by Program administrators 
as an assist to the Resources Division's work, not as a usurpation or 
duplication of its authority and duty. In addition, not only was 
'i 
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Director Finigan the head of the department of which Resources was a 
division, but he was by law the Resources Division Advisory Committee 
Chairman as well as being Chairman of the new Nebraska Program 
Advisory Committee. In sum total Director-Chairman Finigan was in an 
excellent position to utilize the Reso~rces Division and the Nebraska 
Program for similar purposes as he pleased. 
As a sidelight to the above situation, and perhaps a clue to 
why the Resources Division question was exploited by the Seaton-
owned Tribune, was the fact that the Resources Division head, 
Mr. David Osterhout, was.a staunch Republican appointed during a past 
Republican administration. It was well known that his views and 
Finigan's were not compatible, for obvious reasons. The political 
climate that had caused many Republicans to desert their party and 
assist in electing a Democrat governor in 1959 caused that governor 
(Brooks) to .wisely maintain his strength by being moderate, even 
quite conservative (as his successor Morrison would be), and keep 
many Republicans in leadership positions within the state govern-
~ental structure. This sometimes caused delicate working rela-
·tionships and some political conflict, as can be seen from the 
Finigan-Osterhout situation. 
The New Crops Educational Effort 
A look at the New Crops branch of the Program can best be given 
by viewing the work done with castor beans. The need to change the 
thinking and behavior of agricultural workers was pointed out by such 
things as this newspaper headline: "Need To Find Replacement Crops 
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For 245,000 Acres Of Wheat Lost As Quotas Tighten.,,76 In Nebraska, a 
Cheyenne County committee went to the state university with the 
problem. The University promised to do research; however, it was by 
that time significantly behind the Nebraska Program in such a field, 
having concentrated its efforts on increasing production of tradi-
tional crops through hybrid grains production research. The 
University had originally experimented with castor beans in the 
1950's, but had abandoned them as not feasible for growing in the 
Midwest. At the beginning of the 1960's another state agency took up 
the challenge on two fronts: the education of the public in the 
growing of the plant, and the utilization of ~it. 
Using as a stimulus the fact that ninety percent of all castor 
oil used as low grade lubricants, medicines, and high temperature 
oils in the United States was imported from Brazil, the Nebraska 
Department of Agriculture let contracts for laboratory experimen-
tation on the oil as an industrial fluid and funded the growing of 
1,500 acres of the plant by the University of Nebraska and the South 
Central Nebraska Agricultural and Industrial Corporation of Hastings 
~in 1960. With the help of the Department the Hastings Corporation 
contracted with Pacific Vegetable Oils Corporation of 'San Francisco 
and Baker Castor Oil Company of Bayonne, New Jersey for purchase of 
the harvest from 1,000 of the planted acres. This purchase proved 
that the all-important buyers, the industrial users of the product, 
were available. It was up to the' Nebraska Program to make the 
Midwest public aware of the opportunity to attract these industries, 
and to therefore widen production of both raw materials and finished 
i 
" 
I 
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products. The Federal Utilization Laboratory at Albany, California, 
a federal government institution which was watching the progress of 
the state-run, state-financed Program, estimated that an awakened 
agriculture industry could increase its castor oil market by ten to 
fifty times--significant encouragement for the Nebraska Program from 
an important branch of the Progr~m's target federal agency, the USDA. 
The University of Nebraska reactivated its abandoned castor 
bean breeding program and, with restored Nebraska Program funds which 
previously had been withdrawn as recorded in this chapter, began 
experimentation on the production of hybrids for the Midwestern 
climate and conditions. The University was back with the Program, 
operating where it performed best--production research. As education 
about this crop was increased by the Department and the newly 
aroused University, interest within Nebraska increased: five hundred 
people gathered at Hastings, Nebraska to see the first castor bean 
crop harvested in the fall of 1960. 77 
Another 1,500 acres of the crop were grown in 1961, but in -
1962, as the education effort expanded, those who had held back to 
-watch the outcome of experimentation cast their vote, and 10,000 acres 
were grown. This figure represented fifty percent of the nation's 
1962 production of a crop hardly known in the Midwest before the 
78 Nebraska Program. McRoberts Industries of Hastings, Nebraska 
be d' b h . h d f' h b' 79 gan pro uClng castor ean arvestlng ea s to It w eat com lnes, 
and tractor-mounted flamethrowers were experimented with for culti-
80 
vating the crop. 
Education designed to increase acreage, and publicity about 
... .' 
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the attraction of more industry to Nebraska and the Midwest, an 
attractive prospect for urban workers, continued under Program 
auspices. Finigan stated that companies were discussing the possi-
bility of establishing processing plants in the state costing three 
million dollars and having a projected_payroll of one million dollars 
if 60,000 acres were grown. This was verified when the Pacific Oil 
Company of San Francisco indicated that if Nebraska could grow five 
hundred short tons of castor beans the company would build such a 
81 plant. Finigan and his staff met repeatedly with Nebraska 
chambers of commerce to discuss the attraction and location of such 
82 industry. Finigan then proceeded to ask the State Legislature for 
a 1960-61 Program budget increase of 156,000 dollars over the current 
1959-60 allotment for resources and industry attraction, an increase 
over that total of 142,000 dollars in 1961-62, and a leap of 
83 333,000 dollars over that in the 1962-63 budget. 
Using the methods and inertia of the successful castor bean 
program, education about a second new crop, safflower, was begun. The 
newly aware farmer evidenced a crop-growing attitude and behavioral 
-change that increased safflower' s acreage enough that the Pacific Oil 
Company of San Francisco did indeed build a processing plant at 
84 
. Sidney, Nebraska. Sesame, a Southeast Asian plant used by Americans 
in foods, was introduced into the state by the educative machinery of 
th P '1962,85 hOI h f d' d e rogram 1n W 1 e guar, anot er new crop rom In 1a an 
86 Pakistan, continued to be studied in test plots. 
The Nebraska Democratic Administration seized upon the fore-
going progress for political advantage in the eyes of the state 
114 
public, while continuing the effort to gain nationwide attention for 
the Program. 
The PoliticRl And Economic Context Of The New Uses Effort 
As time progressed, the laboratory projects, or "New 
Industrial Uses" branch of the Program, picked up momentum and began 
to gain its share of attention from the education unit. By 
September 1960, approximately one year after the Program's 
initiation, 444,630 dollars worth of projects had been approved for 
contracting to research institutions, and the Nebraska Research 
Advisory Committee, slowly regaining stature, continued to meet 
monthly to consider further proposals. 87 At this point projects 
were well underway and could be used for educational discussion 
purposes, but there were as yet no results or discoveries to 
"tilize. 
The Nebraska Legislature also' continued to work closely with 
the utilization research and education effort. A move to widen the 
scope of LB-722 to include certain other areas of investigation by 
the University·of Nebraska was supported by Director Finigan and 
passed in September 1960. 88 The Program's education unit had gained so 
.much prestige for its accomplishments that Senator Joe Vosoba, at 
Governor Morrison's request, introduced a University of Nebraska 
study which resulted in the Legislature's Education Committee rushing 
to the floor a bill (LB-702) to create a Nebraska Industrial Research 
Institute, then sending in LB-160 designed to have the state's 
Abandoned Property Trust Fund finance it. Again Director Finigan 
89 
supported the move. 
There were indications during this time that the Nebraska 
Program's educative apparatus was gaining increased national 
attention for the Program, a direct goal of the effort. In 
September 1960 representatives of the Jederal government (USDA), 
Midwest Research Institute personnel, and Director Finigan met in 
Kansas City, Missouri to discuss what Nebraska was doing. 90 The 
meeting was reported in these terms: 
The federal government is curious about practical studies 
made by Nebraska •••• The work of Finigan's department is 
beginning to attract widespread attention. There is 
hopefulness in the state's new policies. • But there 
are national problems in agriculture which cannot be 
successfully treated on the state level. 91 
-After such praise on the state and national level,Nebraska reit-
era ted its bid for the location of a federal utilization laboratory 
in the state,92 pushing its new-found advantage to the fullest 
extent. 
The Legislature and the Nebraska Department of Agriculture 
began in 1961 to take action designed to anticipate the future. As 
information on results in the r.esearch projects began filtering in, 
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consideration of patents on new products and processes was begun. In 
much of the research entered into by the Nebraska Agricultural 
Products Research Fund Committee the contracts provided for the 
assigTh~ent of patents on discoveries to the Committee (1959-1960).93 
Since the department had no previous guidance for dealing with 
patents, it was necessary for the Legislature to provide a further 
legal base. LB-597 was passed in 1961 designating the Nebraska 
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from the Nebraska-financed Program stay wi thin Nebraska boundaries .• 
This of course hindered progress toward the interstate cooperation 
state officials .were working for. It became apparent that increased 
education efforts were necessary to inform Nebraskans of this need 
as well as to educate the national pu~lic as to its duty. Emphasis 
was soon switched to this endeavor for a period of time. Finigan, 
however, did not hesitate-to approach the state public for increased 
financial support for the Program, commenting that he wished "to see 
the Agricultural Research Fund Levy raised to .5 percent of a mill 
from .1 percent.,,98 
Utilization Education Material: New Uses Project Results 
-An examination of the laboratory research achievements found 
a tendency on the part of research institutions to claim significant 
or encouraging initial results in order to prompt renewal of their 
contracts. It was difficult to determine which claims of the 
research laboratory, the contracting agency and its education effort, 
and the politician were actually significant and which were part of 
the "carrot" technique. 
During 1960 the Midwest Research Institute (MRI) of 
Kansas City, Missouri, working with a project under the direction of 
Dr. J. W. Barger, a former DuPont Company scientist in charge of 
basic and developmental research, produced a clear plastic film from 
amylose corn which had packaging, wrapping, and other commercial 
possibilities. Dr. Barger, Dr. J. W. Evans, Vice President for 
Research of American Maize Products Company, Roby, Indiana, and 
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Dr. John Lonquist, a University of Nebraska specialist, conferred 
with the Nebraska Merrick County Industrial Group and a Hamilton 
County group to see about the raising and supplying of amylose corn 
to the laboratories and eventually to a manufacturer. Merrick County 
99 
was selected. Florida winter planting§ of the corn to speed up 
research by year-around experimentation were cancelled as a result of 
the Merrick County group's agreement and the imminent perfection of 
the films. lOO 
Nebraska proceeded to take the necessary patent steps, filing 
applications in the United States ("Plasticized Extrusion for 
Amylose," United States Patent Office, Serial Number 159,752, 
December 15, 1961), in Britain and in Canada, all retroactive to 
December 15, 1961. An MRI patent attorney informed the Nebraska 
Department of Agriculture that a European Common Market single patent 
registration was imminent and that filing with the Continent could be 
held till then. Governor Morrison requested bids on the patent and 
the Department of Agriculture placed a legal advertisement in the 
101 Wall Street Journal, a significant historic move, for few states 
-had ever put patents up for bids or _received royalties from them. 
Response was immediate. A number of countries, several European and 
,one Asian, expressed interest in the development of the film. l02 
American firms such as Thiokol Chemical Corporation of Trenton, 
New Jersey and others, it was learned through Dr. Max Thorton, a 
Vice President of MRl, had been paying visits to MRI during the past 
year gathering information on research progress in addition to 
sending written inquiries. l03 In April 1962 the Nebraska Department 
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of Agriculture applied for the approval' of the United States Food and 
Drug Administration for the films. By the end of 1962 the films 
were being experimentally produced commercially, with construction 
of a pilot plant at Central City, Nebraska slated for 1963. 104 
During this time the Department's educ~tion unit prepared to exploit 
one of the developments it had hoped would be produced to dramatize' 
the Program's goals. The pilot plant was invaluable to this effort. 
As MRI continued its film, textile fiber, and adhesive 
research utilizing surplus agricultural products, Bjorksten 
Laboratories at Madison,Wisconsin, with an expenditure of 16,312 
dollars later produced another plastic, film-like material with a 
tensile strengtb of 7500 pounds. The interesting aspect of this film 
was that it was made from ground-up corn cobs. Further pursuit of 
this project saw the development of a by-product, cornstarch-based 
adhesive made from the same process. 105 Bjorksten also developed 
cornstarch-urethane foams in solid form for insulation and padding. 
This institution, which had been given a contract to develop foam 
106 from starch for structural purposes in 1961, produced these foams 
107 for such uses a full year before the Burlington Railroad Company 
announced the development of the same in its research and testing 
108 
shops. 
The Institute of Paper Chemistry (IPC) at Appleton, Wisconsin 
submitted its findings. The Institute had found that 306 million 
pounds of tapioca starch were imported into the United States during 
1961 (five times more than in 1954) for use in making paper and 
adhesives and for industrial sizings. This raw material amounted to 
',:i 
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eighty-nine percent of all American starch imports and entered the 
nation's shores duty-free, in contrast to the European Common Market 
which imposed a twenty-eight percent duty on it. Wheat was initially 
tested as a prospective competitive substitute for this import, but 
was outperformed by cornstarch as a filler and beater adhesive for 
109 paper at IPC. The Institute was sure that cheap, dry-milled corn 
flours could compete and gain the market for surplus American agri-
110 
cultural products. IPC was soon able to produce high-quality 
paper with its process and a large quantity was experimentally manu-
factured for the Nebraska Program's educational unit's use. lll 
The year 1962 marked the beginning of an alfalfa project at 
the federal government's USDA Western Division Laboratory in 
Albany, California. With the addition of this agency and the USDA's 
Northern Laboratory, two of the four USDA laboratories operating in 
the United States were actively cooperating with the Nebraska 
Program. The State of Nebraska allocated 200,000 dollars for this 
. project in 1962, with a Platte Valley farmers group supplying the raw 
material. The Nebraska Department of Agricultpre coordinated the 
three-party "New Uses" effort, as its over-all education and 
lobbying effort appeared to be making progress. 
Also in 1962 Finigan announced that the Southwest Research 
Institute of San Antonio, Texas would investigate the use of grain 
alcohol in fuels to combat automobile exhaust pollution. 112 (That 
year 200,000 tons of lead were released into the air by automobiles.) 
This institution had done past research on, and was expert in, the 
area of fuels and air pollution. In addition, J. Leroy Welsh, Omaha 
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grain dealer and producer of the Welsh 'Report, agreed to serve as an 
unpaid consultant to the parties engaged in the contract, while 
maintaining his d~ties as a trustee of the Southwest Institute. The 
Institute, after six months of work, released the usual encouraging 
news: "Grain alcohol research is proll!ising in reducing lead in the 
air.,,113 Mr. Welsh, Program administrators, and the supporting 
public appeared satisfied with such pronouncements, but the gap 
between promise and fulfillment remained wide. Nevertheless, 
because it was an important part of the education effort the aura of 
promise continued to be emphasized, and attention and support for 
the Program continued to be gained in the state and nationally. 
Midwest ~esearch Institute again gave the education effort 
assistance when it took a survey of Nebraska Department of Roads 
highway paints and theorized that soybean oil could be refined and 
made cheap enough to win back the paint market from synthetics. As 
in the grain alcohol project, MR.I felt "the problem was economics; a 
" f k" d h h f "d ,,114 quest10n 0 ma 1ng pro ucts C eap enoug or 1n ustry. The new 
project brought about a state-wide test of soybean oil-based highway 
paint: test strips were laid down and the education unit erected 
signs by these strips telling of the Nebraska Program project. All 
these developments were excellent material for the educational 
purposes of the Program, and gained the Program a good deal of 
discussion in the press l15 and in the communities where the test 
strips were located. Reports on' this project continued to be opti-
mistic, with testing lasting into 1964. 
Another Program project entered what could be considered to be 
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a spectacular and controversial area of endeavor when it was 
announced by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture that combinations 
of agricultural and petroleum materials were being subjected to 
cancer-control studies. These materials were said to be undergoing 
cancer chemotherapy screenings at ~ research laboratory under contract 
116 to Nebraska. Naturally some publicity was given this project by 
the media, but it was perhaps too dangerous an area for spectacular 
claims or promises, and investigation shows that the Department's 
educational unit did not exploit it for its purposes. 
The latter part of 1962 saw another project produce educa-
tional, political, and practical results. It was a most timely 
development. Foster D. Snell, Incorporated of New York City had been 
given a contract to do research on new uses for animal fats and acids. 
The main goal was to find a non-foaming, degradable (soft) form of 
soap which would compete with market-dominating, petroleum-based, 
non-degradable (hard) detergents for the 800 million dollars per year 
117 
market. However, Mid~est Research Institute developed such 
promising soft detergents made from corn starch that they were given 
- emphasis, while Snell turned its attention to developing lubricants 
from animal fats and tallows. 118 
The Program's soft detergents gained public attention because 
of the increasing controversy over pollution of the nation's waters 
by non-degradable detergents whose petroleum base caused foam which 
would not dissolve through the processes of nature, unlike soft 
detergents. Detergent companies were under pressure from public and 
political reaction to the growing menace, a menace emphasized by the 
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nation's media and of increasing concern to a newly educated 
citizenry. Nebraska therefore asked its researchers to increase 
their efforts to perfect a soft detergent which might dramatize the 
suggestion that agriculture gain the market by getting a product 
made from surplus agricultural ma~eria1s on store shelves before 
detergent companies could market a petroleum-based degradable soap. 
The State also aided the project on the educational and political 
fronts. Finigan formed a Detergent Study Committee to act as a 
sounding board for project efforts and to assist in the educative 
functions of the project through its advisory duties. This citizens 
committee, meeting infrequently at the Capitol Building in Lincoln, 
considered evidence of pollution in the nation's rivers, darns, 
streams, and reservoirs, and was instructed by various individuals 
concerned with control of water pollution in other parts of the 
nation. It considered alternatives and dispersed to form other 
discussion groups, give talks, and in general spread the message 
using educative techniques. The State Legislature was also presented 
with this evidence and the knowledge that other states of the Union, 
plus the federal government, were considering restrictive legis-
lation. It was found that Germany and other European nations had 
already passed laws controlling marketing and use of hard, petro1eum-
based detergents. 
The administrators of the Nebraska Program continued to push 
their advantage. The Director of Agriculture recommended that the 
Legislature impose a tax on hard detergents in Nebraska,119 
realizing that not only would the state's waters benefit, but the 
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Program would gain considerable attention because of its soft 
detergent research. Such a bill 120 was introduced into the Nebraska 
Unicameral by Senator Harold Stryker of Rising City, an individual 
who in the past had played a significant part in the Program. It 
failed to pass. The Program absorbed !his political setback and 
continued its developmental research on the detergents, while easing 
its educational efforts in the area. 
Snell, Incorporated, having been removed from detergent 
research, concentrated on its oil research. Nebraska had become 
increasingly envious of the role played by neighboring Missouri in 
the new missile and space age. Missouri had been able to acquire 
federal government contracts and to attract much private business and 
industry to help build missile and space vehicles, including manned 
orbital capsules. Nebraska, in contrast, had almost nothing outside 
of Strategic Air Command personnel. The state, through the 
educative apparatus of its Program, began-demonstrating that castor 
bean oil and animal fats as lubricants might have a missile and space 
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age role. Snell laboratories found that such fats and tallows were 
-suitable for high temperature lubricants (in the 650-900 degree 
range) for use in jets and missiles. The company's contract which 
had called for an initial 12,000 dollars was doubled to 24,000 
122 dollars and extended one year. The Nebraska Program now had the 
glamorous federal space program to utilize as another utilization 
education device. 
September 1, 1962 marked the beginning of a most unique and 
modern education project by the Program. In cooperation with the 
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Nebraska Wheat Growers Association and the University of Nebraska, 
the Nebraska Department of Agriculture contracted for an information 
retrieval project for use in educating the public. The Association 
and the state agencies furnished the facilities for collection of all 
information available or being published on the subject of the 
, 
utilization of wheat. North Carolina had just completed such a 
project with tobacco as the subject, and Miss Margaret Drenowatz who 
had been in charge of the Carolina effort was hired to direct the 
Nebraska retrieval project. She and her staff were to gather all 
available material into a central repository and publish a monthly 
abstract of publications for interested individuals and groups. 
As ·the project advanced, a discovery was made which bore upon 
the philosophy of the Nebraska effort. It was found that the State 
of Washington was conducting a similar project with wheat as the 
subject and was preparing to publish an abstract. Receipt of a test 
abstract from that state caused consternation among Nebraska Program 
administrators. Here was clear evidence that there was a lack of 
coordination between the states in their utilization research and 
education efforts. The Nebraska retrieval project nevertheless 
continued to its completion on September 1, 1963. 
At the end of 1962, Midwest Research Institute in its 
previously cited starch investigations came upon an ironical side-
discovery. It was found that certain parts of agricultural starches 
which had the function of helping a plant·to grow could be isolated, 
condensed, and used to stimulate rapid growth in other plants. This 
placed the Nebraska Program in an awkward position, for the "utili-
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zation" program had rendered an "increased production" result. At 
the same time, the University of Nebraska College of Agriculture 
announced it had found a hybrid wheat which would double current 
production. These two developments illustrated exactly the type of 
thinking and research the Program an~ the several individuals who 
testified at the Welsh Report Hearings were publicly professing to 
be fighting and attempting to change via utilization research and 
education programs. The education unit, while viewing the 
University's find as a predictable result of the production ethic 
tradition, worked to provide an answer to the potentially 
embarrassing position in which the Nebraska~Department of Agri-
culture and its administrators found themselves. Use of the 
stimulants for traditional crop production was played down, and 
their use on the new crops of the Nebraska Program was emphasized 
by the edu~ation unit. Statements to that effect by officials, 
notably Finigan, also lessened the negative implications of the 
s.timulants. As for the University's discoveries, it was noted that 
" 
they continued to be production-oriented even when faced with a 
surplus of the researched commodity. It was likewise expected that 
lobe University would continue to educate its constituency to produce 
more. The educative thrust of the Program had yet to hav.e its 
e!fect on this institution. 
Field tests of the stimulants were scheduled for the spring 
of 1963 in five Nebraska counties, under the supervision of 
Dr. J. B. Skaptason, President of Biosearch and Development, 
Inc t d Ka C · t M·· . 123 .orpora e, nsas 1 y, 1ssour1. Various encouraging 
statements by Nebraska officials and MRI people ("The research is 
moving fast, and if things work out the stimulants could be 
available in commercial quantities in 1964 • may provide more 
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patents ••• • ") 124 accompanied each step of the project. Such 
publicity attracted the desired att~ntion, and the material from this 
project was useful in the New Crops education effort. Queries were 
received in the Nebraska Department of Agriculture from, among 
others, interested cotton industry groups in Washington, D.C. and 
New Orleans, Louisiana. In a successful conclusion to an event that 
occurs frequently in research, accidental discovery of an important 
side effect while in pursuit of the main goal, the rights to the 
stimulants were,sold in late 1963 for 300,000 dollars in advance 
roya1ties--a figure equalling the budget of the Nebraska Program for 
. one year. 
One of the best known results of the Program in Nebraska and 
nationally, one which became almost a symbol of the effort because 
of its renown, was the NEBRASKIT. This small, edible wheat bar 
gained an educational value unsurpassed by any. other instrument 
developed by researchers for the Program's purposes. In fact, it was 
one of the few Program items that moved from a place of educational 
value to one of commercial value. Its name was registered as a 
trademark with the Nebraska Secretary of State, and a patent was 
applied for. 
The NEBRASKIT became a prime device in the effort to urge the 
Federal Government to increase agricultural utilization research. 
The immensity of the national defense posture motivated Nebraska 
',., 
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officials to plan to link agriculture to national defense through the 
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accumulated grain reserves and by aggressive research and lobbying. 
In 1961 circumstances created a situation which allowed the 
Nebraskans to capitalize on their ideas. Facing a Berlin crisis, 
the Federal Government announced plan~ to move 213,000,000 bushels 
of surplus bulk wheat from Midwest storage points to metropolitan 
areas of the United States. This food would be stockpiled in 
readiness for an all-out United States-Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics armed confrontation. 
Immediately upon learning of the Federal Government's plans, 
the Lincoln, Nebraska Chamber of Commerce through Mr. Daniel Olson, 
Chairman of its,Agriculture Committee, proposed in a letter (dated 
July 29, 1961) to President Kennedy and other officials that the 
wheat be processed into an edible wafer form before shipment. His 
reasoning was: .(1) Bulk,wheat would be of very little use to an 
urbanized society whose processing machinery was destroyed and, 
(2) bulk wheat would be more difficult to store and dispense than a 
processed item. Governor Frank B. Morrison rushed a delegation with 
Finigan at its head to Washington to talk to USDA, Civil Defense, 
Pentagon, Congressional, and White House personnel. Before leaving 
for Washington, Finigan authorized crash work on the formulation ofa 
wheat bar by Midwest Research Institute with an initial allocation of 
3,000 dollars. 126 
The Federal Government through the USDA had done previous 
work with wheat as a basic food for mass feeding, but mainly in the 
area of shipment of bulk wheat without processing. The only act 
12.9 
which could be considered "processing" was the crushing of the grain 
to make it more usable. Since the government bad five such 
processing plants in the United States and planned to buy 
130,000,000 bushels for feeding use, Finigan and his staff worked to 
get both crush-type processing plan~s and end-item, wheat bar 
processing plants into the Midwest, therefore connecting the area 
more closely to national needs and the national administration of 
agricultural raw material utilization. 
Nebraska, while not gaining its grain-crushing processing 
plants, did see the federal government begin a quest for processed 
grain "survival rations." The Defense Department decided not to 
purchase the type of ration developed by the USDA from the Federal 
Government's own crushed-wheat raw material because of the ration's 
unsatisfactory characteristics. In addition, the Pentagon found 
that the food industry did not have sufficient facilities 
immediately available to efficiently produce such a ration on a 
full-scale basis. The State of Nebraska therefore gained added time 
to gear its educative apparatus to the vigorous promotion of its 
Program-developed "survival ration. ,,127 In this endeavor Nebraska 
obtained a measure of success. By joining forces with the civil 
defense education effort and anticipating the need for a ration to 
stock shelters in the then strong fall-out shelter market, by 
initiating research through an in-progress research program, by 
aggressive competitive bidding, and by intensive lobbying by public 
officials, Nebraska gained an initial five million pound order for 
NEBRASKITS out of a 30 million pound federal order to industry.128 
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In April of 1962 the Federal Government purchased another 16 million 
pounds of NEBRASKITS, 3,700,000 dollars worth, out of an 18.3 
°11' d . d 129 m1 10n poun contract to 1n ustry. And in June, Nebraska received 
another far larger order for 45 million pounds of the ration, 
130 11,063,589 dollars worth. The State of Nebraska through one of 
its public agencies had begun the movement of agricultural raw 
materials from laboratory research to end-item sale, and involved 
itself in a commercial endeavor that dealt with the sale of a 
processed item to another public agency. Specifically, 66 million 
pounds of NEBRASKIT survival rations were processed by industry and 
purchased by the Federal Government from January 1962 to June 1962. 
By such example Nebraska could say it was itself practicing what it 
was preaching through its educational program. 
At this particular time there was increasing fear, building to 
a climax since 1945, of a third world war between the Communist Bloc 
dominated by the USSR and the Western Alliance led by the United 
States. It was the "darkest before dawn" period before the 
Kennedy-Khrushchev detente of 1963. Therefore, just as the Berlin 
. Crisis of 1961 had, in the government' s view, created a need for an 
item such as the NEBRASKIT, so did the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 
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.create a public demand for it as a commercial product. As the 
public became educated about and reconciled to the realities of 
atomic age civil defense, sales of fall-out shelters rose, and corre-
spondingly so did the demand for food stocks that could be met by the 
Realizing the potential of the public as a market, and that 
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this could translate into the crowning educational vehicle for the 
utilization research program, Nebraska worked to move the NEBRASKIT 
wafer into commercial markets. The State applied for a patent on the 
formula and requested bids from private companies. The Department of 
Defense, which gained the formula ~s a proviso of its former 
contracts, contracted with the National Biscuit Company and the 
Kroger Company to provide more rations for the Federal Government's 
programs, for the State of Nebraska's Department of Agriculture was 
no longer acting as a coordinating agency between private industry 
and the Federal Government. Nebraska did, however, continue to 
receive royalties from such federal licensing agreements, just as it 
did from its own.agreements with private producers. The statements 
of Nebraska's Governor Morrison and his director of agriculture about 
the Program eventually paying its own way began to appear quite 
valid. 
The commercial aspect of the NEBRASKIT proceeded, directed by 
a state agency (an unusual situation in NebraSka), by distribution of 
h · h h' d '1 h' 132 t e ltem t roug certalTI department stores an retal C alnS e 
The product sold well, possibly out of need for it, possibly out of 
novelty, but surely because of the immense publicity given it. All 
retail outlets Were constantly sold out. The education unit of the 
Nebraska Department of Agricul ture kept a large supply on hand in 
its State Capitol Building offices for use in the education effort, 
besides acting as coordinator of ·bulk shipments between commercial 
producers and distributors. Every item of educational 
material mailed or handed out to individuals or groups contained 
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NEBRASKITS and their utilization research success story. The 
Nebraska Program now had a product which was financed by one state 
(Nebraska), developed in another (Missouri), and produced in yet 
another (The Johnson Company, Council Bluffs, Iowa). There were at 
that time no facilities for producing_the ration within the State of 
Nebraska, but the Department of Agriculture stressed the fact that it 
hoped to locate such a plant in Omaha as part of the "industrial" 
aspect of the· Program. By such moves the opportunities to reach the 
state's largest urban population with utilization research education, 
in this case using the NEBRASKIT, were being seized. 
Realizing that the survival ration market was a severely 
limited one, as .critics were quick to point out, Nebraska asked its 
contracted laboratories to modify the NEBRASKIT in order to move it 
'into international feeding programs which were designed to reduce 
i world political tensions through the policy of sharing the wealth 
and filling the stomach. A strong possibility for expanded use of 
the item was under the newly inaugurated Public Law 480 Food-For-
Peace Program passed by Congress in 1962. Nebraska, already 
blessed by having native son Theodore T. Sorenson working as Special 
Advisor to the President of the United States, was further 
encouraged when it saw former United States Senator George McGovern 
of South Dakota, an old friend of Nebraska and its Director of 
. Agriculture, appointed to head the 480 Program by the Kennedy 
Administration. Governor Frank Morrison again moved on the political 
front, organizing a Nebraska Food-For-Peace Committee which from 
1962 until 1967 held meetings with the Governor, the Nebraska 
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Department of Agriculture, various United States Senators, and other 
interested individuals and groups. Because of such early efforts, 
which resulted in Nebraska being the first state to organize such a 
committee to assist the federal government's program as administered 
by the USDA, Morrison and Finigan w~re called to Washington by 
United States·Secretary of Agriculture Freeman. There, voicing the 
belief that "food could be used as a weapon," they spent considerable 
• • b h fl' 1 1 . 1 133 tLme see Lng a out t e use 0 surp us agrLcu tura raw materLa s. 
The education of the Federal Government and its USDA could be seen 
to be proceeding apace •. Now it was not the USDA laboratories 
requesting information from the Nebraska Program, it was the 
Secretary of Agriculture himself. 
Parallel to these efforts to establish a cooperative project 
with the Federal Government, an effort to which the Nebraska Program 
was well geared, Program administrators began cooperative projects 
through the Nebraska Department of Agriculture with other groups: 
The Great Plains Wheat Marketing Organization, The Nebraska Wheat 
Growers Association, and the Nebraska Wheat Commission, all 
marketing and educational organizations. Cooperation with these 
public and private organizations led to several Latin American 
projects utilizing Program-developed food bars. NEBRASKITS were 
sent in quantity to Peru where a feeding program suitability test 
was conducted under the supervision of Program personnel and individ-
1 f h b .. 134 ua s rom tea ove organLzatLons. The success of this test 
resulted in a Nebraska Department of Agriculture representative 
being sent to Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, and Columbia to 
134 
attempt to arrange programs which would see Program food rations, 
including the newly developed solid milk bar, sent to relief agency 
officials in those countries for use in feeding programs for school 
h .1d 135 C 1. ren. One interesting result of this face-to-face nego-
tiating was a request for NEBRASKITS by the armed forces of Columbia 
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and Guatemala for testing with their troops on maneuvers. It was 
not exactly a "food-for-peace" request, but they received their test 
rations. 
Officials of the American Dairy Association met with 
Director Finigan to discuss markets for the follow-on to the 
NEBRASKITS, the new Program-developed solid milk bar. As a result of 
coordinated efforts, joint agreements were concluded with the Federal 
Government (State Department and Food-For-Peace), United Nations 
relief agencies, and several private agencies for initiating 
shipments of NEBRASKIT wheat and milk bars to Europe. The first test 
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shipments went to Greece. Corn, soybean, and milo were also 
developed into food bars, and growers of each crop sought a 
processing plant in Nebraska with the assistance of officials in 
the Nebraska Department of Agricu1 ture. The Program had gone inter-
national. 
And utilization education was taking big strides. In its 
short span of life from 1959 and reaching toward its cut-off date of 
1967, the Program had developed working relationships with the 
Federal Government, the United Nations, and national private 
agencies. It could not be denied that some surprisingly solid 
achievements had been made in research, and satisfactory progress was 
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evident in the education effort's attempt to gain attention for and 
understanding of utilization and utilization research needs among a 
newly awakened public. The long-range goals of the Program, public 
awareness resulting in pressure for federal attention and help, 
appeared to be realistic in their cha~ces for success. l38 The cost of 
this success was made available for the supporting public to scru-
tinize whfm, for the first time, Program administrators released 
financial information in mid-l962: 
Contracted Research To Public and Private 
Agencies, including $59,482 to the University 
of Nebraska 
Personal Services 
Travel Costs 
Board and Lodging Costs 
Miscellaneous (Office supplies, equipment, 
maintenance)-
TOTAL PROGRAM COST (approximately three years) 
$473,563 (87'7.) 
37,934 
20,672 
4,840 
9,478 
$546,487 
The Program had operated for a sufficient time to provide the 
figures, and the public was by then educated and involved enough to 
-expect such information. Program officials pointed out that admin-
istration costs were six percent of the total figure, in contrast to 
USDA research administration costs of twenty percent for the same 
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amount of money. Program administrators could, in retrospect, feel 
confident in the progress of the demonstration and education effort. 
The public continued its interest and support. The educative effort 
appeared to be working. And, given the success of the NEBRASKIT, one 
last area remained to be further exploited: the international sphere. 
"~'" 
136 
Utilization Education On An International Stage 
The effort to gain national interest was increased as the 
Program progressed. Nebraska used every opportunity to expand its 
state-supported Program into a states-supported one, and finally into 
a federally-supported one, It began its efforts with its neighboring 
states and worked toward such expansion through meetings of regional 
associations. But Nebraska's neighbors adopted a friendly, cautious, 
wait-and-see attitude. By 1962, Iowa, which came the closest to 
direct assistance, apparently wanted another two years to view results 
of the Program before fully committing itself. 
Inquiries were received from other states after Nebraska 
presented its case at the Fourteenth Annual National Chemistry 
Conference in Kansas City on November 16, 1962. Twenty-four papers 
on agricultural utilization research and education were presented at 
this meeting and Director Finigan was asked to serve on the 
conference's main symposium. In addition, another important stimulant 
to other states' interest occurred when the National Utilization 
Research· Association agreed to hold its 1962 meeting in Lincoln, 
. Nebraska. The informational and educational opportunities presented 
the Program by the meetings were augmented by an offer of cooperation 
from the National Chemergic Council in a letter from that body to 
Finigan • 
. Utilizing national stages afforded by national associations, 
the nation's press, the United Nations, and traveling Program repre-
sentatives, the Program became known in many parts of the world. 
Requests for and usage of food bars by Latin American and European 
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nations has been discussed previously. Some other examples: 
In 1960 five English businessmen representing the British 
milling industry visited the Nebraska Department of Agriculture and 
submitted a request for a shipment of Program-developed high-amylose 
flour for experimental purposes. The request was filled somewhat 
belatedly because of developing department reluctance to release 
research results free-of-charge. However, because of the overriding 
interest of utilization education which could exploit possible 
140 
market development, the English got their Program product. 
In 1961 Program administrators received news of a foreign 
utilization research development which stimulated their interest. 
Just as Ame.rican scientists had in the past obtained nylon from 
coal, so had a Belgium manufacturer now produced cloth made from 
milk and wood. Program officials had a dress made from the process 
and displayed it throughout the. nation along with other Program 
results. The education unit of the Program, aided and abetted by the 
nation's press, had a field day.14l 
In 1962 news of Program-developed dissolvable wrapping films 
not only gained the interest of the United States Army Quartermaster 
Corps, which asked for test samples, but brought inquiries from 
C. Itoh Company, Limited of Japan, and from an import-export company 
in Sweden, asking respectively for manufacturing rights in the Orient 
d t • . ht f th S d'·' . 142 Al f an agen s r1g s or e can lUaVl.an countrl.es. so rom 
Sweden via Canada came a "new" process (though used in England for 
fifteen years) for making fire-proof building insulation from 
143 
straw. A pilot plant for the educational purpose of demonstrating 
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the feasibility of this process was established in Nebraska by 
Program administrators. Various other countries such as Germany 
requested information about the Program and its results, thereby 
demonstrating the interest engendered in this modest, cautious, 
scientific/educational Program with ~ocia1ly and economically 
important goals run by one lone state and supported by a small tax-
paying population. The need for utilization education and research 
in Western European nations at the time was demonstrated by France's 
experience with the agonies induced by agricultural surpluses: 
For French farmers,'government officials, riot policemen and 
vacationers, harvest time has become a sort of annual 
summer madness. Every year, increasingly mechanized and 
efficient farms yield such a cornucopia of produce that 
market prices inevitably collapse under the load. And then 
the 'madness,' or--as the French call it--Ie malaise 
agraire, begins •••• Farmers stage rebellions reminiscent 
of what their serf forebears did in the Middle Ages, aimed 
at prodding the government into doing something about the ' 
surplus produce. In one city 6,000 farmers stormed into the 
area. President Charles de Gaulle, however, thought the 
vision of the farmers was faulty. The surplus problem, he 
quipped, lay not with the government but with the 'good 
Lord.' Instead of seeing their local government prefects, 
the general added, the peasants should go to their 
bishops.144 
In addition to the above international affairs, the Department 
was engaged in other types of international projects. A personal 
friend of Finigan, Sergeant Shriver, Director of the newly-
established Peace Corps, contacted him about assisting in the 
recruitment of agricultural volunteers. Even though Peace Corps 
efforts concentrated on acquiring production-oriented people for 
underdeveloped countries, this assistance was given in the form of 
an information saturation effort in Nebraska by the Program's 
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education unit, and the appointment of a department recruiter. 
The prospect of sale of grain to the Soviet Bloc was also 
considered by the pepartment in 1962. Several organizations 
questioned department officials closely as to whether this might be 
tied into the Program in some manne~. However, the Department 
decided to concentrate on less controversial Program subjects, 
letting the USDA field such issues in the foreign policy area as 
trade with the Soviets. In fact, it was not until ten years later, 
in 1972, that such trade was actually established. 
This did not, however, preclude Russian visits to Nebraska. 
At the 'beginning of the 1960' s an agreement to exchange visits of 
certain cultural and professional personnel had been worked out by 
the United States and the USSR. After an initial tour of Russia by 
f Am • • '1 1 ff' . 1 146 hR' d a group 0 erlcan agrlcu tura 0 lela s, t e USSlans returne 
the visit in the summer of 1962. Upon reaching the Midwest the 
group, which included K. G. Pysin, Soviet Minister of Agriculture, 
and M. A. Olshanskiy, President of the All-Union Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences, insisted upon seeing Nebraska Department of 
Agriculture and Economic Development operations and talking with, 
Director Finigan~ Department operations and the Nebraska Program 
were discussed in detail. Because of the intense Russian interest in 
the Department and what it was doing through the Program, so much 
time was spent that the group's entire tour schedule had to be 
• d 147 reV1se . 
This exchange program eventually sent United States Secretary 
of Agriculture Freeman to Russia and brought Soviet Premier 
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Nikita S. Khrushchev on an agricultural tour that reached into Iowa. 
Premier Khrushchev, even though he was but a few miles distance, did 
not express an interest in the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, 
its Program, or its director. The Premier was known to be production-
oriented and concerned with opening up Siberia to agriculture. 
Nebraska Director of Agriculture Finigan was, however, officially 
invited to tour the USSR under the exchange program. He did not do 
so, as departmental and political concerns pressed without let-up. 
The Program demanded constant attention and Nebraska was approaching 
the November 1962 gubernatorial campaign, thereby increasing 
political duties. Programs such as the Nebraska effort do not 
operate in a neutral vacuum, and politics began to have its effect. 
Regardless of far-flung international dealings, the parochial 
influence of state politics was always the more pervasive. 
The 1962 Gubernatorial Campaign--The Political Situation 
Nebraska Republicans had not had a chance to manage the state 
government since the inception of the Program in 1959. It appeared 
that, unless they could find a particularly strong candidate in 
1962, their party would not be able to unseat Democratic Governor 
Frank B. Morrison because of his personal popularity and the success 
of his administration's programs. The political climate of the 
State of Nebraska had in the past been unfavorable to the election of 
a Democratic governoYa So Republican and conservative was the state 
that, should a Democrat win any state office, his re-election would 
be equally startling. 
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The Democrats, who were fortunate enough to see their 
candidate elected in the 1958 gubernatorial election for the first 
time in some thirty years, were unfortunate enough to see him die in 
office during his first term. But the Republican Party fielded a 
weak candidate against Frank B. MOErison, Democratic Party candidate 
in 1960 and a man who knew how to project an imag~ and the 
Republicans found themselves without the governor's office for 
. another two years. 
Morrison, although he had not held elective office before, 
proved adept at handling official duties while maintaining his image 
and improving his and his party's political position in Nebraska. 
The two years from 1960 until the 1962 election were busy in 
preparation for the predicted hard fight by the now thoroughly 
determined Republican Party to win back the governor's chair. 
Morrison vigorously pushed his administration's programs, building 
groundwork for political claims of accomplishment in 1962. And that 
year did indeed see the need for a strong position, for the battle 
was joined with a well known Republican, Fred A. Seaton of Hastings, 
Nebraska, former Eisenhower Secretary of the Interior. Morrison, 
the incumbent, naturally enjoyed an advantage and had in reality 
been conducting his campaign during the preceding two years. The 
challenger was left to form his issues, what few he could find. 
Because of the lack of fresh, substantive issues, the campaign 
proceeded slowly. It reached what the state's press termed "the 
bottom of the barrel" after it had covered the usual charges and 
counter-claims about highway mileage built, soil and water conser-
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vation, state promotion, and education. Finally, personal attacks 
began on Morrison and his Director of Agriculture for the dismissal 
of several employees of the Department of Agriculture during the 
reorganization/revitalization and economy measures Finigan had under-
way. This issue served two purposes: (1) It could be used as a 
badly needed campaign issue and, (2) it led an attack on the 
Morrison Administration's strongest area, the Nebraska Program 
directed by the Department of Agriculture under Finigan. 
The Program In The Campaign 
Except for the short interim opportunity of approximately four 
months by Republican (Lieutenant) Governor Dwight W. Burney, between 
the time Governor Brooks died in office September 9, 1960 and the 
assumption of office by Morrison on January 6, 1961, Nebraska 
Republicans had only been able to state what they would do with the 
Nebraska Program. They could not get in position to take action. 
Candidate Seaton needed to find areas of Morrison Administration 
weakness in the Program and give creditable suggestions as to where 
he, Seaton, would improve it, for this Program alone became 
recognized as the one which would make or break either candidate. 
It had great voter interest. As the campaign progressed, however, the 
public began to appear fairly satisfied with the job Morrison and his 
Administration were doing. 
Seaton used the previously mentioned attack on Finigan to try 
to weaken some of the prestige the director was building for 
Morrison and for himself via the Program. He faced a difficult task. 
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Because of the lackluster campaign which had few major issues except 
for the Program, there were some in Nebraska who commented: "Finigan 
is perhaps more valuable than either candidate."l48 Even though 
Finigan had in the past been associated with Morrison's political 
enemy and rival for party 1eadership._Democratic Party Chairman 
Bernard Boyle of Omaha, Morrison and Finigan achieved a working rela-
tionship which culminated in the governor's answer to a campaign 
question of would he or could he replace Finigan: "Finigan cannot be 
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replaced." Seaton, in a speech and question and answer session 
before University of Nebraska students in October 1962 did not seem 
as sure', or at least as clear, in his answer· to the same question. 
Morrison.and Seaton met twice, once for a debate at the 
University of Nebraska and once for a question and answer session 
before the microphones of Radio Station KFMQ of Lincoln, Nebraska. 
Each time the Nebraska Program received considerable attention. 
Morrison never failed to stress its progress, and Seaton never failed 
to say he would "strengthen and accelerate it, mainly by using the 
University of Nebraska more instead of giving contracts to companies 
outside the state. ulSO Seaton was, of course, appealing to the pride 
and sense of justice of Nebraska tax-payers. Morrison would counter 
Seaton's statement by citing Program accomplishments, thereby 
challenging the suggestion that strengthening and acceleration of the 
Program were needed. And the listening taxpayer was then led by 
Morrison to believe that Seaton"s ideas entailed more money. Finigan 
would counter the remainder of Seaton's statement by proclaiming 
that: "Forty percent of the Agresearch dollar already goes to the 
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University of Nebraska. The university is working on all it can 
dl . • h . "lSI han e 1n e1g t proJects. Finigan was supported in his attempts 
to keep control of the Program out of the hands of the University by 
farm groups who feared the Program's utilization education emphasis 
would be warped or over-shadowed by ~he production orientation of the 
school. They appeared to also feel that state officials were in a 
stronger position to deal directly with industry and the federal 
152 government. 
The day after the election left no doubt about the Program's 
role in Nebraska political history. With its state, national, and 
international image, it had caught the public's fancy. How it would 
affect the state's or nation's social and economic, as well as 
political, history remained to be seen, but a re-elected Governor 
Frank B. Morrison knew where to give credit for assistance: 
Governor Frank Morrison placed his finger on striking progress 
in Nebraska's Agricultural Research Program as the key voter-
appeal factor in his re-election victory. Tasting the sweet 
fruit of the largest Democratic gubernatorial triumph in the 
past 26 years, Morrison pointed to five phases of his ["admin-
istration's progresil which he believes attracted heavy 
voter appeal. First by far, the 57-year-old chief executive 
declared, was the Agricultural Research Program. 153 
The Nebraska Program At High Tide And Waterloo 
The Program pursued its educative way with surprisingly smooth 
sailing through the middle 1960's. Critics and skeptics refrained 
from open battle, apparently choosing to adopt a wait-and-see 
attitude combined with occasional sniping. The educational effort 
continued to get sympathetic assistance from the state and national 
media. Sophisticated Program education unit methods and materials 
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had, by the middle 1960's, reached·a point of routine operation and 
dissemination. And the research projects, which had produced a 
flurry of exploitable material in the early 1960's, continued to 
offer a convenient item frequently enough to keep the educative/ 
lobbying effort alive and moving. _ All of the above established an 
inertia for the Program that continued until approximately 1965. 
After the Program had weathered its use in the 1962 gubernatorial 
battle, its administrators attempted to put the Program into 
perspective with the rest of the educational and political programs 
of the State. It was not as heavily utilized as a campaign issue 
when Governor Morrison went on to win a third term in 1964. The more 
spectacular methods and claims utilized early in Program were mostly 
gone, as promotive techniques gave way to orthodox educational 
methods. 
The .lower profile and more orthodox methods possibly contrib-
uted to an easier than expected Program renewal struggle in 1963. 
It was not a time for observers, directors, or senators to draw solid 
conclusions about the Program. While some state senators severely 
disagreed with the Nebraska Director of Agriculture's committee 
hearing statement, "1 feel the Program has made good strides,,,154 a 
majority appeared to agree, as did the media. 155 The Nebraska 
Legislature therefore accepted for debate Senator Jules Burnbach's 
bill to extend the Program to 1968,156 but debated primarily the 
administration of the Program and its involvement with the University 
of Nebraska. This assuredly was a short-sighted view of the Program, 
yet political reality demanded that this type of debate again take 
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place. The long-range goals of the Program were almost totally 
ignored--except as they pertained to the administration/University 
debate. 
Most senators were as yet reluctant to form a firm opinion of 
the Program. But they were equally reluctant to let a vote on 
Program extension slip by without hearings, feeling that information 
might be gained which would assist in developing an opinion. 
Governor Morrison, Senator Burbach, and Director Finigan would have 
been pleased to See the Program allowed to continue without the 
lengthy interruption of committee hearings. Senator Burbach, who had 
introduced the extension bill upon the request of the Governor, asked 
that the measure.be placed on general file without a public hearing, 
but those who resented past use of the Program for political gain 
thwarted this move. Even though Burbach attempted to appease the 
Legislature -by declaring "I chose 1968 because that date will fall in 
the middle of the new four-year gubernatorial term and keep this 
legislation £PrograrrY out of politics," he was thwarted by such 
statements as the following: 
A great amount of money has been spent on the Program since 
1959. I want to see if we are getting our money's worth. 157 
I wish to question policies regarding the Program and use of 
out-of-state facilities. 158 
I would like to explore the possibility of delegating more of 
the work to the University of N~braska.159 
I t bl · h . 160 wan a pu ~c ear~ng. 
Director Finigan adopted a discreet silence: "I have no recom-
d k . b· ,,161 men ation to rna e on th~s su Ject. 
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All doubt that the Program would not be granted continued life 
was removed when the Legislature's Revenue Committee voted 6-1 for 
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renewal of the Program's tax levy. In order to assist this 
continuance, Governor Morrison made, among others, one statement 
calculated to gain continued support fur the Program from the public 
and therefore influence its representatives: "I believe that it's 
possible the Program will be self-sustaining by 1968 from royalties 
f h d · . ,,163 rom researc 1SCQVer1es. This was a politic statement but, 
given the true goals of the Program, it did not appear to have a 
good chance of coming true. The research was not designed to achieve 
such a 'goal, being useful as a means to other ends. In fact, by 
August of 1966 Director Finigan would state: "This Program wasn't 
designed to make money.,,164 This was true, it was an educative! 
lobbying effort only. Finigan, in the same 1966 statement, 
confirmed that the Program was only an education-effort-by-example 
when he announced that the state had proved its point and therefore 
his department would not actively support continuation of the Program 
by the 1967 Legislature. 165 
Finigan's statements, uttered in the late 1960's as the 
Program approached another renewal date, were prompted by rising 
criticism of the Program's administration. There was no indication 
that certain members of the media 166 and the Legislature,167 who 
became the chief critics, had come to disagree with the goals or 
even the means of the Program. 'Their interest appeared to lie with 
the money spent and how the Program had been administered. 
The administration of the Department of Agriculture as an 
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agency was not challenged. Nor would" it have been easily possible to' 
have done so. Finigan, his staff, and the Program had continued to 
change the concept and image of the Department of Agriculture. 
People who had bemoaned the fact that the Department had in the past 
been merely a routine inspection-col~ection operation, began by the 
end of 1960 to see the strong administrative hand of Director 
Pearle F. Finigan bring about positive changes. Finigan initiated 
significant changes in the Department's operating structure, 
combining scattered similar administrative functions into a single 
office, merging inspection duties to eliminate overlap, eliminating 
/ 
activities such as state-line truck inspection ports-of-entry which 
were not paying their way and substituting more economical means. 
He particularly emphasized cost reduction in his agency. The 
reorganization of these offices and activities brought about a ten 
percent decrease in department operating expenses from 1960 to 1963. 
The director was consequently praised for overcoming Parkinson's 
Second Law, but severely cr~ticized by some individuals for putting 
workers out of jobs and arbitrarily shifting personnel who had no 
Civil Service protection. The latter figured in the 1962 guberna-
. 1 . 168 tor~a campalgn. 
In 1963 two bills reached the floor of the Nebraska 
Legislature which assisted in changing the concept and operation of 
the Department. Legislative Bill 717169 requested a change in the 
Department's name from the Department of Agriculture and Inspection 
to the Department of Agriculture and Economic Development. The bill 
won first-round approval, was then killed, but later waS revived and 
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170 passed. At the same time Governor Morrison proposed Legislative 
Bill 767 which would have set up an independent division of state 
government designated the Department of Economic Development. The 
bill, which also reappeared later and successfully established such 
a department late in the 1960's, was defeated by a 25-15 vote of the 
Unicameral on June 4, 1963. As the Governor's bill read, the 
Department of Agriculture would have lost both administrative control 
of the Nebraska Program and the Department's Resources Division 
which dealt with promotion of Nebraska's industrial development. 
Whatever the merit of arguments for the bill, the fact is that 
Program management remained within the Department of Agriculture and 
Economic Development until the Program's semi-demise in 1967. 171 By 
this time the significant changes in the Department were stabilized 
and Nebraskans began to realize and rejoice in a fact long recognized 
by perceptive observers, that: 
The work of Finigan's Department LwasJ beginning to attract 
widespread attention. What [haQ] happened LWasJ a 
departure from the conception of a state department as a 
caretaker agency to one of constructive competition against 
depressing problems. l72 
However, the skepticism and .reduced support evident in the 
Legislature as to continuation of the Department's education and 
lobbying program could be charted with a listing of the steps taken 
when the Program came up for its second renewal in 1967, and for 
subsequent Legislative action. 
1967 LEGISLATURE (77th SESSION), GERDES LB-34 
Created the Nebraska Department of Economic Development, 
formerly the Division of Nebraska Resources in the 
Department of Agriculture and Economic Development. 
1967 LEGISLATURE, CARPENTER LB-862' 
1967 
Changed name of Department of Agriculture and Economic 
Development back to Department of Agriculture. 
LEGISLATURE, ROBINSON LB-877 
Transferred Nebraska Agricultural Products Research 
Fund to Department of Economic Development, 
effective July I, 1967. Passed: For 43 Against 2 
Not Voting 4,17 3 -
1967-71: OLD NEBRASKA PROGRAM DORMANT 
The Economic Development Department, because of 
criticism of past administration of the Program, 
preferred to let the research projects run their 
course and to not initiate any new action of an 
educational or lobbying nature. It was considered too 
much of a "hot potatoe" politically in the state. 174 
-
1971 LEGISLATURE (82nd SESSION) SCHMIDT LB-776 
Frustrated by non-renewal of the original Program and 
by the'inaction of the Department of Economic 
Development where the reduced program was placed, 
Senator Loren Schmidt obtained the passage of a bill 
establishing an independent Agresearch Committee of 
the Legislature for a two-year period, funded with 
68,000 dollars. The Department of Agriculture was 
,listed as an advisor. This development is examined in 
the Evaluation section of this paper.175 
1974 LEGISLATURE (83rd SESSION) SCHMIDT LB-756 
New, reduced program reaches renewal date. 
Governor Exon signs into law, March L, 1974, legis-
lative bill 756 severing the Committee from the Legis-
lative Council and creating an independent agency: 
Agency No. 60, Agricultural Products Industrial 
Utilization Committee. Appropriation given of 
117,423 dollars to June 1974. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EDUCATIVE OPERATIONS AT CLOSE-HAND 
Those who viewed the Nebraska Program with a penetrating eye 
should have been able to discern that the Program was other than a 
true research effort. Nor, given the level of spending authorized, 
could it have been a true research effort. In the face of the tens 
of millions of dollars industry put into utilization research each 
year, 300,000 dollars per year for research by a state was woefully 
inadequate. The real goals of the program--and the only reasonable 
goals, given the Program's funding--were edu~~tional and political. 
The utilization research effort was but a device to achieve those 
ends. 
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Seen not as a research and development effort but as an 
educational effort, the Program still represented a considerable 
undertaking. It was going against hundreds of years of tradition in 
challenging the thinking of those who believed that agriculture's 
problems could be solved by traditional production efforts. Program 
administrators were faced with initiating nothing less than an 
immense re-education effort with clearly-defined attitudinal and 
behavioral objectives. Achievement of educational objectives was to 
be evidenced not only by an attitude change (support for utilization 
research over production research) but also by public action 
(pressure on the federal government to increase its utilization 
research). Moreover, the Program would have to be managed in such 
''''. 
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a way as to secure continued public support (i.e. funding). Program 
administrators reasoned thus: an education effort utilizing a 
dramatic research. program would through promotion cause the Nebraska 
taxpayer to support the program, thus causing him to continue to fund 
the very device which was used to acquire his support. Therefore the 
"research program" had three goals: to educate for utilization and 
utilization research, to lobby the Federal Government, and to keep 
itself going. 
There were indications in 1959 of how much the new Brooks 
Administration appreCiated the role of education even as Brooks, 
himself an educator from McCook, Nebraska, took office. His office 
immediately initiated an educational program for agriculture, 
calling a Midwest meeting of the University of Nebraska, the 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture, farm organizations, and other 
groups from within and without the State. The purpose was to plan 
the engagement of the public in a discussion which would raise agri-
culture's tarnished image. That image included loss of status as an 
industry, price supports as a tax burden, and agricultural groups 
whose attempts to raise market prices produced a rise in consumer 
prices. l It took approximately one and a half years to get the 
effort organized and launched, but the formal announcement finally 
came that the program was in existence and operating. At that time 
a committee was formed and charged by Brook's successor, Frank B. 
Morrison, to draw the public into an educational effort in the 
previously mentioned areas. 2 This Brooks-initiated program was to 
be completely overshadowed by the educational work of the Nebraska 
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Program. By its very nature and goals the Nebraska Program encom-
passed the concerns of the governor's committee. The Program's 
efforts, which began almost immediately upon passage of LB-722 in 
1959, had gained such a head start and so much emphasis and attention 
that the governor's connnittee was ec!ipsed. 
As a first step in the Program's educational effort, the 
Nebraska Attorney General was asked for an opinion on the use of 
Department of Agriculture funds for public education on utilization 
research in agriculture. This official ruled that department funds 
contained in its Resources and Wheat Commission Divisions had been in 
the past and could in this instance be used for such education. It 
was assumed that most Nebraskans would be interested in the plight of 
agriculture and therefore drawn to the Program. As taxpaying students 
they would also be paying their way. 
The _.next move Was to begin gathering personnel to handle the 
educational effort. Program administrators realized that they must 
have on hand written material to work with, material the public could 
read and digest. Every educational effort needs its textbooks. A 
journalist hired as "publications director" was given the mandate to 
expand the supply of printed documents. From this base came the 
eventual use of all media. The first job of the publications 
director was to promote the Program, to get its name before the 
public. Like a politician, this educational effort with a political 
goal had first to sell itself in order to draw people to it and its 
cause. Once a dialogue was established, education could proceed 
with interested participants. The first educational documents 
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produced of which there is any record were of a promotional type quite 
simple in design and message. They were attractive and designed to 
announce the State of Nebraska's initiation of a program of utili-
zation research which was said to offer an answer to the problem of 
market-depressing surpluses. 
A Nebraska Department of Agriculture assistant director was 
named, moved up from heading a department division, and given the duty 
of not only overseeing day-to-day operations of the Department but of 
directing the Program's newly formed education unit. It was signif-
icant that this particular man, besides being loyal to the party in 
office, .was a former educator who was currently working on a 
doctorate in educational administration at the University of Nebraska. 
This appointment meant that the educative business of the research 
program was to be given serious attention at a high level in the 
Department •.. The business of directing the research projects would 
fall mainly to another individual, a "research coord ina tor," and to 
the department director. 
A full staff under the assistant director, to complement the 
,already acquired publications specialist, began to form with the 
addition of two former university agricultural economics instructors, 
a former science instructor, and graduate students from the University 
of Nebraska's Education, Political Science, and Agriculture 
Departments. In addition, a former 'agriculture instructor who was 
also working on a doctorate in Adult Agricultural Education 
Administration was named Secretary of the Nebraska Wheat Commission of 
the Department of Agriculture, moving from a position with the 
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University of Nebraska Center for Continuing Education. 
Initial deliberations by this education unit centered around 
the best methods to educate the public. Certain things were 
realized. First, the research projects were to be used to dramatize 
utilization research. Second, the m~dia would serve as the chief 
educative device whereby teaching and learning would be pursued; 
later, in-person group instruction would be added. Third, the 
educational effort would gradually be expanded to reach all 
Nebraskans, to interest the public outside Nebraska in other states, 
and finally to engage certain agencies of the Federal Government. 
The planners also added private agency personnel to their numbers. 
The Lincoln, Nellraska firm of The Carroll Company was selected in 
1961 to assist because of its years of experience in handling the 
educational work of the Nebraska Wheat Commission. However it was 
not without difficulty that the firm was oriented in a primarily 
educational, in contrast to a purely promotional, direction. The 
Program's early need for promotion created a mind-set that gained a 
momentum of its own. Certainly publicity had to be given the Program, 
but the educational goal was to remain uppermost. This effort 
became even more complicated when the final political goal of 
influencing the Federal Government through education of the public 
became enmeshed in Nebraska politics and accompanying party struggles. 
The Carroll Company began by initiating radio shows and 
building traveling displays. The radio shows were centered around 
the definition and value of utilization research. Experts were inter-
Viewed, various subjects explored in-depth, people visited with, and 
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information disbursed in great quantity. The public was invited to 
participate by sending in written questions which would be answered 
by the education unit through correspondence if not on a radio show. 
This format was followed until the research projects began to 
produce exploitable material. The focus then shifted from people 
to projects and their products. 
The traveling displays were designed by the education unit 
with various suggestions by Carroll Company personnel in regard to 
their actual construction. Use of machines in education was at the' 
time very much in vogue. The use of electricity, light and sound, 
was gaining adherents among entertainers and among those who would 
make education ~ttractive (and possibly even entertaining), as the 
education of an adult clientele must be. Therefore the first 
displays were teaching machines, large, cumbersome affairs, full of 
lights and.wires, which displayed questions on utilization research 
and required the adult to manipulate buttons to gain an answer. The 
panels were purposely built at a high physical level to thwart a 
child's playfulness, but the urge to stop and "play" with these 
machines was too great for most passing adults. The displays drew 
those curious about the machines as well as the Program. The educa-
tional cause was served. Attendants were later stationed by these 
displays to pursue that cause even further by engaging the partic-
ipants in informal conversation about utilization research and the 
Nebraska Program. Attempts would later be made to conduct formal 
Program effectiveness surveys in this manner. The displays, which 
would in time become less kinetic and less cumbersome, were especially 
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useful in the education of Nebraskans at state and county fairs in 
Nebraska,- since a large number of Nebraskans attended those 
occasions. The displays were by no means limited to fairs, showing 
up at most any function that had people and floor space. University 
students hired part-time were dispatched throughout the state with 
department trucks full of such exhibits; on-special occasions, 
higher-level department personnel put in an appearance. The reverse 
was also true: no department official appeared anywhere without a 
display and printed material. Eventually the more elaborate machines 
were to be utilized nation-wide as the Nebraska Program expanded its 
constit-uency as planned. 
A second.company was hired in 1962 to submit and pursue ideas 
on how to educate through use of the media. Rall and Raglin, 
Incorporated of Lincoln, Nebraska consisted of Frank Ral1, a 
scholarly individual who often lectured on journalism at the 
University of Nebraska, and Jim Raglin, a dynamic, outgoing person-
ality. Both were former newspaper reporters (and editors) who had 
been assigned to the State Capitol Building. They therefore had 
good experience in the writing of news releases and news stories, 
and in knowing the right people for getting the fullest exposure for 
the Program. As in the case of the Carrol Company, Rall and 
Raglin's main efforts were to be directed toward drawing attention to 
the Program, using news stories, articles, and printed material to 
engage the public in a full-fledged discussion of utilization 
research. The underlying purpose was to motivate members of the 
public to inform themselves about utilization versus production 
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research, and to form them into a pressure group so convinced of 
utilization research's value that the federal government would be 
influenced by their powerful lobby. 
A first move by RaIl and Raglin was to send out to all news-
paper publishers and editors a memo pad made from newly-developed corn 
starch paper with a short message about the Program printed on the 
bottom of each page. (By this time the research projects were 
beginning to show results.) The result was almost total saturation 
mention of the Program in the state's press--both in columns and "". 
editorials--in December 1962. The in-depth analysis included in this 
attention was considered educationally invaluable. The state press 
continued to cooperate as the results and promise of the research 
projects began to provide copy. Almost any statement composed and 
distributed by Program officials found space in numerous newspapers 
throughout the state. The education unit and its allies became 
increasingly busy composing speeches, news copy, articles, printed 
documents, scripts, and research abstracts. It was not until 10 
years later, 1972, that society would realize the opportunities latent 
-in the use of newspapers to give formal instruction. The National 
Endowment for the Humanities in cooperation with the Extension 
Service of the University of California, San Diego, began to offer 
11 b h . 3 co ege courses y newspaper at t at t1me. 
Department planning provided for a consistent and ever-
increasing supply of information to be utilized by the daily press. 
Weekly or monthly magazines and newspaper supplements provided a 
format for in-depth presentations. These in-depth articles and the 
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loose-leaf material the Department printed provided education unit 
personnel with their first "textbook" materials: now they could 
begin to deal witb formally organized groups in the state. Nebraska 
Program instruction at first assumed the character of a speaker's 
bureau, consisting of six of the seven personnel assigned in the 
Department's utilization research area and two of the people working 
with the New Crops section. A direct follow-on from this effort was 
the production of taped instruction packages and slide shows. 
Professionals from radio and television were brought in to lend 
their expertise and trained voices. Of course, the radio and 
television programs were also available on tape and film for playback 
to groups. In the course of this work the education unit became 
experienced enough to produce its own series of radio shows through 
the Ash Williams Recording Studios of Lincoln, Nebraska utilizing 
only the unit's own personnel. This type of instruction continued 
for over three years. Complementing the previously mentioned 
material were the research abstracts produced in abundance by 
cooperating laboratories or test farms. In essence they represented 
a constant up-dating of all the "textbook" material. Finally, the 
Department expanded its Biennial Report, a publication required by 
the State as a state-of-the-department message to the governor, 
legislature, and people of Nebraska, to include a large section on 
utilization research, the Nebraska Program, and the research 
abstracts. One could almost label these reports the textbooks of 
final authority. 
The farm groups were the organizations which contained the 
".,'1 
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most interested and participating individuals in the education effort, 
as might have been expected. Department personnel spent a great deal 
of time out in the state with these groups, until group leaders were 
either well enough informed in-the-field to take over or until they 
could be brought in and instructed in the department's offices in 
Lincoln. During the early 1960's the Grange's president spent a 
period of time working in the department's offices learning about 
utilization. The Farm Bureau, the Grange, and the Farmers Union were 
most cooperative, with the National Farmers Organization less readily 
accessible. Other groups with an educational bent were willing 
students: The Future Farmers of America (FFA), Future Homemakers of 
America (FHA), 4~H clubs, and similar groups of many names. It was 
felt that the youth were open to change and a new emphasis in agri-
culture because their economic future depended upon adaptation and the 
sensing of trends or the need to change. The main thrust of the 
Program's message was always the imbalance between production research, 
which was generously funded and produced ever larger crops, and utili-
zation research, which was not funded at the level necessary to 
-supply new uses for those crops. Of great advantage in conducting an 
educational program among these groups was their practice of holding 
regularly scheduled meetings. The atmosphere was not always one of 
open acceptance of ideas when working with production versus utili-
zation, given the long traditions of agriculture, but the instruction 
and discussions usually met with interested listeners and partic-
ipants--something all educators sincerely appreciate but do not always 
find at levels of learning other than adult education. According to 
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Nebraska Program group leaders, to work with these groups was to feel 
that one was indeed assisting the process of "learning." To observe 
the actual changing of attitude or behavior was exhilarating. 
Groups which either contacted the Department or were contacted 
by the Department were fed a steady stream of speakers, printed 
matter, instructional lectures, and audio-visual materials. These 
groups included community development leaders of Nebraska towns and 
cities, high school classes and assemblies (especially FFA and FHA 
classes), college classes and groups (especially in agriculture 
colleges), discussion groups such as library, church, and adult 
education classes; radio and television shows with group discussion 
formats, educational television, political education groups such as 
the League of Women- Voters, political party meetings, conventions, 
and service group meetings such as the Elks, Eagles, Lions, Masons, 
Rotary, Chamber of Commerce, and union and business groups. The 
education of these last opinion leaders, which usually included the 
community development personnel, business leaders, school and church 
personnel, and governmental officials of a city or county, was 
. considered of utmost importance. More than one conflict in 
scheduling was resolved in their favor. The use of department-
sponsored field trips to the participating laboratories and to the 
New Crops test plots was a useful device in attracting and holding the 
participation of these leaders. The Department's education unit and 
the personnel assigned to a particular research project usually 
conducted the laboratory trips, while the two New Crops men assigned 
from the Department's Weed and Seed Division assisted the education 
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unit with what could truly be called "field" trips to planted 
acreages and test plots. These last two men, both gentlemen 
farmers, had previous experience with experimental farm crops 
through their state government seed work and, most importantly, had 
experience in education through one of their number being a former 
college agriculture instructor. Both had conducted a state 
government educational program in weed eradication, including the 
building of displays, the composing of printed material, media 
exposure, and the handling of test plot field trips--surely the right 
men for the new job in the Nebraska Program. These men were 
responsible for taking the New Crops effort to the public, and the 
public demonstrated its interest by turning out 500-strong in 1960 to 
see one of the first large castor bean harvests in Nebraska (see 
Chapter 3, Footnotes 46 and 77). 
The passing of time brought the expected exploitable results 
from the research projects, plus a gradual increase in the acres of 
new crops planted. The project results were used, as had been 
... 
planned, to dramatize the utilization research.~rogram and what 
could be done if efforts were increased in this area--especially on 
the federal level. The results so used are examined in the 
discussion of the research projects in Chapter 3 of this study. 
Suffice it to say here that the products made from surplus agri-
cultural raw materials found wide use as teaching examples: foams, 
paper, milk bars, Nebraskits, growth stimulants, insulation, fuel 
additives, adhesives, foods, packagings, and paint. Pilot plants to 
be used for the purpose of producing some of these program-developed 
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products were established in several Nebraska towns. The plants had 
two goa,ls: to produce example products to draw the people to the 
Program in order to be educated, and to demonstrate feasibility to 
industry in hopes of attracting it to the state to put the new 
products into production. 
While group and opinion leaders were being trained and high 
school and college instructors were being asked to move utilization 
and utilization research study to a primary place in their curric-
ulums in the state, the media were kept busy with their important 
contribution. This effort Was of a continually expanding nature, 
some of' it through trial and error, but mostly planned by the 
educational unit of the Nebraska Program using its knowledge of 
educational methods. As the Program began to operate smoothly in 
the state, the decision was made to execute the next step, taking 
the Program to the nation's public. 
The pattern followed the methods tested and proved in the 
State of Nebraska. It was first necessary to catch the national 
, 
,pUblic's interest. The greatest concentration of effort had to be in 
the states with a primary interest in- agriculture. The most fertile 
ground was thought to be the southern states, with which Nebraska 
often found itself allied in Congress because of common agricultural 
interests and conservative philosophy. These cotton- and tobacco-
growing states were ripe for the Nebraska ~ffort, as evidenced by the 
following press report appearing in 1961: 
There is a need for two things in the cotton industry. There 
is a need for a positive educational program to win back the 
public image of cotton as a vital industry producing vital 
materials; to dispel the negative image of cotton as a price-
support tax burden. Further, there is a need for cotton to 
go deeply into research to win back markets from synthetics. 
The cotton industry has just now begun an information 
retrieval project based on the successful tobacco industry 
effort. Cotton is an old industry with a built-in love for 
the status quo. Its biggest hurdle is to overcome entrenched 
traditions. If the cotton industry ever goes out of business 
it will be because of dogged clinging to the past. 4 
The warning evidently carne too late, for on July 1, 1964 the 
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historic New Orleans Cotton Exchange closed after ninety-three years 
of business. Advertisements were placed in the nation's newspapers 
which pointed out precisely what Nebraska was saying in its educa-
tional effort: the agri~ulture industry as a whole had failed to 
take heed of the situation which the cotton growers had experienced, 
and past,federal actions had proved ineffective or unfair. The 
Exchange's swan song read thusly: 
We cede our role in the market place to the United States 
Secretary of Agriculture. Under federal government substi-
tutions' for the free enterprise system, cotton is the first 
to fall. Will the cotton industry be fo'llowed by all the 
rest? [We blam§7 the closing on a new government cotton plan 
under which the government would pay 6.5 cents per pound 
subsidy on domestically consumed cotton. The taxpayers will 
not stand still for these subsidies forever. s 
The conclusion could be drawn that cotton as a part of the agri-
culture industry had indeed been tardy in entering the education, 
utilization, and utilization research fields. In spite of that 
negligence, Nebraska's Program was saying, it had a chance to regain 
its stature through these mediums. 
The Nebraska Program was, in contrast to such status quo 
factions of the agriculture industry, aggressive in its education 
efforts. Utilizing modern mass media, it adopted the methods of 
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industry and manufacturers in its "southern campaign." The states 
of North and South Carolina, because of their emphasis on cotton and 
tobacco, were the prime education targets in the South. 
As to the rest of the nation, a media program was designed and 
pursued in an ever-widening circle out from the State of Nebraska. 
Articles frequently appeared in newspapers in Wisconsin, Colorado, 
Kansas, Iowa, the Dakotas, Missouri, Texas, and Florida. The best 
coverage on the national level was considered to be articles placed 
in the Wall Street Journal (see March 25 and November 5, 1965, for 
examples) and one by Bob Considine, a nationally syndicated 
columni"st (example in the Boston Record-American, March 18, 1962). 
Coverage of the.Nebraska Program was also given on a Huntly-
Brinkley NBC-TV News Special. The educational unit immediately 
tried to get a full specia1 done on the Nebraska Program over net-
work television.by these same individuals. Despite requests by high 
Nebraska officials and some indication that the effort might be 
successful, the NBC program as it was finally produced dealt with the 
plight of agriculture and its surpluses in general, mostly outlining 
the problems, not solutions. 
The spreading knowledge of the Program enticed the Asso-
ciation of State Departments· of Agriculture to hold its convention in 
Nebraska in 1962. After absorbing some of the Nebraska Center for 
Continuing Education's (Kellogg Center) ideas and methods, education 
unit personnel worked to the point of exhaustion arranging formal 
seminars, informal discussion groups, field trips, and displays. 
Here was adult education operating at its finest, with a group of 
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interested, live-in students located in the best of facilities with 
a program designed for them. It was realized that a state's news 
people followed the movements and doings of their state officials; 
therefore the media effort alone, especially in the area of printed 
matter, was massive. Neither the officials nor the media returned 
home with their heads and hands empty. 
As a follow-up, education unit individuals visited certain 
colleges and capitols of the states in attendance, concentrating on 
the colleges of agriculture, and discussed with them utilization 
versus production philosophy, the idea of increased utilization 
research, new crops, and the Nebraska Program. It was at approx-
imate1y this same time that Nebraska's Department of Agriculture, 
after viewing the successful tobacco and cotton information 
retrieval programs, initiated its own information retrieval endeavor 
as part of_its education effort. One outcome of this retrieval 
program was a realization that some education and lobbying had to be 
directed toward certain of the large United States corporations, for 
it was found that since the companies were entering the agriculture 
area by buying up farm land, their .laboratories were beginning to 
devote increasing attention to finding better ways of producing agri-
cultural crops. These corpora~ions were found to be increasing their 
agricultural raw material-producing landholdings until states such as 
California had 45 corporations owning some 3,700,000 acres, making 
California the leading farm state by the end of the 1960's.6 The 
increased production emphasis was, of course, anathema to the 
Nebraska Program. 
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A more welcome increase came in the area of national attention 
for the Program. The effort proceeded well during the early and 
middle 1960's. The attention of state governments, private labora-
tories, the USDA, Congress, the White House, the national news media, 
and a wide public was drawn to the Nebraska endeavor. But the 
Nebraska Program had not yet ended its expansion. It initiated 
movement into the -international arena in order to use resulting 
publicity for educative/lobbying purposes. The projects involved in 
these international affairs of state are discussed in another part of 
this paper (see Chapter 3). Only mention of their educational aspects 
is made' here. 
Naturally when a state of the Union dealt directly with other 
nations the Federal Government too~ notice. And Nebraska began so 
dealing, ~nowing that the federal government's interest would be 
stimulated.' The NEBRASKIT and the milk bar were relied upon to give 
dramatic emphasis to the Program through international attention, and " 
the Food-For-Peace Program was found to be the most natural outlet 
for these food products. The Nebraska Program had utilized a 
national stage when the Federal Government was convinced to buy tons 
of NEBRASKITs for civil defense shelters. Now the NEBRASKIT was 
gaining an international stage. - Nebraska was convinced that the 
nation and its Federal Government would soon see the immense value of 
increased utilization research. 
Accompanying the international movement of food ,products were 
the inquiries received from foreign nations such as Sweden and Japan 
concerning the patenting of Program-discovered processes. Clearly, 
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had the Program been an effort adequately funded for utilization 
research rather than one utilized for education and lobbying 
purposes, it could have been impressive indeed, by several indi-
cations including this one. Yet, perhaps all efforts, education, 
~ 
research, and lobbying, would have failed in the end no matter what 
the emphasis and funding, in the face of political manipulation--and 
in the face of increasing confusion over the Program's goals (was it 
a research and development program or an education and lobbying 
effort?). These problems are examined in the final chapter of this 
study. 
>The education unit took advantage of the increased attention 
given to the Program by initiating continuous correspondence with 
individuals. Aware of the success of the United States Government, 
private industry, and military suggestion programs, the education 
unit (using Director Finigan as its voice) asked individuals to 
correspond with the Department and write in their ideas for research 
projects. 7 Out of this grew a type of educational correspondence 
bordering on a correspondence course for the individuals involved,» 
for a constantly increasing amount of upgraded material was sent to 
them for study. This educative aspect of the Program developed to an 
extent whereby it required a good deal of Program personnel time, and 
several secretaries were assigned to assist with the immense amount 
of paperwork. On a purely state level the effort was valuable for 
its contribution to state government-private citizen relations, 
especially in giving the taxpayer-supporter of the Program a sense of 
partiCipation and authority. Herein lay a recognizable adult 
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education method aptly described by Malcolm Knowles: "The adult 
education processes were most effective in mobilizing public support 
• 
8 
when used directly. for this purpose." 
In addition, Program personnel talked at length with citizens 
in the state and nation as well as keeping in contact with federal 
officials. What could be called formal interviewing was carried out 
most commonly by personnel stationed with traveling displays. 
Education unit personnel assigned to these exhibits eventually devised 
a short checklist which they used to prompt questions and record 
anSWers. Of course, statistical information could be checked each 
year to' discern how much more acreage of new. crops had been planted, 
how much more u~ilization research the federal government's USDA was 
doing in its laboratories, how much more correspondence was coming 
in, how much more media coverage had been attained, or how much more 
educational material was being prepared and used. Nebraska Department 
of Agriculture staff meetings of Program personnel usually ended with 
education unit members and department director Finigan attempting 
some evaluative steps by discussion and by use of such material and 
statistics. These education personnel were Finigan's top staff 
members, as they in fact should have been in view of the utilization 
research program's true educative goals •. These should also have been 
the evaluative personnel. It is easy, however, for personnel to get 
so involved in a program that they do not fully and objectively 
examine it. Operations assume a life of their own, and activity 
confers a seeming value upon the individual worker and his efforts. 
The Nebraska Program was no different. Its history of accomplishment 
t" 
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as orchestrated by administrators and the education unit, and 
documented by the media, seemed commendable. Even the eventual 
realization by the public that the Program was not in itself a true 
research effort that would solve agriculture's problems did not 
lessen the worthwhileness of the effort in relation to its methods 
and goals--though this realization was in part responsible for the 
reduction. and modification of the Program in 1967. 
Were the Program's true goals accomplished? Had the pUblic's 
attitudes and behavior been affected? Were the problems of an 
industry on their way to being solved? Had the education effort been 
effective? The next section of this study looks· at these questions. 
The methods, the progress, the triumphs and failures have been 
evaluated by this researcher, in the expectation that the experience 
of the Nebraska Program can serve as a model for similar efforts by 
similar agencies which find the courage to pursue this kind of 
education program. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EVALUATION: ADJUSTING THE PROGRAM MODEL 
The Program's personnel did not do a very systematic job of 
evaluating their work. Some evaluation was done, but Program 
personnel did not concern themselves at all with the answers to 
questions which were uppermost in this researcher's mind. Questions 
such as: Were citizens mistrustful of an education program admin-
istered by a political agency? From what sources did Nebraskans get 
information about the Program? What organizations did people trust as 
sources of information? Consequently, this researcher found it 
necessary to conduct a survey of Nebraska citizens and their legis-
lative representatives. The results of this survey (See Appendix B), 
along with the investigation of the conduct of the Program in 
Chapter 3, provided the basis for the conclusions presented in this 
chapter, and made it possible to identify the points at which the 
program planning model should be adjusted. 
Two separate questionnaires were composed: one for legis-
lators and one for citizens (see Appendix B). The legislator 
questionnaire was sent to every senat.or who had served in the 
Nebraska State Legislature during the years 1959-1967. The citizen 
questionnaire waS sent to a randomly-selected group of Nebraska 
citizens in cities, towns and rural areas selected via area-
probability sampling. The areas represented in the survey were an 
eastern Nebraska small town and .surrounding rural area (Geneva), a 
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western Nebraska small town and surrounding rural area (Bridgeport), 
a medium-size city (Grand Island), and a metropolitan area (Omaha). 
Results of the Citizen Survey 
Agencies or officials wishing to initiate similar education 
programs may be heartened to discover that responses to the citizen 
survey indicated that the public can be receptive to education 
programs originating with po1itica1--in tbis case state governmental--
agencies. Contrary to this researcher's expectations, most people 
surveyed felt that the information they had received in connection 
with the Program had been of an educational nature, that its 
purpose had been educational rather than political. Few seemed to 
have felt that the Program had been exploited for personal or party 
political gain. Despite this public confidence in the apolitical 
nature of the Program, this researcher felt that political exploi-
tation (along with secretive administration-and confusion over 
goals) hurt the Program when it came up for renewal before the Legis-
lature in 1967, resulting in considerably reduced stope and funding. 
It should be noted here that 16'7. of the legislators and 18'7. of the 
citizens responding to the questionnaire did feel that the Program 
had been exploited for political purposes. A number of citizens 
indicated that they had felt the Program had been both educational 
and political, and 37% said they had voted for candidates who 
supported the Program. 
It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that despite the earnest 
desire of most people connected with the Program to "keep the 
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Program out of politics," it was almost impossible for the Program to 
avoid politics: to begin with, one of the goals of the Program was 
political--Le. pressure on public representatives at the state and 
national levels to support utilization research. Further, the 
Program was initiated and administered by a government agency. The 
fact that the Program operated in a political context made it 
dependent on the good graces of politicians for its very existence. 
It also made the Program susceptible to political exploitation by the 
existing state administration and the object of criticism by 
opponents of that administration. At the heart of the Program, 
of course, was its massive education effort designed to change the 
attitudes of a production-oriented citizenry--an effort with an 
economic rather than a political motive. 
A number of questions on the survey were designed to ascertain 
how many people had received information about the Program, where 
they got it, and how they regarded various sources of information. 
(See Table 1.) A whopping two-thirds of those to whom the Program 
was directed had heard of it. And of those who had heard of the 
_Program, 75% said they had supported it (the other 25% were undecided). 
There was no significant difference in degree of support for the 
Program between rural and urban xespondents. It is interesting to note 
that virtually all of the urban respondents indicated that they felt 
their work, if not directly related-to agriculture, was related to the 
fortunes of agriculture: in light of this feeling, urban support for 
the Program is not surprising. Of course, urban support for the 
Program may also have had something to do with the fact that new uses 
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TABLE 1 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Respondents to the citizen questionnaire were asked to identify the 
sources from which they received information about the Nebraska Pro-
gram. The table below lists the various media utilized by the Program 
in its education effort and the percent of respondents who learned 
about the Program through each. Sources are listed in order of 
effectiveness. 
INFORMATION SOURCE % OF RESPONDENTS REACHED 
Newspapers 76% 
.. ··Television 40% 
... " : Magazines 32% 
Word of Mouth 26% 
Radio 26% 
Farm Organization 24% 
County or State Fair Display 20% 
Speaker 00% 
Printed Pamphlet 00% 
Department of Agriculture Personnel 00% 
. Respondents were also asked to rate the trustworthiness of various 
sources of information. The table below lists the various agencies 
and media which generated information about the Program and the per-
cent of respondents who felt each to be trustworthy. Sources are 
listed in order of trustworthin",.ss. 
INFORMATION SOURCE % WHO FELT SOURCE TRUSTWORTHY 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture 64% 
Media 56% 
Nebraska Department of Economic 40% Development 
Nebraska Governor's Office 32% 
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for agricultural products might result in new jobs in new industries 
(although one 26-year old respondent said he didn't regard new 
industry as desirable per se). 
Of those who said they had actively supported the Program, 
just under half said their chief means of active support had been 
vocal--talking about the Program with friends and neighbors. 
Consequently, it was not surprising to find that approximately 25% of 
the people who had heard about the Program had gained at least part 
of their information by word-of-mouth. In terms of number of people 
reached, newspapers ranked first (75% of respondents had gained at 
least part of their information from newspapers), television second 
(42%), magazines third (32%), and radio, word-of-mouth, farm organ-
izations, and fair displays fourth (20-25% apiece). It was inter-
esting to note that a significantly larger number of rural than of 
urban respondents cited magazines, fair displays and farm organ-
izations as sources of information. This finding should be of 
interest to educators attempting to reach adults in rural areas. 
Newspapers, radio, television, and word-of-mouth were equally 
important sources of information for both urban and rural respondents. 
The Program's educational effort relied heavily upon press 
coverage to disseminate information, so <it was not surprising to find 
that newspapers were the largest single source of information about 
the Program cited. Responses to a question which asked citizens to 
rate sources of information for trustworthiness rated the press 
considerably higher than either the Governor's Office Or the 
Department of Economic Development (the present Program custodian). 
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It should be noted that the Nebraska Department of Agriculture also 
rated comparatively high in trustworthiness ("comparatively" because 
even the press received only a 56% vote of confidence!). A related 
question asked whether citizens would place more confidence in infor-
mation released by private research laboratories or by university 
college of agriculture laboratories. Responses gave an edge of 10'7. 
to university laboratories, not a very considerable margin, but 
nonetheless a significant one>, This result tends to confirm the 
judgment>of those legislators and Program personnel who had argued 
for a larger role for university laboratories. 
>All of the sources of information discussed so far--news-
papers, radio, television, etcetera--have involved individual 
learning. Responses to the questionnaire revealed that group 
learning also played an important role: 60% of those surveyed had 
participated in some sort of group discussion of the Program. In 
addition, 45% of those responding said they would consider joining 
a discussion or study group on the topic of utilization research if 
such were to be offered in the near future. And although 20% said 
they would not be interested in joining such a group, 35% were 
undecided, all-in-all an indication of considerable receptivity to 
the idea of group learning. O£ those who had participated in group 
discussions, 25% had attended a farm group, another 25% a school or 
church group, and the remainder had participated in informal groups 
of various kinds. Although group participation was not significantly 
greater in the rural areas than in the cities, it was the rural 
respondents who had participated in farm groups and the urban ones 
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who had participated in school or church groups. The 25% partic-
ipation in farm group discussions seemed to justify the time, effort 
and expense which the Program expended in getting educational infor-
mation out to these groups. However, responses to the questionnaire 
revealed that other kinds of groups (e.g. school and church) ought not 
to be overlooked. 
Because the Nebraska Program was designed as a model to 
demonstrate what should and could be done in the field of utilization 
research, the results of its various research projects were them-
selves employed as educational devices. The results of the projects 
which produced the Nebraskit, milk bar, paint from soybeans, paper 
from cornstarch,.etcetera were widely publicized. Samples were made 
available to the public at state fairs and were distributed as widely 
as resources made possible. This being the case, this researcher was 
interested to discover how well people remembered individual projects, 
and how many had had an opportunity to test any of. the results. 
The two best-remembered projects were the Nebraskit wheat 
biscuit and the grain alcohol additives for auto fuel (recalled by 
·68% and 64% respectively). This result was not surprising to this 
researcher, as the Nebraskit had been the most widely used of the 
projects in the educative effort. It was named after the state, was 
widely covered in the media, and was served at countless dinners and 
luncheons. The fuel project, though less widely publicized, was the 
one project continued by an independent committee of the Nebraska 
Legislature and vigorously pursued after the original Program was 
reduced in 1967 (at which time most of the surviving projects were 
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given to the Nebraska Department of Economic Development). Thus most 
recall of this particular project was probably a result of recent 
media coverage. 
Three other projects--milk bars, paint from soybeans and paper 
from corn starch--were recalled by about a third of the respondents: 
only half as many as recalled the Nebraskit, but still a respectable 
showing. Again, this researcher was not surprised, as these projects 
had lent themselves particularly well to educative situations. The 
milk bars, along with the Nebraskit, were touted as survival rations 
and as nutritional supplements. Highway paint test strips were put 
down iIi numerous connnunities and identified via signs posted for 
motorists. Corn paper was made into desk pads, etcetera. What did 
surprise this researcher was the fact that, considering the wide 
distribution of samples, so few respondents (only 17%) had actually 
tested any of the research products. There is scanty statistical 
evidence that these teaching materials contributed as significantly 
to the education effort as believed. The fact that so many more 
people recalled these projects than had actually tested them confirms 
the superiority of the media for information dissemination. This is 
not to say that the research products were not important: the 
Nebraskit in particular was important as a symbol--as an example of 
what could be done--but it was important irregardless of whether you 
had actually tasted one! 
One other project should be mentioned here: growth stimulators 
were recalled by a significant number of respondents despite the fact 
that no particular effort had been made to publicize them (aside from 
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acknowledging their existence as a project). The discovery of growth 
stimulators as a new use for surplus agricultural raw materials was in 
itself somewhat ironic, and one can only surmise that people 
remembered them because they continued to be interested in increasing 
production despite the best efforts of the Program to shift emphasis 
to utilization. 
Considering the reasonable success the Program had in reaching 
a large constituency, it was interesting to find that 68% of the 
respondents felt that they had not received enough information about 
the Program. rn addition, almost all the respondents indicated that 
they would like to see more information about utilization research 
prepared and made available to the public. One suspects that this 
would have been gratifying intelligence for Program officials, for it 
signifies that the education effort had interested, motivated and 
responsive learners. rt appears that the public would have welcomed 
an education effort even more ambitious than the one undertaken. 
Although almost no one was opposed to the Program or its goals, a 
significant percentage of respondents were undecided about its 
-merits. Given the respondents' stated desire for more information 
about the Program, it seems likely that the 25% or so of respondents 
who were undecided about the Program simply lacked sufficient infor-
mation to respond affirmatively. 
When asked to compare the 1959-67 Nebraska Program with its 
modified successor, most respondents found the former effort to have 
been satisfactory in both scope and funding. They appeared dubious 
that the reduced program was doing an adequate job of achieving 
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Program goals. However, when asked whether they agreed with a state 
senator's opinion that the Legislature would grant the Program all 
the money it asked for, only 18% of the respondents agreed that this 
should be done. It is this researcher's opinion that this response 
reflects a commitment to the idea of fiscal restraint, rather than a 
reluctance to fund the Program adequately (especially since most 
respondents felt the original, better-funded program was preferable 
to the present one). 
It is doubtful that reliable statistical information of this 
sort regarding public attitudes toward spending for utilization 
research was available to State Legislators when the Program came up 
for renewal in 1967. Program evaluation efforts conducted by Program 
personnel were neither particularly extensive nor systematic. 
Further, although some evaluation was conducted, there is little 
evidence that the guiding officials utilized this feedback to good 
effect to modify the existing program. This is a common criticism 
and failure of education programs. Probably a system of evaluation 
should have been devised by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture 
when it first assumed administration of the Program. But it is 
possible that initiation of operations required all expended effort. 
In any case, evaluation phased _into existence slowly and uncertainly 
during the education unit's work. This researcher's survey found 
that none of the respondents had been involved in any attempt to 
evaluate the Program prior to the present one. 
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Results of the Legislator Survey 
The results of the legislator survey are most interesting at 
those points where they provide a contrast with the results of the 
citizen survey. For example, responses to the legislator survey 
suggest that attempts to get information to legislators should 
utilize different avenues than those used to educate citizens. Most 
legislators (85%) got at least part of their information about the 
Program directly from the Nebraska Department of Agriculture--from 
personnel associated. with the Program's education unit or from 
Program progress reports forwarded directly to individual legis-
lators" This provides a significant contrast with citizens, none of 
whom cited the Department of Agriculture as a direct source of infor-
mation. Citizens seem to have received their information almost 
entirely secondhand--e.g. through newspaper reports (75%), tele~ 
vision (42%), magazines (32%) and radio (26%). While legislators 
also read about the Program in their newspapers (60'70 cited news-
papers as the source of at least some of their information), only 
10% of legislators cited the electronic media (radio and televisiop) 
as a source of information (5% cited radio and 5% television). 
The close physical proximity of the Legislature's chambers 
and offices to the Department _.of Agriculture's offices probably 
accounted for the success of direct department contact with the 
senators. It is harder to account for the fact that so few legis-
lators cited radio and television as sources .of information. Either 
the legislators didn't watch television, or other sources of infor-
mation were so far superior that television was insignificant in 
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comparison. The one method of acquiring information which ranked in 
the same order of importance for both legislators and citizens was 
word-of-mouth (cited by 25% of both citizens and legislators, with 
legislators naming lobbyists, personal staff,and other senators as 
well as department personnel as sources of word-of-mouth information). 
In general, the legislators seemed to be even better informed 
about the Program than the citizens--in particular they had better 
recall of individual projects (with one important exception) and fewer 
were undecided on questions which asked for personal responses to the 
Program. This was at least partly a consequence of the fact that 
legislators had to vote on the Program's renewal: this made it 
imperative that they inform themselves on its progress and accom-
plishments. 
The combined influence of the education unit and the need-to-
know requirement of individual legislators created a Legislature well 
informed about the Program's various research projects: 90% of the 
legislators recalled the fuels project, compared with 64% of the 
ci tizens; and .407. recalled paper compared with 287. of the citizens .. 
·Interestingly, the citizens recalled the paint project twice as well as 
the legisla·tors: only 157. of the legislators recalled this project 
(compared with a 307. recall by citizens); making it one of the 
projects least well-remembered by legislators. Citizens, on the other 
hand, recalled only the Nebraskit and the fuel projects better. The 
reason lies in the efforts of the Program's education unit,which went 
into a large number of communities and literally "painted the town" by 
laying down numerous paint test strips on the main streets. Close 
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contact on the local level eVidently made this project stand out in 
the minds of citizens, while legislators recalled it only dimly if at 
all. 
When asked to evaluate the success of the .Program's effort to 
re-educate the state's production-oriented citizens, 80% of the legis-
lators said they felt the Program had been successful: as a result 
of the Program, the state's citizens would be willing to support 
increased utilization research. This result correlates favorably 
with the citizens' own evaluation and suggests that the legislators 
knew their constituencies very well indeed: 79% of citizens agreed 
that utilization research needed more emphasis. 
Interestingly enough, while 80% of the legislators felt that 
the Program had been responsible for increasing public support for 
utilization research, only 33% felt it had been responsible for 
increasing.support in the Legislature itself (33% disagreed and 33% 
were undecided). The senators may have felt that they did not need 
the Program to convince them of the necessity of utilization research: 
after all, they would hardly have initiated the Program if they had. 
not been already convinced of the need for utilization research. 
Not surprisingly, those who felt the Program had not increased legis-
lative support for utilization ~esearch included the 16% who 
expressed the belief that the Program's educational effort was 
essentially political, as well as the 20% who opposed emphasizing 
utiliza tion research a t the expense of production research. 
Some 30% of the legislators said that the information they had 
received about the Program made their attitude toward the Program 
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more negative. Those who chose to comment on the source of their 
negative attitude cited a feeling that the Program had promised more 
than it had delivered. One senator whose attitude had become more 
negative during the course of the Program said he felt that the 
Program had been a good investment, but he had come to feel that 
utilization research could be better carried out on the national than 
on the state level. His feelings exactly parallel those of Program 
administrators in the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, who came 
very early on to see that the Program could hope at best to be no 
more than a model program, an example for other states and the 
Federal Government, and that no one state could support the level of 
research necessary to get new projects into actual production. 
The feeling of disappointment, of unfulfilled 'promise, on the 
part of certain legislators points up an important failure of commu-
nication between Program administrators and the Legislature regarding 
Program goals. While legislators were remarkably well informed 
about individual projects, many senators seemed to regard these 
projects as ends in themselves. When they voted for the Program, 
most, senators had felt that they were making a direct investment in 
the state's economic well being--that the Program would spawn new 
products which would utilize the state's agricul tural surpluses. If 
this expectation of direct economic dividends from their investment 
was unrealistic, no one in the Legislature seemed aware of the fact 
at the time; what is surprising'is the fact that Program admin-
istrators did not disabuse the senators of their expectations after 
it became clear that the Program's goals would have to be more modest. 
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Confusion over the Program's goals (should the Program be seen 
as an "example" program, or should it press on for marketable 
products?) may have contributed to its 1967 reduction in scope and 
funding. In any event, legislators were divided on the survey 
question which asked them to judge whether the reduced Program was 
doing an adequate job of meeting Program goals. The survey found 
that 50% of the legislators approved of the reduced Program and 30% 
favored the old one, with 20% undecided. If, as Director Finigan had 
asserted, the Program had served its purpose out by 1967, the 
question of which program was better is academic. (The Department of 
Agricul'ture had not recommended renewal in 1967, arguing that the 
Program should be seen as an "example" and that its work had been 
done.) There is however considerable evidence that to this day many 
senators see the Program's essential focus as research and develop-
ment. For example, of those who favored the better-funded 1959-67 
Program, half said they would have favored giving it even more money 
than it had been allotted--as though more money would have enabled it 
to be a "real" research and development program rather than a mere, 
example. Also, half of those who preferred the present reduced 
Program favored reactivating some of the projects initiated by the 
1959-67 Program. The citizens··gave an even stronger vote of 
confidence to the old Program, 40-50% favoring the old Program and 
only 5-10% favoring the new one. One can only conclude that most 
Nebraskans felt that paint from soybeans might be on the market today 
but for the 1967 cutback in Program funds. 
This is the point at which to retaIl that nearly everyone 
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queried felt the Program had been educational--i.e. the information 
they had received about the Program had been informative, reasonably 
objective, and seemed to be in the public's best interest. This is a 
particularly important verdict, considering that the Program had 
been administered by a government agency. On the other hand, just 
because the respondents felt the information they had received was 
educational does not mean that they understood the·Program's goals 
to be "merely" educational, or that they did not expect marketable 
results from the Program. The evidence, as noted above, is quite 
otherwise. 
·If the Nebraska public did not get what it expected from the 
Program, what did it get? Clearly, it got itself educated about 
utilization research, but did it get anything more? More had been 
promised, even in the fairly modest objectives of Department of 
Agriculture. administrators. It had been hoped that if the Program 
could not produce marketable results on its own, it would at least 
attract the attention of other states and the Federal Government, so 
that acting in concert expanded utilization research programs migh~ 
be undertaken. What evidence is there that this in fact happened? 
When Nebraska legislators were queried about the influence the Program 
might have had on Congress, 57~ felt the Program had had a positive 
influence. Another 247. disagreed, and 19% were undecided. Queried 
about the Program's influence on the USDA, 38% felt the Program had 
had a positive influence. Nineteen percent disagreed, and 38% were 
undecided. The large number who were undecided points up again the 
lack of systematic evaluation of the Program. It also suggests that 
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many senators had never considered the Program's influence on Congress 
and the U.SDA to be an important goal, and so were unprepared to make 
a judgment on thatpoint. 
How Effective Was The Example? 
There remains the question of how effective the Program was in 
reaching the public beyond Nebraska's borders. In particular, what 
influence, if any, did the Program have on spending for utilization 
research by other agricultural states and by the Federal Government? 
As we have already noted, there is no record of any attempt by 
Program personnel to answer these questions. This would seem a 
rather serious omission for an "example" program whose ultimate goal 
was to convince Congress, the USDA and other agricultural states of 
the need for increased utilization research. On the other hand, this 
investigator discovered that the statistics necessary to make such an 
evaluation are all but impossible to come by. The researcher wrote to 
seven agricultural states requesting a comparison of expenditures for 
utilization and production research during the life of the Program. 
Without exception, he was informed that available records did not 
distinguish between these two categories of research, and that the time 
and expense required to compile such figures would be prohibitive. It 
is possible that such statistics would have been easier to acquire had 
they been requested each year as budgets· for agricultural research 
became available. At any rate, they are not available now. It was 
called to the investigator's attention that the best source of infor-
mation about agricultural economics is the Current Research Infor-
'.'"f 
188 
mation System (eRIS) which inventories agricultural research at the 
state agricultural experiment stations and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). However, this system waS not set 
up until 1966, and consequently would not provide statistics for the 
years when the Program's influence would have been felt most strongly. 
Efforts to evaluate the Program's influence on the USDA met 
with somewhat better success, partly because it was possible to 
obtain the necessary statistics from the USDA Agricultural Research 
Service. It should be recalled that only 38% of Nebraska legis-
lators responding to this investigator's survey had felt that the 
Program had had a positive influence on the USDA. There is, 
of course, no way of telling from statistics alone whether increased 
spending for utilization research was the result of the influence of 
the Nebraska Program. However, an analysis of USDA spending for 
utilization research from 1959-1967 reveals that the greatest increase 
in spending occurred during the first half of the decade. It is 
interesting to note that these were the years when the Nebraska 
Program waS expanding its activities and making its most successfuL 
bid for public attention. Of course, spending for other kinds of 
agricultural research (including production research) waS also on the 
rise during these years. In f~ct, there was only one year during 
which the spending for utilization research increased at a signif-
icantly greater rate than spending for other kinds of agricultural 
research. 
In 1963 spending for utilization research increased by 21%--
the biggest jump of the decade--while spending for other kinds of 
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agricultural research increased by only 4%. This significant 
increase in spending may reflect the lobbying efforts of the 
Nebraska Program and the National Utilization Research Association 
(which had held its 1962 meeting in Lincoln, Nebraska). This was 
also the year that the Kansas City National Chemistry Conference had 
heard 24 papers on agricultural utilization research, and Nebraska 
Program Director P. F. Finigan had participated in the conference's 
main symposium. Last but not least, 1962 was the year that the 
Federal Government purchased 66 million pounds of Nebraskits for use 
as survival rations. It is not impossible that the USDA's 1963 
budget-for utilization research, drawn up during 1962, was 
influenced by these events. The relevant statistics were provided 
this researcher by the USDA and appear in Table lIon page 190. 
The Program's most-clearly-demonstrable success remains the 
success it had with Nebraskans, educating them about utilization 
research and reordering the agricultural research priorities of the 
University's College of Agriculture. Statistics provided this 
investigator by the College of Agriculture reveal that from 1959-1970 
spending for utilization research increased by 305% while spending 
for production research increased by only 126%, This is only a 
relative gain however; in te)Cm~ of dollars spent, production research 
still outstrips utilization research. (See Table III, page 190.) 
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TABLE II 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
Agricultural and Utilization Research Obligations, 1959-1967 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
Other Total 
Agricul tural Utilization 
Fiscal Years Research % of Increase Research % of Increase 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
Year 
$109,057 $19,900 
115,207 057. 19,198 007. 
137,597 167. 22,105 147. 
137,554 007. 22,870 03% 
143,958 047. 18,897 217. 
177,703 187. 30,154 On. 
200,864 127. 35,683 147. 
224,000 107. 35,655 007. 
230,733 037, 37,693 057. 
TABLE III 
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE 
Funding for Agricultural Research 
Production 
Research 7. of Increase 
Utilization 
Research 7. of Increase 
1959 $ 601,770 $104,995 
1970 1,364,987 126% . 425,699 3057. 
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Final Evaluation 
At this point, the strengths and weaknesses of the Program can 
be assessed. The strengths lay in three areas: funding, personnel, 
and educational methodology. The weaknesses were on the surface more 
numerous: friction with the University of Nebraska College of 
Agriculture, unpreparedness on the part of the-administering agency, 
, political exploitation of Program gains, failure to communicate 
goals to the public, and inadequate evaluation. Actually, all five 
of these problem areas had their source in the fact that the 
Nebraska Legislature had broken new ground in assigning what came to 
be an education program to a political/governmental agency. Under 
the circumstances, it is remarkable that the Program did so well. 
From the vantage point of hindsight, none of the problems encountered 
by the Program are at all surprising. It would even seem that they 
might have been anticipated and steps taken to prevent or minimize 
them. 
For example, friction with the University of Nebraska College 
of.Agriculture was inevitable the moment the administration of wha~ 
was essentially an education program in agricultural economics was 
assigned to a "non-educational" agency. In any field the personnel 
of an established institution-understandably think of themselves as 
the appropriate persons to conduct research in that field. It should 
not have been at all surprising then if university personnel felt 
their expertise had been neglected when the administration of the 
Program was given to the Nebraska Department of Agriculture. But 
university pique wasn't merely a matter of bruised egos: adminis-
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tration of the Program would have brought with it access to special 
sources of funds not otherwise available to the school. The intense 
competition for funds in education is well known. Reputations depend 
upon funds for research, and when the administration of the Program 
was given to apolitical agency, the College of Agriculture had to 
content itself witb the five projects (and associated funds) 
allocated to it by the Department of Agriculture. 
This problem was in fact not unforeseen, and when the issue of 
Program administration was being debated in the Legislature, the 
College of Agriculture had its proponents. Patiently, opponents 
argued that it was precisely because the College of Agriculture had 
traditional competence in the field of agricultural economics that it 
should not be entrusted with a project designed to challenge the 
prevailing wisdom in the field. The leaders of institutions which 
have worked in a given way over a period of years develop a propri-
etary interest in their work and cannot be expected to regulate or 
change themselves to any great extent. It was further argued by 
those who opposed administration of the Program by the University that 
- the College of Agriculture, with its strong programs in production 
research, should itself be one of the targets of a utilization research 
education program. In supporting the prevailing orthodoxy (production 
research), the University was engaging in social and economic main-
tenance; its programs reinforced existing thinking and priorities 
rather than reordering them. B. E. Swanson and C. Lindly, in an 
article entitled "College and the Community," have warned adult 
educators that established educational institutions, busy maintaining 
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the status quo, cannot be counted on as agents of social intervention 
1 
or change. 
In the end, the Nebraska Legislature allowed itself to be 
persuaded that the Nebraska Department of Agriculture ought to go into 
the education business, or as it was seen at the time, the research and 
development business. Administration of the Program was given to 
this Department, which had no particular education or research bias, 
since it had never done either: its job heretofore had been 
inspection, tax collection and consumer protection. If the University 
College of Agriculture was upset by the decision, it was only 
natural; and it was only natural that the University should adopt an 
"I told you so" attitude when the Department of Agriculture found 
itself ill-prepared to undertake the resulting educative effort. 
Unlike the University, the Department of Agriculture did not 
have its own facilities either for research or for public education. 
So it began by delegating these tasks--research to private labora-
tories, and education to private firms. What could be sounder? It 
was felt that, with no philosophical preconceptions, these private 
agencies could be counted on to carry out the tasks for which they 
were being paid. As the focus of the Program changed from research 
and development to education, the Department began to put together an 
education unit of its own. At first, however, the department's 
education unit saw itself as only another kind of public relations or 
public information agency, whose work was no different in kind from 
that of the hired public relations agencies. It engaged itself in 
promoting the Program (assuring Nebraskans that their investment 
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would payoff), the Department of Agriculture (look what a great job 
we're doing for you), and the administration of Governor Frank 
Morrison ("Nebraska's Governor has provided valuable support to the 
Nebraska Program," headlined a state fair display). Fortunately for 
the Program, this public relations phase was outgrown. It is, 
however, hardly surprising that a governmental agency with little or 
no experience in the field of public education should initially 
conceive of its job in terms of public relations. No one in the 
governor's office--and none of the Democratic appointees in the 
Department of Agriculture--was going to object if the Program's 
education unit engaged in public relations for the Governor or the 
Department. Nor were the state legislators averse to making 
political points from Program successes. 
Political exploitation of the Program and consequent pressure 
on Program personnel to produce visible results--especially in terms 
of potentially marketable products--was responsible for what was 
perhaps the Program's greatest weakness: its inability to state its 
goals clearly and publicly, and to acknowledge the fact that its 
administrators had come to see' it as essentially an education 
program--not as a research and development program. Program admin-
istrators suspected that Nebraskans would not take kindly to the 
idea of investing 300,000 dollars a year in what was essentially an 
effort at consciousness-raising. Furthermore, legislators controlled 
the purse: the Program would be up for review every four years, and 
senators who had voted for research wanted results to report to the 
folks back home. It is not surprising then that respondents to both 
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the citizen and legislator questionnaires of this investigator seemed 
to regard the Program's primary focus as research and development--
even though they granted the educational nature of the information 
they had received about the Program. Nor is it surprising that 68% 
of the citizen respondents felt they had not received enough infor-
mation about the Program (as opposed to individual research projects): 
the public had been left to infer Program goals from bits and pieces 
of information about utilization research and about individual 
projects. It was not until the Program neared its second renewal in 
1967 that Nebraska Director of Agriculture P. F. Finigan publicly 
stated-his understanding of Program goals, saying he considered the 
effort to have been no more than an "example" program, that in fact 
as far as he was concerned its work was done--even though only one 
project had reached the marketing stage. 
On the face of things it would seem that Program administrators 
had been disingenuous, that they saw that continued funding depended 
upon their producing some kind of visible results, and so they 
allowed people to think that products like the Nebraskit would some 
day be produced in Nebraska, providing a ready market for state agri-
cultural products. Meanwhile, Program personnel were importuning 
federal officials and their own representatives in Congress with the 
argument that the Nebraskit was only a "model" product, an example of 
the sort of product which could be manufactured and marketed if--and 
only if--federal funding and facilities were re-directed toward this 
end. 
Evidently, Nebraska Department of Agriculture officials did 
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not in fact care if the Program failed to generate marketable 
products. It was as if they set the Program up with every expec-
tation that it would fail, that they counted on it to fai1--that is, 
to raise expectations which could not possibly be met. And that they 
expected to use those disappointed expectations to raise a cry for a 
stronger utilization research program on the federal level. In a 
sense, this was a maneuver designed to turn certain failure into 
success. By a shrewd early assessment of what the Program could 
reasonably be expected to accomplish, Program administrators had 
seen that if the Program was to succeed it would have to succeed as an 
education program rather than as a research ~nd development program. 
And since they believed in utilization research, they were willing to 
accept this more modest but clearly important goal. They were also 
shrewd enough to suspect that the Nebraska public would not be willing 
to pay for "a program which would not return innnediate economic 
dividends. Consequently, Program personnel did all they could to 
encourage public excitement over the Nebraskit and other research 
products. It looked to the public as though its investment in the, 
Program was paying off. The Program was indeed paying off--but not 
in the way John Q. Public thought.' The projects raised public 
expectations, and raising pubLic expectations vis-a-vis utilization 
research had become a major goal for Program administrators. In their 
view of things it did not really matter if a project ever reached the 
marketing stage: John Q. Public may have .had his eye on the market, 
but the Program had its eye on John Q. He had become the object of a 
massive public education campaign. 
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If politics was the reason that the Program's goals were not 
clearly delineated to the public, it was also the reason that the 
Program was not adequately evaluated. That is to say, the Program 
was not evaluated in terms that would satisfy an educator. In the 
political sphere, a program's success tends to be judged in terms of 
its ability to garner votes for its legislative supporters; 
"evaluation" comes down to a legislator asking himself whether the 
program had a positive press so that he can count on the people back 
home being favorably impressed. And while the Program's admin-
istrators' could not have- shared the senators' reasoning, they too 
depended largely upon the press for feedback about the Program, 
hiring a press clipping service to keep a record of the Program's 
progress. Not that the Department really expected the media to be 
critical. The chief role of the media, as the Department saw it, 
was to provide an avenue for disseminating information about utili-
zation research to the public. The Program's education unit or one 
of the public relations agencies provided copy, and the media 
cooperated by using it. It must be said that the Program enjoyed a 
cooperative, even an enthusiastic press. This happy arrangement 
lasted until 1965, when a reporter for the Lincoln Journal decided to 
do some investigative reporti~g on the Nebraska Program and find out 
for himself precisely what the people of Nebraska were getting for 
their investment. He wanted to know, for instance, exactly how much 
money was being spent and on what, and when and where the Program 
would payoff in the marketplace. The answer to the latter question 
was of course "never. It Department officials were certain that 
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answer would please neither the paper's reporter nor its readers, and 
repaid the reporter's curiosity by declaring him persona non grata. 
Although a full disclosure of spending had been made in 1962, no 
further disclosures were made, and as journalists pressed to take a 
more active role in evaluating the Program, Program officials became 
increasingly reluctant to release information. Strange behavior on 
the part of a program which "welcomed" feedback from the public. 
Letters which the Program received at Department of 
Agriculture offices represented another potential source of feedback, 
but they do not seem to have been seen in this light by Program 
personnel. Public suggestions and comments had been actively 
solicited by Di,ector Finigan, especially at the beginning of the 
Program when Program personnel were looking for research projects. 
The public's response to this invitation to participate in Program 
design was .to broaden into a give-and-take exchange resembling a 
correspondence course for participants. Here, as with media 
coverage, Program personnel showed themselves to be more interested 
in getting the information out than in evaluating public responses. 
Every contact with the public was seen as an opportunity for 
spreading the word about utilization research: little thought was 
given to the possibility of u~ilizing these contacts to provide feed-
back about the Program. 
The single exception to this pattern took place at the state 
and county fair exhibits. Program personnel manned these exhibits, 
and it occurred to so~eone in the Program's education unit that 
friendly chats with passersby could be turned into opportunities to 
• 
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conduct non-directive interviews. Mental files were replaced by nole-
taking which was in turn replaced by a survey sheet. These surveys 
were not, however, very scientific. No attempt was made to extend 
the survey to include the non-fair-going population, and there is no 
evidence that such feedback as was acquired in this way was utilized 
to modify the Program. 
This lack of attention to the business of evaluation is 
particularly surprising when it is recalled that the Program was to 
come up for review after a stated length of time. The material 
describing the Legislature's creation of the Program made no mention 
of evaluation procedures despite the provision for periodic review, 
but as has been noted, legislators have their own methods of judging 
a Program's success. Nor are their methods to be scorned: Homer 
Kempfer, in his book on adult education, cites among informal but 
useful methods of program evaluation "votes at elections, trends in 
vital statistics, and attendance at speeches and group discussions.,,2 
Judging by their reluctance to disappoint public expectations about 
the Program, Program administrators were themselves not a little 
. sensitive to such indicators. 
We have seen that all of the Program's problem areas--friction 
with the University, initial unpreparedness on the part of the admin-
istering agency, political exploitation, failure to communicate goals, 
and inadequate evaluation--have their source in the fact that the 
Program represented a new kind of venture for the administering state 
agency. Even had it accomplished nothing else, the Program would have 
demonstrated the sorts of problems likely to beset a state agency that 
• 
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undertakes an educational venture. Not that all of these problems 
are the-exclusive property of programs conducted under the auspices 
of governmental institutions. For example, an article in the 1970 
Handbook of Adult Education noted vis-a-vis program evaluation that 
"Often evaluation plans are not considered prior to the implemen-
tation of the program. As a result, there are often inadequate 
3 bases from which to determine the success of the program." 
This researcher has suggested that many of these problems 
might have been foreseen and steps taken to prevent or ameliorate 
them. At any rate, if the Nebraska Program is to serve as a model 
for similar education programs, one wants to. adjust the model at the 
points where problems occurred. Some of the adjustments suggest 
themselves: the problem of inadequate evaluation could be avoided by 
setting up evaluation procedures during the planning stages of a 
program. It is also clear that evaluation is not possible without a 
clear statement of a program's desired outcomes. In the case of the 
Nebraska Program, the goals were clear to Program administrators, but 
were not clearly understood by the public. Not that evaluation 
depends upon a public statement of goals: programs designed to change 
attitudes and/or behavior do not often state their purposes in so 
many words. But if evaluation is to become a matter of public 
record, as it clearly must if a program is to be reviewed by a state 
legislature, a clear public statement of goals would seem to be 
imperative • 
Some problems can hardly be avoided--e.g. controversy over who 
should administer a program. In the case of adult education programs, 
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institutions with traditional competence in the field of education 
will resent the competition of agencies whose primary function is 
seen as something other than education. Similarly, when government 
goes into the education business, it is not going to be possible to 
entirely eliminate political pressure. There are steps which might 
be taken to minimize political pressure, but they are not fool-
proof. For example, a bipartisan advisory committee might be created, 
in prder to prevent polarization of support for a program along party 
lines, with one party claiming credit for the program and the other 
trying to sabotage it. (The Nebraska Program did have an advisory 
committee, but it wasn't realistically bipar"tisan.) Another measure 
which might insulate education programs in government from political 
pressure would be the setting up of independent education divisions 
within the administering agencies. Of course, personnel of even 
"independent" divisions are not completely immune from political 
pressures. Further, if one is going to be concerned about the 
philosophical bias of established educational organizations, an 
education division of a state agency is going to be no less suscee-
tible to bias than, say, the state university. 
It would clearly be impossible to preclude all problems in a 
venture of this sort. Moreover, if the entry of government into the 
field of education and social change is fraught with problems, it is 
also blest with certain advantages. All of the Nebraska Program's 
strengths--funding, personnel, and methodology--can be traced in part 
to the fact that it was a program of state government. For example, 
funding: the Program was initiated by the State Legislature and was 
• 
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generously funded from the outset. Unlike many new education 
programs, it did not have to allocate funds for itself out of 
already-limited resources. 
Similarly, the fact· that the Nebraska Program represented a 
new venture on the part of a state agency was at least partially 
responsible for the way in which its education unit was staffed, 
drawing as it did upon the skills of public administrators, public 
relations and information officers, and professional adult 
educators. Some of these personnel were transferred from other 
duties in the Department of Agriculture; others were new recruits. 
In any· event, it never occurred to the Department that the work of 
the education unit should be entrusted to educators alone. One of 
the results was that the education unit functioned initially as a 
sort of public relations agency for the Program, and while it quite 
properly moved beyond this public relations function, public 
relations skills continued to be important throughout the Program. 
This is not surprising: Roger Axford has observed that the true 
adult educator is: 
•• a person who could just as well have been with an 
advertising agency •••• An honest-to-goodness adult 
educator is ready, willing and anxious to have his ideas 
duplicated, emulated, replicated or even stolen.. 4 
Furthermore, adult education programs have long had to employ promo-
tional tactics as an integral part.of their structure--e.g. in the 
"selling" of programs to potential participants. In this, the 
Nebraska Program was no different. Potential participants in the 
New Crops program or in farm organization discussion groups on utili-
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zation research needed to be "sold" on the Program. When Boyle & 
Johns, in an article in the 1970 Handbook of Adult Education, caution 
about public relations tactics in adult education, they are 
discussing a kind of public relations which the Program soon out-
grew: 
Public relations efforts, even though of an educational 
nature, are usually intended to generate support for the 
agency. Consequently, they are illustrative of an adminis-
trative or maintenance function directed toward a popu-
lation external to the agency •••• 5 
While certain of the education unit's activities did in fact serve 
to generate support for ·the Department and even for the Governor and 
his administration, the general thrust of the Program could scarcely 
be called "maintenance," directed as it was at social and economic 
change. 
Levin and Slavet, in Continuing Education: State Programs 
for the 1970's, speak of programs like the Nebraska Program in terms 
of the rise of a new profession. They contrast the traditional 
approach to education in state government, which was conducted 
through public information officers and served primarily to promot~ 
particular agencies, with what they see as a new professionalism. 
The "new profession" of state agency education places its emphasis 
upon substantive education and requires· the related skills of public 
administration, adult education, and public communication, as well as 
6 familiarity with the substance of state agency programs. This is 
in fact quite a good description of the Nebraska Program's education 
unit. 
Besides the public administrators transferred from othe.r 
I 
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department duties and the public relations individual hired at the 
outset of the Program, the education unit recruited a number of 
professional adult educators. Professional adult program personnel 
have not been plentiful in the past. Only a few universities 
trained these individuals, who were then faced with very narrow 
employment opportunities. As more attention has been focused on 
providing adult programs in society, more professionals are becoming 
available. At the time the Nebraska Program was initiated, there was 
no Department of Adult Education at the University of Nebraska; 
there was, however, a handful of individuals in the Education and 
Agriculture Departments who were attempting .to specialize in adult 
education programs. This small group was drawn upon to form the 
nucleus of the Nebraska Program's education unit (a list of personnel 
is included in Appendix A). One man was usually depended upon to 
suggest another. On the face of it, this procedure might smack of 
parochialism, for well-trained personnel might also have been found 
outside state boundaries. In point of fact, hiring practices were 
influenced by a belief that Nebraskans "knew the territory" better., 
and of course, by politics: qualified adult educators who not inci-
dentally were good Democrats recommending other good Democrats. 
Strong in funding and personnel; it is not surprising that 
the Program's education unit went to work with a will, developing a 
formidable array of educational methodology. It tried just about 
\ 
everything except offering a formal course in the subject of utili-
zation research--an important exclusion, reflecting perhaps an adult 
educator's philosophical bias against the methods of formal 
t 
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education, or perhaps the ad-hoc nature of the education unit and the 
resources available to it. It was clearly not possible for the 
education unit to hold formal classes in utilization/research for an 
entire state, and responses to this investigator's surveys revealed 
that while the vast majority of legislators had received information 
about the Program directly from the Department of Agriculture, the 
citizens had' received all of theirs second hand, catch-as-catch-can 
via print and electronic media, state fair displays, discussion 
groups and word-of-mouth. 
While certain physical constraints--e.g. available personnel 
and size of the target group--were operative, there was also good 
theoretical basis in the literature of adult education for this 
informal, catch-as-catch-can approach. For example, in its concen-
tration upon agricultural workers, the Program was directing its 
efforts toward a group of low socio-economic status whose formal 
education was comparatively low. The author of an article entitled 
"The Influence of Social Class Behavior upon Adult Education Par tic-
ipation" reported that persons of low socio-economic status prefer 
informal participation in activities of an educational nature to 
7 formal. Verner and Booth, in their text on adult education, 
confirmed this preference for-informal participation: they reported 
that 60% of the population, irrespective of economic status, does not 
take part in the organized group life of a community, although there 
is a high rate of informal participation. S This is borne out by 
responses to this researcher's survey, which revealed that fully 50% 
of the citizens who had participated in group discussions of the 
I 
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Nebraska Program had participated in informal, rather than formal 
groups. Responses to the survey also confirmed dramatically the 
utility of the media as an avenue of informal education. It should be 
noted here that the Nebraska Program's use of the medi~especially the 
newspapers, to transmit educational content, antedated by a full 
decade the University of California's pioneering experiment in 
offering college courses via newspaper. 
Researchers in the field of public attitudes point out the 
importance of the role of opinion leaders. The Nebraska Program's 
education unit tried to reach opinion leaders by making a special 
effort to proselytize for the Program among farm group leaders. This, 
however, ignored. that group of opinion leaders who are not formal 
leaders and who are consequently difficult for educators to identify 
and influence. Here again reliance on the media as the chief avenue 
of education paid off. As Katz and Lazarsfeld have pointed out, 
informal opinion leaders: 
• • • tend to be the audience of mass media who then dissem-
inate the information gathered to those whose opinion they 
influence. Such leaders are not readily identified, therefore 
adult educators cannot work through them directly. By 
judicious use of mass media, through which information can be 
diffused to opinion leaders as well as to potential partic-
ipants, the importance of adult education can be amplified. 9 
. 
Fully 25% of the citizen respondents to this investigator's survey 
cited "word-of-mouth" as a source of at least some of their infor-
mation about the Program. It would seem that informal opinion 
leaders were at work here picking up information about the Program 
from the media and "disseminating the information gathered to those 
whose opinion they influence." 
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The importance of individual participation in the learning 
process is axiomatic in contemporary education theory. Further, group 
self-help activiti~s are considered a social virtue--especially in the 
American heartland. The Nebraska Program itself was originally 
conceived of as a self-help program, and the Program's education unit 
provided numerous opportunities for citizen participation: the 
New Crops program, group discussions, and state fair displays which 
required the individual to take part rather than remaining a spec-
tator. Many of the state fair displays were mechanical or electronic 
and operated in the manner of teaching machines. Responses to this 
researcher's citizen survey revealed that 20'7. of respondents had 
received at least part of their information about the Program via 
these participatory fair displays. Another 60% of the citizen 
respondents had participated in a discussion group of some sort. 
Participation in the New Crops branch of the Program was particularly 
gratifying to Program administrators, especially considering the fact 
that this phase of the Program was seriously understaffed. The 
increase in acreage planted to three of the new crops was dramatic: 
, 
CASTORBEANS 1960 153,000 acres 
1970 2,000,000 acres 
SOYBEANS 1960 150 acres 
·1970 824 acres 
l SAFFLOWER 1960 3 acres 
1970 86 acres. lO 
The Program's other industrial crops, although introduced and grown 
on private acreage, remained primarily experimental. Guar, for 
example, proved to be unsuitable for Nebraska's growing season. It 
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should be noted that the New Crops branch of the Program appeared to 
be the best evaluated, probably because it was the easiest to 
evaluate, involving no more than a comparison of acreage figures 
available from other sources. 
By way of conclusion, one might recall Arthur Garner's 
observation that: 
Almost every department of every level of government is 
actively engaged in adult education, yet within the govern-
mental structure itself there is little awareness of the 11 
extent to which government is involved in adult education. 
The Nebraska Department of Agriculture, as it existed prior to 1959, 
bore out this observation. It had given little thought to the 
educative aspects of its operations, and although it had a public 
relations officer in its employ, her role was seen largely as 
promotion of the agency. When the Department assumed administration 
of the Nebraska Program in 1959 it was breaking new ground, moving 
beyond its traditional service capacities to a position of advocacy. 
It found itself serving as an education agency and operating, as it 
were, within the context of what Malcolm Knowles has called a 
12 developmental philosophy--education as a means to an end. Kidd 
would call the same philosophy "reconstructionist," which he sees as 
deriving from Progressivism--educational goals derived from 
national purposes, while social processes provide the context for 
1 . 13 earnl.ng. The Nebraska Program's goals were nothing if not derived 
from national purposes: its ultimate goal was nothing more nor less 
than the socio-economic well-being of citizens--and education, 
directed toward reordering p:iiorities in agricultural research, was 
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seen as the means to that end. Further, the educative work of the 
Nebraska Program clearly went on within a context of social 
processes. Those processes had been at work eroding the socio-
economic well-being of the nation's agricultural population, eroding 
as well the agricultural worker's sense of self: the most efficient 
agricultural workers in the world had not only lost status as an 
indus,try, but had also been baffled and hurt by public resentment of 
farm price supports and rising consumer prices for agricultural 
products. Social processes had made the Program necessary and social 
processes ensured it an ,interested and highly motivated clientele. 
'The success of the Nebraska Program in educating its target 
groups--and the ,size of the investment made by the State of Nebraska 
in this education venture--bodes well for similar programs. Adult, 
educators, after decades of existing on marginal finances usually 
earned on a self-supporting basiS, may find that their time has 
finally arrived. Impressed with the practical results a successful 
adult education program can show, government may be more willing to 
devote tax monies to adult education programs, and the clientele o{ 
adult education may be vastly expanded. If this should prove to be 
the case, the Nebraska Agricultural Products Industrial Utilization 
Research Program (Nebraska Program) should be examined as a model for 
future government agency education programs. 
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Program Personnel 
Behind the phrase "Program administrators" is a group of able 
and energetic men who deserve to be described more fully. 
PEARLE F. FINIGAN: After his appointment as Director of 
Agriculture and Inspection by Governor Brooks in January 1959, 
Finigan took strong administrative control. He exhibited enthusiasm, 
ability, and perceptiveness as to what the Nebraska Program could do 
for Nebraska, for agriculture and its problems, and for the Brooks 
Administration. His leadership of the Research Advisory Committee 
became almost total, since he was the only one to have a day-to-day 
relationship with the Program. He negotiated research contracts, with 
the recommendations of his staf~ and therefore knew the complete 
details of all work. The committee then was filled in on the details 
arid usually approved contracts on the basis of Finigan's recom-
mendations. ' This was not to say that the committee was entirely 
useless, but to demonstrate Director-Chairman Finigan's control and 
to further point out that the "advisory" role was somewhat reversed. 
Finigan was showing himself to be a developing master poli-
,tician as well as a competent administrator. In a year and a half he 
had become so well known that he was considered "in the running" for 
United States Secretary of Agriculture if'John F. Kennedy was elected 
in the 1960 presidential election. Mr. Finigan seemed to possess all 
the qualifications Mr. Kennedy specified. Actually, Director Finigan 
stood about seventh in line for the job, and when a man of higher 
rank and of ' more strategic political value, Governor Orville Freeman 
of Minnesota, got the job (despite Nebraska Governor Frank B. 
c 
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Morrison's ardent support for his Director of Agriculture), Finigan 
was appointed to head the Nebraskans for Kennedy 'organization. 1 
Finigan would no doubt have accepted the position of 
Secretary of Agriculture, had it been offered to him. It was a high 
office. It would have continued a rapid rise in politics and, as a 
cabinet office, would certainly have made good references for an 
elective term in a state or national legislative body or office. 
Further, and most important to this analysis, he would have been in 
a position to strongly back the cause of federal assumption of the 
burden of utilization research in the field of agriculture. His 
selection and the loss of his services would have been a tactical blow 
to the Nebraska Program, but a strategic victory for the cause. One 
of the goals of the Program, a recognition of the importance of and 
need for increased utilization research, would surely have been 
closer to realization. 
Finigan apparently decided that his future and the Program's 
success did not lie with his acceptance of certain jobs within the 
Federal Government. Several times from 1960 to 1963 he was offered 
. positions by the Federal Government such as the Food-For-Peace 
directorship which George McGovern of South Dakota left in order to 
run for Congress. But Finigan-would consider only a top job, 
preferably in the USDA as an assistant on utilization research to the 
Secretary of Agriculture. He refused all other offers of payment for 
his work for Kennedy. Governor Morrison and other individuals and 
groups continued to promote Finigan2 from the time he was considered 
for the cabinet position until the Kennedy Administration (and most 
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of Nebraska's White House contacts) crumbled with Kennedy's death in 
3 November 1963. It should also be noted here that Finigan was 
considered for the Nebraska Democratic Party's Senatorial nomination 
which the late Governor Brooks was certain to have tried for in the 
November 1960 Congressional election. However, because of personal or 
political considerations Finigan did not make the bid, and the 
Nebraska Program retained its top administrator at a crucial time. 4 
Finigan was reappointed by Morrison in both 1961 and 1963, both 
seemingly content with their relationship and the progress of their 
and the Program's fortunes. Finigan continued to gain luster and 
stature state- and nation-wide as a result of the Nebraska Program, 
being elected to_the National Chemurgic Council's Board of Directors 
in December 19625 and to the Vice Presidency of the North-Central 
Association of State Departments of Agriculture in June 1963. 6 In 
this instance the situation made the man, not to neglect the point 
that Finigan gave a commendable account of himself as an individual, 
politician, and administrator. He proved himself a Democrat for 
Republicans to contend with if he moved on to other things from a 
-Program which had made his name known--even popular--with the public. 
In 1962 a University of Nebraska senior wrote an in-depth 
study of Director Finigan and his directlon of the Nebraska Department 
of Agriculture and its Program. Though slightly dramatic, the 
lengthy newspaper article won a national journalism award for the 
student, Mr. Norman Beatty, and the University's Journalism School. 
Mr. Beatty had access to a great amount of information about Finigan, 
the Department of Agriculture, the Nebraska Program, and the 
"'! 
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political state of affairs, for he was employed in a part-time 
position by RaIl and Raglin, Incorporated, one of the agencies 
handling Program Rublic relations for the Department of Agriculture. 
A large number of Nebraska newspapers carried the article, some in 
condensed or serial form. Whatever the form, it gave immense 
publicity to Finigan and the Nebraska Program, furthering the image 
of both through the positive and sometimes dramatic style of the 
author. 7 
Staff 
At the time the Program was initiated, no special division 
was set up within the Department of Agriculture to carry out the work 
of Program administration. This workload was assumed by the 
Director's staff. All department divisions and offices Were expected 
to contribute personnel and material, and all personnel were 
expected to put forth effort for the furtherance of the Program. In 
the early days of the Program, the only people formally identified 
as having responsibility for the Program were the Department 
Director (as Research Committee Chairman) and an individual whose 
job it was to serve as "research coordinator. 1I The education unit 
moved around to different locations within the Department, finally 
finding its home in the assistant director's office and ultimately in 
the research coordinator's office. 
Finigan gathered around him a young, dynamic staff, many of 
whom were still engaged in getting their education. They were loyal, 
ambitious, and intelligent. 'At the end of 1963 most of these 
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personnel working directly with the Program held designated official 
positions within the department as assistant directors, special 
assistants, consultants, division chiefs, or field men. A total of 
nine full-time individuals were most readily identifiable. Four held 
college bachelor degrees, four held masters degrees, one held a law 
degree. Of these, four were former full or part-time teachers, three 
were part-time college students (one of these was pursuing his 
doctorate), and one was a former reporter. They were assisted by 
other university undergraduate and graduate students hired part-time 
from the fields of Education, Political Science, Agriculture, and 
Law. Director Finigan held firm control. Assistant Directors 
LEON W. KREINER {January 1960-July 1962) and JEFFERSON R. BROADY 
(July 1962-December 1966) handled duties ranging from routine day-to-
day Program matters to some long-range planning, but generally 
existed to lighten the load on the Director as far as smooth operation 
of the Department was concerned as it administered, among its varied 
responsibilities, the Nebraska Program. Although overshadowed by 
Director Finigan, assistant directors were intelligent, competent, 
- shrewd individuals, loyal to the Program and confident of its success. 
ROGER L. LANGENHEIM was perhaps one of the most unsung 
influential individuals involved in the administration of the 
Program. Certainly he was as responsible for the Program's 
development and progress as Director Finigan, for Finigan relied 
heavily on this man's advice. Langenheim was a student attending his 
final year at the University of Nebraska's College of Law and working 
part-time as a reporter for a Lincoln, ,braska newspaper when the 
I 
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Program was initiated. He took an interest in what he considered to 
be a Program with far-reaching implications, and supported it with 
the "power of the press." He was consequently hired away from his 
reporter's job by Finigan and put to work examining research 
proposals submitted to the Department by laboratories and gathering 
extensive information on such research. Langenheim soon became a 
much~re1ied upon individual in the Program's administration, 
ultimately earning the title of Research Coordinator. Within this 
designation from January to May 1960 he occupied a position similar 
to the assistant director, but did not have as a primary duty 
anything to do with department operation. His first concern was 
administration of the Program. Langenheim maintained an advisory role 
in the Program even upon moving from the Department to.employment with 
a law firm in Kansas City, Missouri, for the firm was the very one 
which handled the Program's account in its contracts with the Midwest 
Research Institute of Kansas City. Langenheim's influence could be 
considered strong in project considerations and development work 
through 1964; he was in effect carrying out the role of the advisory 
committee. In point of fact, it can be stated that he was the only 
person outside of the director and assistant director who devoted 
some time to the important "development" part of the Program: the 
introduction of research results into industry and the commercial· 
ization of patents. Finigan continued to respect Langenheim's 
advice even as distances, communication, and relationships changed 
from 1960 to 1966. 
Because of the above unusual relationship of Mr. Langenheim to 
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the Program, this gentleman was later accused of conflict-of-
interest by political opponents of the Program and its admin-
istrators. These ~ntagonists accused Langenheim, apparently 
,correctly, of being a paid lobbyist in the State of Nebraska's 
Legislature for a western cattle firm at the same time he was a full-
time lawyer in Kansas City and working on the State of Nebraska's 
Department of Agriculture payroll--an involved situation to say the 
least and one which could possibly sustain the charge. Whatever its 
negative aspects, it should not overshadow the fact that the Nebraska 
Program owed much to the labor of Mr. Langenheim, a fact which will 
probably remain little known. 
Other individuals involved in administering the Program were: 
DONALD L. DOESCHER, a dynamic, intelligent individual who 
assumed the title of Research Coordinator after Mr. Broady vacated 
the position when he succeeded Mr. Kreiner as Assistant Director. 
(Broady had originally succeeded Langenheim as Research Coordinator.) 
Doescher was capable of great flexibility in handling a variety of 
"trouble-shooting" duties in regard to Program administration and 
-department operation. 
R. HAROLD MARKS, information and publications supervisor of 
the Department, moved from the-Department's Resources Division to 
the director's staff in June 1960. He was a competent and meticulous 
journalist by training, and handled the press and public relations 
duties so important to the Progra'm' s acceptance and progress. 
ELLSWORTH R. CARLSON and ARTHUR E. HABERLAN, the New Crops 
,managers. Carlson rose from an inspector's job with the Weed and 
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Seed Division of the Department to chief of that division, which was 
to handle the field activities of the New Crops part of the Program. 
Haberlan became chief field agent for the New Crops effort under 
Carlson. Together these two practical, amiable Nebraskans, who took 
intense pride in their work, created a warm working relationship 
with a skeptical University of Nebraska, the diverse farm groups, and 
other individuals whom they had contact with throughout the state. 
RAYMOND M. SNYDER, a scholarly, well-read individual whose 
in,te11igence and interest in the Program gained the notice of the 
department's Program staff and raised him from an obscure position in 
the Department to the director's staff in 1963. 
These individuals, together with numerous department 
personnel, outside resource people, and university student help, put 
together an educative effort which included an example research 
program that lasted nearly eight years. 
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Dear Fellow Nebraskan, 
This nation is aware that American agricultural workers have 
been extremely effective in the production of agricultural raw 
materials. In fact, so successful has the production effort been 
that a large surplus of such materials has accumulated. In view of 
this fact, the State of Nebraska initiated a program during the 
1960's which attempted to deal with the problem of surpluses. The 
program worked to change the priorities of the public, the Congress, 
the USDA, and the colleges of agriculture from an emphasis on 
production to one of utilization. Using the dramatic results of 
small research projects, and utilizing educational methods, the 
Nebraska Program tried to present itself as such a powerful example 
of what utilization research could do that no group or institution 
could resist the lobby of are-awakened, re-educated public. 
A sample, of which you are an important part, is being taken 
of selected groups among the public. The enclosed questionnaire is 
a part of that sample, and is designed to find out how well the 
Nebraska Program presented itself to the public-and how successful 
it was in its methods and aims. Your answers will represent the 
thinking of several hundred of your fellow citizens. It is believed 
that governmental agencies wishing to conduct similar programs in this 
or other states will benefit by responses to studies of this kind. 
The public's interest will be served by government's knowledge of how 
the public accepts and reacts to such programs which attempt to 
solve societal problems. Better programs can then be constructed and 
pursued with the interest and active support of the individual 
citizen. 
The questionnaire is strictly anonymous. If you sign your 
name to any comments, it will be held in confidence. The answers will 
be used to compile statistical totals. The value of the study will be 
increased if you will give careful thought to each answer and return 
the form to me as promptly as possible. 
time. 
Thank you for taking a moment from the numerous demands on your 
Sincerely, 
Kent Murray 
Ph.D. Candidate 
University of Nebraska 
CITIZEN QUESTIONNAIRE * NO NAME PLEASE 
ALL ANSWERS ARE COMPILED AS STATISTICS 
1 *1 lived in or around Omaha, Grand Island, Ge'neva, Bridgeport, 
Nebraska during the 1960's. CIRCLE CORRECT CITY. 
2 *If you did not live in one of the above named areas during the 
1960' s. WRITE IN CITY AND STATE LIVED IN: 
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3 *1 was out of the State of Nebraska during the following years of 
the 1960's: 
STATE YEARS: 
4 *Occupation ______________ -c Age ______ ~ ____ Sex ________________ __ 
5 *1 consider my work directly related to agriculture. 
YES 40% NO 60% .• 
6 *If not directly related to agriculture, I. consider my work 
related to the fortunes of agriculture. YES 74% NO 27% 
7 *Do you recali a state program during the 1960's called the 
NEBRASKA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INDUSTRIAL UTILIZATION 
RESEARCH PROGRAM (AGRESEARCH)? YES 48% NO 52% 
IF YOU DO NOT RECALL THE NEBRASKA PROGRAM, PLEASE RETURN THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE NOW WITHOUT ANSWERING THE REST OF THE QUESTIONS. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. 
8 *The Nebraska Department of Agriculture administered the Nebraska 
Program during the 1960's to change the priority of the public, 
the Congress, and the USDA by education and example from an 
emphasis on production to one of utilization in regard to agri-
cultural raw ~aterials. CHECK THE PROJECT YOU REMEMBER HEARING 
ABOUT: 
NEBRASKIT 68% GROWTH STIMULATORS 24% 
MILK BARS 32% INSULATION FROM STRAW & COBS~ 
PAPER FROM CORN STARCH 28% TANNED HIDES UTILIZATION 20% 
PAINT FROM SOYBEANS 28% CASTORBEANS 32% 
WRAPPING & COOKING FILM 20% SAFFLOWER 44% 
INDUSTRIAL FOAMS 04% GHAR 16% 
AUTO FUEL FROM GRAIN 64% NONE OF THESE 00% 
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9 *1 supported the Program described above. CHECK APPROPRIATE 
BLOCK: 
17% 57% 26% QCIl6 QCIl6 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
10 *If you supported the Program, how? Vocal support 48% ,Wrote 
letter to newspaper 04% ,Wrote letter to state legislator 04% , 
Voted for candidates that supported the Program 37% 
Other (State) 07% 
11 *During the .1960's the Nebraska Program attempted to get 
Nebraskans to support a program of utilization research to find 
new crops and:!!§g ~ for agricultural products as strong as the 
state's very successful production research program locatedin~ 
the University of Nebraska College of Agriculture. Do you agree 
that utilization research needed more emphasis? 
22% 57% 22% 00% 00l! 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
12 *One of the goals of the "New Uses" branch of the Program was to 
draw industry into Nebraska to produce the new products. 1-
supported this goal. 
27% 59% 09% 00% 05% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
13 *1 had an opportunity to test actual products such 
milk bars, and corn paper. YES 17% NO 83% 
TESTED: 
-----------------
as Nebraskits, 
STATE PRODUCT 
14 *1 participated in evaluating the Nebraska Program. YES 05% 
NO 96% State method of evaluation: SURVEY.-;:;-__ _ 
INTERVIDI MACHINE TEST QUESTIONNA1RE~ __ _ 
OTHER (STATE) ___ __ 
15 *How did you get information on the Nebraska Program? FARM 
ORGANIZATION 24% NDlSPAPER 76% MAGAZINE 32% RADIO 26% 
T. V. 40% WORD OF MOUTH 26% SPEAKER 00% PRINTED 
PAMPHLETS 00% COUNTY OR STAT;: FAIR DISPLAY 20% CONTACT WITH 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
AGRESEARCH PROGRAM 00% 
16 '~hat groups did you participate in that discussed the utili-
zation research projects and products part of the Nebraska 
Program? FARM BUREAU 16% . GRANGE 04% FARMER'S UNION 04% 
NFO 00% FAMILY 08% SCHOOL 08% INFORMAL GROUP 24% 
OTHER 20% 
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17 *What groups did you participate in that discussed the New Crops 
part of the Nebraska Program? (STATE): FannBureau=16% Grange =04% 
Other = 12% 
18 *Considering all the 
listed in questions 
ENOUGH INFORMATION 
I CARED FOR 00% 
sources of information on the Nebraska Program 
15, 16, & 17, do you feel that you got: 
39% TOO LITTLE INFORMATION 68% MORE THAN 
19 *Do you.remember considering this information as: EDUCATIONAL 68% 
POLITICAL 00% BOTH 18% NEITHER 14% 
20 *Studies of the public during the late 1960's and early 1970's 
reported a distrust of information produced and distributed by 
the Federal Government. I trusted the information coming from my 
state government agencies on such subjects as agricultural 
production, utilization, and education. 
23% 59% 09% 09% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
21 *1 trusted the following agencies or organizations for information. 
CHECK AGENCIES: Nebraska Department of Agriculture 64% 
Nebraska Department of Economic Development 40% The Nebraska 
Governor's Office 32% The Media (newspapers, radio, T.V._,. 
newsmagazines, etc.) 56% 
22 *1 would have placed more confidence in information about utili-
zation,' utilization research, and the Nebraska Program if it had 
been given out by private laboratories contracted with by the 
State of Nebraska. 
22% 17% 30% 26% 04% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
23 *1 would have placed more confidence in such information if it 
had been given out by University of Nebraska College of Agri-
culture laboratories. 
22% 35% 22% 22% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
24 *1 would have liked more educational information about utili-
zation, utilization research, and the Nebraska Program to have 
been prepared and issued to the people of Nebraska. 
32% 59% 09% 00% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
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25 *1 would now consider Jo~ning a discussion group or study group 
formed by an organization such as the state educational agencies 
(NU), the farm organizations, the Elks, the Rotary, a labor 
union, social, church, or library club, etc., to better educate 
myself about utilization research, resulting increased farm 
opportunities, and jobs from new industry in Nebraska cities. 
10% 35% 35% 15% 05% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
26 *The Nebraska~rogram and its $300,000 per year were taken from 
the. Nebraska Department of Agriculture by the Legislature in 
1967. The research projects continue at a reduced rate in the 
Nebraska Department of Economic Development because of reduced 
funding. The implementation of research findings (applications 
.such as the Gasahol Car) was given to an independent Committee of 
the Nebraska Legislature and continues at a reduced level. 
26a *The old Nebraska Program was better with many, 
diverse projects, top priority, and $300,000 
per year. 
-18% 23% 55% 00% 05% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
26b *The reduced program is better with fewer projects, 
reduced priority, and $68,000 per year. 
00% 11 % 53% 21 % 16% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/UndecidedjDisagree/Strongly Disagree 
27 *In 1972 certain Nebraska Senators in the State Legislature stated 
that the Legislature almost to a man would give a utilization 
research and education program all the money it requested. Do 
you agree with this attitude? 
00% 18% 41% 36% 05% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
28 *Nebraska utilization research and education programs located out-
side the University of Nebraska College of Agriculture in other 
agencies such as the Committee of the Legislature or the 
Department of Economic Development should be cancelled altogether. 
05% 05% 41% 36% 14% 
Strongly Agree!Agree!Undecided!Disagree!Strongly Disagree 
YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO USE THE REST OF THIS PAGE AND THE BACK OF IT 
TO MAKE COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS OR TO "LET OFF STEAM" ABOUT THE 
NEBRASKA PROGRAM. YOU MAY SIGN YOUR NAME IF YOU WISH TO MAKE THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND THESE COMMENTS A MORE PERSONAL REPLY, BUT YOUR 
SIGNATURE WILL BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. 
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, THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR TIME. PLEASE MAIL THIS FORM BACK AS SOON 
AS POSSIBLE. 
COVER LETTER FOR LEGISLATOR QUESTIONNAIRE 226 
TO: Present or Former Nebraska Legislator 
SUBJECT: Research Survey 
Dear Sir/Madame, 
The Legislature of the State of Nebraska initiated an effort 
during the 1959-1967 time period known as the Nebraska Agricultural 
Products Industrial Utilization Research Program. It was admin-
istered by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture. Using the 
dramatic results of small research projects, and utilizing educa-
tional methods,the Nebraska Program tried to present itself as such 
a powerful example of what utilization research could do that Congress, 
the USDA, and the colleges of agriculture could not resist the lobby 
of are-awakened, re-educated public. Nothing less than a complete 
change of priority from production to utilization was expected. 
Records indicate that you were a member of the Nebraska 
Legislature during the 1960's. The purpose of the enclosed question-
naire is to determine how well the Program presented itself and how 
successful it was in its methods and aims. As a legislator, you are 
one of a small but influential group of opJnion leaders who also have 
some control over efforts of this kind; therefore your opinions are 
important. It is believed that governmental agencies wishing to 
conduct similar programs in this or other states will benefit by 
your responses to studies of this kind. The public's interest will 
be served by your evaluation of this effort which attempted to 
solve the societal problem of agricultural surpluses. Better 
programs can then be constructed and pursued, emulating the Nebraska 
Program's successes and avoiding its failures. 
The questionnaire is strictly anonymous. If you sign your 
name to any comments, it will be held in confidence. The answers 
will be used to compile statistical totals. Since there are only a 
few legislators, the value of the study will be increased if you will 
give careful thought to each answer and return the form to me as soon 
as possible. A similar questionnaire is being sent to selected 
sections of the public. 
Thank you for taking a moment from the numerous demands on 
your time. 
Sincerely, 
Kent Murray 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Unive'rsity of Nebraska 
LEGISLATOR QUESTIONNAIRE * NO NAME PLEASE 
ALL ANSWERS ARE COMPILED AS STATISTICS 
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1 *1 was a member of the Nebraska Legislature during the years ____ _ 
2 *1 supported the 1959-1967 State of Nebraska AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
INDUSTRIAL UTILIZATION RESEARCH PROGRAM (AGRESEARCH). 
56% 44% 00% 00% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
3 *1 supported the Nebraska Program: Vocally 33% Supported 
governor who ran on his record as a strong supporter of the 
program 19% Wrote newspaper letter or article 00% Made 
speeches in favor to constituents 00% By votes in Legis-
lature 33% Other. (State) __ -'oo-'-'%:...-______________ __ 
Did not support _-'O~O~%~ ______ _ 
4 *While I was a legislator, my constituents asked me to 
17% 83% 00% the Nebraska Program. 
Strongly Support/Support/Not Support 
5 *My talks out in the state ran ~~3~8~%~-r~~6~<%~ __ 77~00~%~~~~00~%~­
Strongly/In Favor/Against/Strongly the Nebraska Program. 
In Favor Against 
6 *1 received most of my information on the Nebraska Program via: 
Newspaper 60% Radio 05% TV 04% Directly from Nebraska 
Department of Agriculture personnel 60% Lobpyists 15% 
Indirectly from Biennial Reports or pamphlets and releases of 
Department of Agriculture 25% Constituents 15% My own staff 
10% Other senators 25% Other (State) 15% --~~------------
7 *Over the period of time I was .in the Legislature, the information 
I received about the Nebraska Program made my attitude toward the 
Program: More Positive 72% More Negative 28% (The 
attitude toward it I began with was: Positive 100% 
Negative 00% .) 
8 *Most of the information I received about utilization, utilization 
research, new crops, and the 1959-1967 Nebraska Program was of an 
objective educational and informational nature: 
05% 84% 05% 05% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strong1y Disagree 
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9 *Most of the information I received about utilization, utili-
zation research, new crops, and the Nebraska Program was political 
and not objectively educational: 
00% 16% II % 58% 16% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
10 *What Nebraska Program projects do you recall? Growth stim-
ulators 45% The Nebraskit 60% Corn starch paper 40% 
Auto fuel from grain 90% Wrapping and cooking films 50% 
Industrial foams 30% Soybean paint 15% Milk Bars 15% 
Castorbeans 60% Safflower 60% Guar 15% Utilization of 
tanned hides 15% Insulation from straw 25% 
11 *Besides developing New Uses for agricultural raw materials, 
introducing New Crops, and attracting New Industry, the Nebraska 
Program of 1959-1967 tried to educate Nebraskans to support 
utilization research efforts equal to or greater than production 
research in order to lower the agricultural surpluses. The _ 
Program succeeded: Nebraskans will support increased utilization 
research programs • 
.05% 75% 15% 05% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
12 *Leaving aside the question of whether the Nebraska Program 
changed public attitudes, I agree that it at least made 
Nebraskans and the national public more aware of utilization 
research: 
20% 75% 05% 00% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
13 *It was hoped during the 1960's that the re-education of the 
Nebraska public or a wider public to support utilization research, 
and the demonstrated success of Nebraska Program-sponsored utili-
zation research projects, could be used with whatever national 
public help could be gained to pressure Congress, the USDA, and 
the production-oriented colleges of agriculture to support and 
undertake more utilizat'ion research. Was this pressure effective 
with Congress? 
05% 52% 19% 24% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
with USDA? 
05% 38%' 38% 19% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
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with Colleges 
05% 43% 33% 19% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
14 *Leaving aside the question of whether the Program succeeded as a 
pressure tactic, I agree that the Federal Government was at least 
aware of the Nebraska Program. 
10% 70% 10% 10% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
15 *The current Nebraska Legislature will support utilization research 
and education programs: 
14% 64% 18% 05% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
16 *What current Legislature support exists is a result of the 
1959-1967 Nebraska Program. 
00% 33% 33% 3,% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
17 *The old 1959-1967 Nebraska Program was better with many, diverse 
projects, top priority and $300,000 per year: 
05% 33% 24% 33% 05% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
18 *The new reduced program is better with fewer projects, reduced 
priority and only $68,000 per year: 
00% 40% 25% 30% 05% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
19 *The old 1959-1967 Nebraska Program was given $300,000 per year. 
This was adequate. 
10% 52% 14% 24% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
20 *A Nebraska legislator stated in 1972 that the Nebraska Legis-
lature almost to a man would give utilization research and 
education programs all the mone-y they needed and asked for. Do 
you agree with this statement? 
05% 05% - 00% 59% 32% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
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21 *Shou1d the Nebraska Department of Economic Development be given 
funds and encouragement to reactivate the dormant 1959-1967 
Program utilization research projects? 
09% 41% 27% 18% 05% 
Strongly Agree!Agree!Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
22 *1 feel utilization research and education to reduce agricultural 
surpluses is essential: 
33% 57% 05% 05% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
23 *Utilization research and education is more essential at this time 
than production research and education: 
43% 38% 05% 14% 00% 
Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
·YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO USE THE REST OF THIS PAGE AND THE BACK OF IT TO 
MAKE COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS OR TO "LET OFF STEAM" ABOUT THE 
NEBRASKA PROGRAM. YOU MAY SIGN YOUR NAME IF YOU WISH TO MAKE THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND THESE COMMENTS A MORE PERSONAL REPLY, BUT YOUR 
SIGNATURE WILL BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. 
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR TIME. PLEASE MAIL THIS FORM BACK AS SOON 
AS POSSIBLE. 
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ABSTRACT 
ADULT EDUCATION ASPECTS OF A PROGRAM OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
Kent K Murray, Ph.D. 
University of Nebraska, 1974 
Adviser: Wesley C. Meierhenry 
I think I can see Adult Education deriving great benefit 
from the theorizing and research of the "change theorists" 
now so active. I see our technology being enriched by 
increased understanding of the process of individual, insti-
tutional, and social change, and especially of the phenom-
enon of resistance to change and strategies for helping with 
change. 
Finally I-see an enlargement of the definition of the 
clientele of Adult Education away from a primary focus on 
individuals qua individuals toward a concern also with insti-
tutions, communities, and even larger social systems. I see 
us Adult Educators becoming increasingly concerned with 
improving educative quality of total environments and 
increasingly skillful in planning programs that will accom-
plish this end. 
Malcolm S. Knowles 
Professor and Philosopher of Adult Education 
Adult Leadership 
Fe bruary 1967 
With the passage of LB-722 in 1959, the State of Nebraska 
embarked on one of the most extensiv~ and challenging adult education 
programs of the past decade. LB-722 established the Nebraska 
Agricultural Products Industrial Utilization Research Program 
(Nebraska Program) which in the ~ourse of its ambitious life undertook 
the re-education, first of Nebraska's production-oriented agricultural 
citizens, and then of other agricultural states, the USDA and 
Congress. Seen as an adult education program, the Nebraska Program 
clearly represented the kind of "enlargement of the definition of the 
clientele of adult education" proposed above by Malcolm Knowles. 
This was adult education moving "away from a primary focus on individ-
uals qua individuals toward a concern.also with institutions, 
communities and even" larger social systems." It was education 
functioning within and concerned with a total environment, an environ-
ment whose production-oriented values, and whose success in living up 
to those values, had back-fired resulting in huge and embarrassing 
agricultural surpluses which depressed the market value of agricul-
tural commodities, reducing the agriculture worker's standard of 
living and his status in the eyes of his fellow citizens. Insofar as 
the Nebraska Program attempted to change values and attitudes it also 
functioned as a change agent, finding itself increasingly preoccupied 
with "the phenomenon of resistance to change and strategies for 
helping with change." Resistance to change was rooted in generations 
of emphasis on production and production research. Supporters of the 
Nebraska Program were convinced that utilization research was the 
solution to agriculture's problems: the Programs' educational 
objective was thus a reordering of research priorities and an atten-
uation of the production ethic. 
The size of its clientele and its role as change agent in a 
total socio-economic environment were not the only things which 
distinguished the Nebraska Program. The Program was also distin-
guished by the fact that it was administered, not by a traditional 
educational institution, but by an agency of a state government (the 
Nebraska Department of Agriculture) and in fact saw the state's 
educational institutions as part of its clientele: production-
oriented like the state's citizens, resistant to change, committed to 
maintaining the status quo vis-a-vis agricultural research. 
The Program's name is misleading. It sounded, not like an 
educational program, but like a research and development program. In 
fact, the Nebraska Program was originally conceived as a research and 
development program designed to find new uses for agricultural 
products, and although Program administrators came to see the 
Program's principal business as education, Nebraska citizens and 
their representatives in the State Legislature never ceased to hope 
that the Program would produce marketable products. This misunder-
standing about Program goals was to create problems, particularly in 
the area of program evaluation: seen as an education program 
designed to change attitudes and to reorder priorities in agricul-
tural research, the Nebraska Program was a great success; seen as a 
research and development program, it was disappointing (only one 
product got to the marketing stage). 
Although the agricultural surpluses which gave rise to the 
Nebraska Program have gradually disappeared, the educative work of 
the Program will be of interest to those in the field of adult 
education who are engaged in programs of similar scope, or who are 
involved in education programs conducted by~governmental agencies. 
The Program's problems and omissions, no less than its scope and 
daring, are instructive; in the judgment of this investigator, the 
Nebraska Program provided an exciting laboratory for testing the 
principles of adult education on a large population, and stands as a 
model for programs of similar scope and intent. 
